Thread by @KofmanMichael

Russia’s advance near Dobropillia reflects the broader problematic dynamic, characterized by a lack of cohesive defensive lines, and undermanned units holding terrain, which can result in gradual then seemingly sudden shifts. Thread /1 (DeepStateMap)

The situation is still developing and hopefully will not result in a larger operational breakthrough, but this is a symptom of challenges and problems that many have been speaking to. I sought to cover them in this lengthy thread two weeks ago. /2

https://x.com/KofmanMichael/status/1950998968416215459

Advances around Pokrovsk had been blamed on RF diversionary-reconnaissance groups. But these are often just small assault infantry groups of 2/4/6 men, or motorcycle/buggy groups, which can bypass the porous defensive line if they can get past the drone coverage. 3/

The line is more of a series of pickets, often 2-3 man positions. Much of it is a gray area of overlapping defeat zones covering forward and behind these initial positions. Enemy assault groups seek to get through these positions and keep advancing. 4/

Ukraine has been holding the front with a deficit of infantry, and lack of reserves by depending on drone units. This has bought time, but is not sufficient to stabilize the front, or compensate for more fundamental challenges with force management and force generation. 5/

This recent advance appears to be made by dismounted infantry, and lightly motorized groups. Russian forces have progressed this year, and done so faster, with much lower use of armored fighting vehicles. This is the issue with treating armor availability as a key metric. 6/

This advance cut through a defensive line on the map, which in practice can now mean little, because this is not a war of trenches held by infantry, but of well masked positions for vehicles and small groups of infantry with large gaps in between. 7/

Prepared defenses, mines, still canalize the advance and mapping them is useful, but these lines on a map can also set the wrong expectations given battlefield dynamics. See: 8/

https://x.com/KofmanMichael/status/1950999000636858477

Hence numerous groups of 2-3 men can walk through a porous line, along with buggy or motorcycle assaults, if they are not intercepted by established defeat zones around those positions or AFU drone teams are being suppressed. 9/

Russian forces also used UMPK glide bombs extensively in this direction to help set the conditions for this breakthrough. Contrary to rumors that occasionally crop up here, there has not been a significant reduction in their efficacy. 10/

There are other accounts who do a better job of daily tracking and updates. Suffice it to say information is delayed, there are rumors flying around, but expect the situation to be worse than what is on DeepStateMap. 11/

Its important to also point to a broader problem which is the ‘not one step back’ policy, even when lacking the resources, in disadvantageous terrain, and near envelopment - rather than trading space for attrition or enabling commanders to conduct a mobile defense. 12/

Too often AFU units are forced to maintain untenable positions where the elastic defense is behind their picket positions rather than in front of them. It also leads to false reporting of positions, distrust, and creates perverse incentives that misinform the system. 13/

Another issue is costly counter attacks to regain lost positions, including those which were untenable in the first place, rather than focusing on stabilizing the front. This has led to losses among a steadily shrinking infantry component of the force. 14/

As @Tatarigami_UA writes, a collapse of the front is different in kind from a tactical breakthrough or breach. Could this advance lead to a collapse if mishandled? Yes, it could deteriorate further. But equally, it is too early to make that assessment. 15/

The defense of existing salients will prove even more difficult and this breakthrough can lead to an accelerated withdrawal from those positions. AFU is shifting units to counter the advance, but this is a sign of potentially worse things to come. 16/

From this point it is not difficult to see how this could further affect the defense of Donetsk, endangering Druzhkivka, then Kramatorsk and Slovyansk, especially considering the axis slowly pushing north of Lyman. 17/

Bottom line, its not clear yet how the situation will develop. The next few days will prove telling. But this advance is another indicator that drone units, while critical to the defense, can't fully compensate for observed challenges, or stabilize the front on their own.