I wrote an article about the policy irrelevance of the social cost of carbon in the hopes of prompting an uncomfortable conversation about the future use of the metric.
I'm a fan of both of them, so unsurprisingly it’s a great conversation.
Sunstein brushes aside the SCC critique. He says the alternative is to give policymakers no info on climate policy stringency, i.e., it’s either we stick with the SCC or we fly blind [I’m paraphrasing]
He's giving the instinctual response of economists to SCC critiques, and I get it. I used to say it myself. But I’ve come to realize that its validity rests on 2 problematic assumptions.
First, it assumes that SCC estimates convey *some* useful info to policymakers about climate policy stringency. So, they are estimating something coherent (like an uncertain most likely estimate, or a lower bound estimate, or even a bad estimate with meaningful error bars).
Second, it assumes that the alternative to SCC approach is to totally discard the rich information scholars have developed on climate effects, damages, emissions pathways, intergenerational transfers, etc. And instead picking arbitrary numbers (that implicitly value CO2).
If these two assumptions were true, then Sunstein’s argument follows directly: the SCC provides policymakers with *some* valuable info, and something is better than nothing.
But I don't think either assumption is true.
I explain in my recent article that estimating SCCs entails making methodological choices that are obviously wrong, but necessary to generate specific numbers (or ranges). That process produces results that have no coherent interpretation. energypolicy.columbia.edu/the-social-cos…
On the 2nd assumption: if we pull together a group of leading experts across relevant disciplines with the task of assessing climate risks and providing a science-based judgments on climate policy stringency, they will do vastly better than an arbitrarily-picked target.
So, I’ve come to realize that the situation is almost exactly the opposite of the instinctual economist response. Real-world SCC estimates convey roughly nothing to policymakers, whereas an alternative approach could provide at least something useful.
Of course, these aren't new insights at all. Scholars like Martin Weitzman made similar SCC critiques decades ago. The "alternative" I'm describing is basically what the IPCC is designed to do.
But, due largely to historical context, US regulatory policy has stuck with the SCC.
Reasonable people can disagree with all this. But I’m still hoping we take advantage of this dark moment in the wilderness to have some worthwhile and overdo conversations like this one. /end
cc @lydiadepillis in case of interest
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An unpopular opinion, based on my time at CEA updating the social cost of carbon, is that Democrats should work with Trump to get rid of it, as called for in this EO, while demanding an alternative.
Counterintuitively, this could be a win for both sides.
Here’s why: (1/x)
For Democrats: The social cost of carbon is built on flimsy models that cannot produce robust results. Using these models in policymaking is a house-of-cards that will eventually collapse.
The metric provides zero help with good policy design.
And fighting Trump admin efforts to produce a near-zero carbon valuation will eventually fail.
Also I’m no lawyer, but could a big legal battle over carbon valuation lead courts down the road of revisiting big decisions like Mass v EPA?
Remember the bizarre injunction from the District Court earlier this year on the Administration's work on climate damages? You did not have to be a lawyer to see the utter craziness of that decision. But here was a legal take if you want one (2/x) reason.com/volokh/2022/02…
Putting aside the direct fallout of that particular decision (it was eventually reversed), what it does is take away any reasonable bounds of a debate over legal risks.
Because if a RTJ can put out that decision, they could come up with an excuse for virtually anything (3/x)
Good thread below, but it’s a misconception that EPA's new SCC estimates are larger mainly due to changes in discount rates.
Counterintuitively, the new "state-specific" discounting approach keeps the SCCs relatively low.
This will take some tweets to explain (1/x)
To begin with, EPA assumes that discount rates for the next few hundred years should be calibrated to interest rates on government borrowing. This is controversial among economists (let alone non-economists) but let’s just take this assumption as given...
The previous US gov't SCCs used static discount rates. The new discounting approach, using the simple Ramsey Formula, is dynamic both in regard to time and states of the world, using probabilistic projections of future consumption...
The old SCCs were based on deterministic and unrealistic emissions projections. The new versions, based on some great work coordinated by @rff, are probabilistic projections that are more plausible (to the extent any forests to 2300 are plausible)...
The old SCCs used climate models built by economists that didn't do a great job replicating more sophisticated climate models. The new version uses the FaIR model, which was recommended by the National Academies and seems pretty widely used...
1. They don't account for our ability to use climate policy to improve the economy in ways we might not do otherwise, like investing in crumbling infrastructure, accelerating innovation, or using carbon pricing revenue in pro-growth ways (2/5)
2. They ignore the economic benefits of emissions reductions from local pollution and from climate change. That includes not only things like health benefits, but also improvements in labor participation and productivity, especially in frontline communities (3/5)
Please check out a new interactive table from @ColumbiaUEnergy on the compatibility of a federal carbon tax with other policies that address emissions. And here’s a short thread to explain (1/x): energypolicy.columbia.edu/compatibility-…
Start with these three statements:
1. The price on carbon should be far larger than zero. 2. A carbon price alone is not an ideal climate policy. 3. Some policies fit better alongside a carbon price than others.
Even on twitter, these are uncontroversial, right?
…And they naturally lead to the questions: which new policies should be added when a carbon tax is implemented, and what existing policies should be changed or eliminated?