Thread by @Mohammad_Fikri_

Is the Arabic Wording of the Qur'an Contingent or Necessary? – Thread 🧵

In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful - ﷽

In this thread, I will respond to the following post insha'Allah:

https://twitter.com/abutalhahashemi/status/1954484014267633985

There exist two different types of possibility according to Ibn Taymiyyah. The first is (i) the possibility of substantial origination, and the second is (ii) the possibility to act. (1/75)

The first type of possibility refers to the fact that it is possible for a non-existent substance to come into existence. This possibility is a real, ontologically positive attribute, and it subsists in a prior material state according to Ibn Taymiyyah. (2/75)

This possibility is what we mean by the term "contingency". The contingency of a substance – that is, the possibility for it to originate – is a sound evidence for its dependency on the Necessary God. (3/75)

Indeed, a possible substance that accepts existence and nonexistence has no existence from its own self. No matter how many substances of this kind you add to a set, the whole set will still depend on an external cause that lies outside of it. (4/75)

Since that cause is outside of the set of all contingent substances, it cannot itself be contingent. Rather, it must be an independent Cause by logical entailment, a Necessary Maker who must exist and cannot possibly not exist. (5/75)

Similarly, the very fact that substances originate, i.e. come into existence and go out of existence in succession, means that they all depend on an eternal Originator who brings them into existence and removes them from existence in succession. (6/75)

The fact that an existing substance is (a) possible (i.e. that it was previously possible for it to originate) and the fact that it is (b) originated after its nonexistence – are two facts that always come together. (7/75)

Each of contingency and substantial origination serve as a sound evidence for the existence of Allah, may He be glorified and exalted. Thus, both evidences can be used interchangeably when arguing for Allah’s existence. (8/75)
youtube.com/shorts/m4Jd2Rb…

Related to the possibility of substantial origination is another more subtle type of contingency. This is specifically the possibility of an attribute to originate, within a given substrate, from external material conditions that lie outside of the substrate. (9/75)

Examples of this contingency include the possible arrangements of the clouds. Indeed, the different arrangements in the cloud substrate are influenced by the different motions of the wind. (10/75)

Another example of this contingency is the possibility of heat increase in a pot of water. The heat energy originates in the water from external material conditions, such as chemical energy in burning fuel. (11/75)

In both examples, energy is "transferred" from one system to another system. The clouds and the water "gain" energy from external surroundings that "lose" energy. (12/75)

This type of contingency, namely the possibility of attributes originating from external conditions, is an equally sound evidence for Allah’s existence, though a less evident one. An eternal Creator is indeed required to explain the energy transformations across systems. (13/75)

Notice that these two types of contingency – (a) the possibility of substantial origination and (b) the possibility of attributes arising in a substance out of external material conditions – apply only to created beings. (14/75)

These two types of contingency do not apply to God’s eternal essence or His uncreated attributes. God is independent, necessary, and self-contained. He does not gain His attributes from an external cause. (15/75)

Due to God’s necessary existence, all of His attributes are likewise necessary and uncreated. None of Allah’s attributes is contingent; they are all necessary without exception. (16/75)

However, this necessity does not preclude God from having multiple, ontologically positive attributes subsisting within His essence. God indeed is a single Creator being who is described with various attributes of perfection, such as power, will and knowledge. (17/75)

Furthermore, the necessity of God’s attributes does not prevent them from being characterized by multiplicity. For example, God’s knowledge of a tree is not identical to His knowledge of a human being. (18/75)

Even more, God possesses a beautiful image. God has two healthy eyes, two maximally blessed hands (with five fingers in each), two shins, and two feet. This is indeed a multiplicity in His attributes, one that does not contradict His necessity and independence. (19/75)

All this multiplicity in the divine attributions, which philosophers refer to as a "composition", is both necessary and uncreated. It does not depend on an external specifier that determines it one way or another. (20/75)

This is unlike the multiplicity that exists in the universe. The universe is a collection of distinct atoms that are subject to rearrangement and substantial change, and the evolution of the universe is not physically deterministic. (21/75)

Thus, unlike God who does not depend on an external maker, the universe needs an external Creator who guides it all along, a Specifier who continuously selects one arrangement over the other physically possible arrangements. (22/75)

But what about Ibn Taymiyyah’s second type of "possibility" that was mentioned in the beginning of the thread, namely (ii) the possibility to act? Does God possess this kind of possibility, or is it also impossible for God? (23/75)

The answer is that God must possess this second type of possibility. Even if one refers to this possibility as a "contingency", the fact remains that a God who is a locus for this possibility is more perfect than a God who is not. (24/75)

Indeed, the possibility to act is loosely defined as the power to act. When we say that it is possible for God to speak the Qur’an or create a tree, we are simply stating that it is "within His power" to act in this way. This is obviously a perfection. (25/75)

It is misleading to refer to such a divine possibility as a "contingency". The possibility of divine action does not render God into a contingent or created being. (26/75)

Although the divine act is "possible" in the sense that it is included within God’s power (along with other alternative acts that are equally within His power), God does not depend on an external maker for His divine acts. (27/75)

God’s voluntary activity is uncreated and independent. God acts in and of Himself. He acts successively by His will from the infinite past to the infinite future, without being assisted or guided by a higher Cause. (28/75)

This is unlike human beings and other creations, whose activity is equally created by God. As God says: ((You do not will except that Allah wills)). Unlike Allah, our volitions and acts are not free from external determinants; they are created and contingent. (29/75)

Note that God "actualizes" His divine acts out of His divine potential without creating them. Creation is only meaningful in the context of acting on a separate effect. For example, a carpenter meaningfully creates a chair, but not his decisions or acts. (30/75)

In the same way, God meaningfully creates the universe, but not His own decisions and activity. God simply "decides", "acts", and "speaks", but He does not create His volitions, voluntary acts, or spoken words. (31/75)

It is also very important to note the following nuance. When one asserts that multiple acts are included within God’s power, or that He selects one particular act from a menu of acts by His will, one is not granting that God is a "locus of contingencies". (32/75)

More precisely, there exist two different types of power according to Ibn Taymiyyah. The first type is the power that precedes the act. This power is to do with the soundness and health of one’s body and mind, and it connects to all options in the menu of "possible" acts. (33/75)

Ibn Taymiyyah explains that this preceding power is a condition required for an agent to be held morally responsible. However, it does not sufficiently determine whether the agent will act. (34/75)

In other words, this preceding power simply means that the person will come to act under the condition that he in fact decisively wills to act. If he does not decisively will to act, he never comes to act. (35/75)

For example, a human being who possesses a sound mind and healthy limbs possesses a preceding power that connects to both options: performing the hajj and forsaking it. Such a human being is therefore morally responsible. (36/75)

But whether or not this human being actually performs the pilgrimage hinges on whether or not he further decisively wills to do so. If he decisively wills, he necessarily goes on the pilgrimage, if he does not will decisively, he does not go. (37/75)

This additional decisive will to act is the second type of power. It is a power that arises immediately before the act, accompanies it, and necessitates it. This power may be defined as: a combination of decisive will and complete potency to act. (38/75)

It is literally impossible for this second type of power to emerge within an agent without the act immediately following it. To claim otherwise is to claim a contradiction. (39/75)

For example, when God creates within a human being a decisive will to go on the pilgrimage and a complete potency to do so, God must create the human act of going on the pilgrimage straight afterwards. (40/75)

The absence of this second type of power from the agent does not absolve the agent from his moral responsibility. In the hereafter, God will punish many people who did not possess this second type of necessitating power/will. (41/75)

For example, many unbelievers cannot understand the Qu'ran, not in the sense of lacking sound bodies and minds or being incapable of doing so if they so wish, but in the sense of greatly detesting the Qur'an and not willing to understand it. (42/75)

The same line of reasoning applies when speaking about God. God possesses both kinds of power: (a) the kind that precedes His act, and (b) the kind that accompanies it. (43/75)

As for the first kind, God is eternally powerful, healthy, and sound in His concrete attributes. His preceding power connects not only to the acts which He actually does, but also to all the other "possible" acts which He could have effortlessly done *if He so willed*. (44/75)

Thus, it was "within God’s power" to reveal a different book to the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ, in the sense that this would have indeed taken place if He so willed it. (45/75)

However, given that God’s necessary perfection entails that He possesses the second kind of power to reveal the Qur'an –namely, His decisive will to reveal the Qur'an–, this Qur'an is necessary. (46/75)

The mere fact that other words and revelations are within God’s power (as per the first kind of power) does not introduce contingency to God, nor does it imply that the Arabic wording of the Qur'an is contingent. (47/75)

Rather, God’s divine acts, including His acts of speech, including the Arabic wording of the Qur'an, are necessary and cannot possibly fail to exist at their appropriate time. All of God’s attributes and acts are necessary entailments of His ongoing maximal perfection. (48/75)

As a matter of divine necessity, God voluntarily uttered the uncreated wording of the uncreated Qur'an, in the Arabic language, in a necessary composition that cannot have failed to exist. (49/75)

The composition of the Qur'an cannot have failed to exist precisely because God is necessary. That is to say, the internal succession with God’s essence is necessary and deterministic. (50/75)

Each divine state within God uniquely leads to the divine state that immediately follows it, and uniquely arises from the immediately preceding divine state. (51/75)

Put differently, when all the details of God’s current state are considered, His internal succession is not open to multiple possible futures, nor does it tolerate multiple hypothetical pasts. (52/75)

God knowing everything about His current divine state means that He fully knows everything about all His past and future states. He perfectly knows all His past and future volitions, which are all necessary entailments of His necessary perfection. (53/75)

Thus, God does not depend on an external agent that guides His internal succession. Furthermore, no external maker can shape the manner of multiplicity in His attributes, or specify the composition of His Arabic Qur'an. (54/75)

He is absolutely necessary and independent in His essence, attributes, and acts, may He be praised and exalted. (55/75)

As for the speech of human beings and its wording, it is contingent and created, unlike the Arabic Qur'an. (56/75)

One might wonder: Why is the wording of human speech contingent and the wording of Allah’s Qur'an not, especially if one maintains that both Allah and human beings possess both kinds of power (i.e. that precede and accompany their acts)? (57/75)

After all, haven’t we just admitted that each of God and human beings possess both a preceding power to speak differently and an accompanying power that necessitates the actually spoken words? Why is the human speech contingent when the word of God is not? (58/75)

The answer to this question is twofold. (59/75)

First, it should be appreciated that God originates human beings ex materia along with all of their attributes. God literally brings human beings into existence after they are not there at all, by His unique creative power, out of surrounding material conditions. (60/75)

Since it is possible for human beings to originate substantially out of prior material conditions, it follows by extension that their attributes of speech also arise within them out of external material conditions. This means that human speech is contingent. (61/75)

By contrast, the Arabic Qur'an subsists in the uncreated essence of Allah, and arises in His self-contained essence by His will in an uncreated way. It is not created in Allah by an external cause, nor arises out of external material conditions that lie in His vicinity. (62/75)

The "contingency" predicated of human speech and other human attributes is therefore a sound evidence for the Creator’s existence, as noted in the beginning of this thread. This contingency, however, does not apply to God. (63/75)

The so-called "contingency" of the wording of the Qur'an merely refers to the possibility of God to utter it. It falls under Ibn Taymiyyah’s second type of "possibility", i.e. the possibility to act, and thus does not challenge God’s necessity and independence in any way. (64/75)

Secondly, it should be appreciated that the evolution of the world is not fully deterministic. God can direct the evolution of the world in different ways through miraculous intervention, breaking the customary laws of nature though not the generic laws of physics. (65/75)

For example, using scientifically imprecise language, while the combination of a potent fire and an unhindered flammable substance necessitate the immediately following effect of burning, it is within God’s power to miraculously invalidate the potency or the receptivity. (66/75)

If God invalidates the potency of the fire, the receptivity of the substance, or both, the effect of burning cannot occur in the substance. But if he retains the potency and the receptivity, the effect of burning necessarily occurs. (67/75)

Both futures states of the universe are permitted by the laws of physics under physical indeterminism. God can actualize either state of the universe, as His power equally connects to all physical possibilities in the same way. (68/75)

In much the same way, the combination of the decisive human will and the complete human potency necessitate the human act that immediately follows. If a human being decisively wills to speak a phrase and has a complete potency to do so, he must voluntarily speak it. (69/75)

However, God can miraculously influence the will and potency of the human agent, such that the human will becomes less than decisive and the potency becomes less than complete. In this way, He can prevent the human from voluntarily speaking. (70/75)

In fact, God is always guiding human beings in their life without undermining the truly universal laws of physics. He plans everything, subtly leading humans to voluntarily speak things which they could very well have not spoken, or spoken differently, if He so willed it. (71/75)

Thus, the human act of speech is contingent in this second sense. This is unlike the Arabic wording of the Qur'an, which God independently utters without His perfect life being guided by another to the point where He eventually comes to voluntarily utter it. (72/75)

More clearly, God literally decrees whether or not we speak something in the future. He is constantly guiding the course of the evolution of the universe by His will, selecting one future state over other physically possible future states. (73/75)

In conclusion, the composition in creaturely speech is contingent, whereas the Arabic wording and composition of the Qur'an is uncreated and necessary. This is despite the fact that it was "within God’s power" to speak to the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ differently. (74/75)

May Allah guide us all to that which pleases Him, and forgive our shortcomings.
Ameen.

Allah knows best. (75/75)