🧵 Translated this interview by prominent Polish defence analyst @konrad_muzyka for RP, which focuses on the current state of the Russia-Ukraine war.
It's long, but very insightful. Many numbers, details and assessments.
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It's long, but very insightful. Many numbers, details and assessments.
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- There's the upcoming summit – a meeting between President Trump and President Putin. What do you expect regarding Ukraine?
- I don't have particularly optimistic expectations. It seems that Russia still maintains maximalist goals for Ukraine, assuming its complete subjugation. At this stage of the war, Moscow is in a more favorable position, so Putin will negotiate from a position of strength. Leaks regarding Ukraine's alleged ceding of the remaining part of the Donetsk Oblast have already been denied by Kyiv. Therefore, there is a risk that after the summit, Ukraine will be on a collision course with the United States. However, the negotiation process itself – if it begins at all and includes Ukrainian participation – will likely take months.
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- I don't have particularly optimistic expectations. It seems that Russia still maintains maximalist goals for Ukraine, assuming its complete subjugation. At this stage of the war, Moscow is in a more favorable position, so Putin will negotiate from a position of strength. Leaks regarding Ukraine's alleged ceding of the remaining part of the Donetsk Oblast have already been denied by Kyiv. Therefore, there is a risk that after the summit, Ukraine will be on a collision course with the United States. However, the negotiation process itself – if it begins at all and includes Ukrainian participation – will likely take months.
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- You recently returned from another visit to Ukraine. What's the current situation on the front?
- The Russians continue to maintain the strategic initiative along the entire front. Apart from very local counterattacks, the Ukrainians are in retreat. Russian forces are pressing hard on several axes, particularly in the areas of Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Velyka Novosilka, and most recently in Zaporizhzhia, i.e., in the deep south.
It is concerning that Russian territorial gains, especially in July, have been quite significant and larger than in previous months. The Russians have advanced 10-12 km on several axes. This is something we haven't seen before. If there were any territorial gains before, they were concentrated in a single area. Now we have several areas where the front is starting to leak.
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- The Russians continue to maintain the strategic initiative along the entire front. Apart from very local counterattacks, the Ukrainians are in retreat. Russian forces are pressing hard on several axes, particularly in the areas of Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Velyka Novosilka, and most recently in Zaporizhzhia, i.e., in the deep south.
It is concerning that Russian territorial gains, especially in July, have been quite significant and larger than in previous months. The Russians have advanced 10-12 km on several axes. This is something we haven't seen before. If there were any territorial gains before, they were concentrated in a single area. Now we have several areas where the front is starting to leak.
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- In recent weeks, there's been a lot of talk about a planned Russian summer offensive. Is that what's currently going on?
- Several months ago, we expected the Russians to gradually increase the number of ground attacks using drones, aerial bombs, and other means. However, the amount of armor used would be significantly limited. And indeed, since March, the Russians have been increasing the pace. Now we are seeing the result: with manpower shortages on the Ukrainian side, we are seeing increasingly rapid Russian territorial gains. Among those I've spoken to, there are voices about a planned major Russian offensive, but these are clearly in the minority. Most people, however, claim that what the Russians are currently using is all they have.
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- Several months ago, we expected the Russians to gradually increase the number of ground attacks using drones, aerial bombs, and other means. However, the amount of armor used would be significantly limited. And indeed, since March, the Russians have been increasing the pace. Now we are seeing the result: with manpower shortages on the Ukrainian side, we are seeing increasingly rapid Russian territorial gains. Among those I've spoken to, there are voices about a planned major Russian offensive, but these are clearly in the minority. Most people, however, claim that what the Russians are currently using is all they have.
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- What can we expect in the coming weeks?
- I assume that the Russians will continue to slowly bleed out the Ukrainians in order to open the front and further accelerate their advance west and north towards Kramatorsk and Slovyansk. For now, our main scenario is that what Russian troops are currently doing will not change.
Of course, if any more concrete data regarding a larger deployment of forces emerges, we will update our scenarios on an ongoing basis. The situation is dynamic.
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- I assume that the Russians will continue to slowly bleed out the Ukrainians in order to open the front and further accelerate their advance west and north towards Kramatorsk and Slovyansk. For now, our main scenario is that what Russian troops are currently doing will not change.
Of course, if any more concrete data regarding a larger deployment of forces emerges, we will update our scenarios on an ongoing basis. The situation is dynamic.
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- How many Russian troops are there right now?
- Around 650,000, with around 40,000 that arrived since January. The Russians are capable of regenerating losses very quickly. Withdrawing a company or battalion that has suffered several dozen percent losses and rebuilding its personnel can take a maximum of two weeks.
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- Around 650,000, with around 40,000 that arrived since January. The Russians are capable of regenerating losses very quickly. Withdrawing a company or battalion that has suffered several dozen percent losses and rebuilding its personnel can take a maximum of two weeks.
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- So there are no signs that this "human river" of Russians will somehow stop?
- Absolutely not. Experts in Ukraine estimate that the Russians will be able to maintain their current recruitment pace at least until the end of this year. Some also estimate that this won't be a problem until at least mid-2026. This will depend on the state of the Russian economy. The pace of creating new units and rebuilding existing ones will be maintained, even though losses on the frontline could be very high.
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- Absolutely not. Experts in Ukraine estimate that the Russians will be able to maintain their current recruitment pace at least until the end of this year. Some also estimate that this won't be a problem until at least mid-2026. This will depend on the state of the Russian economy. The pace of creating new units and rebuilding existing ones will be maintained, even though losses on the frontline could be very high.
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- How does their recruitment mechanism work?
- One stream is still based on volunteers, meaning those seeking a substantial bonus for enlisting in the military. They receive this bonus, undergo training lasting from several days to several weeks, and are then assigned to a specific unit. We don't know if they undergo additional training within their unit—this is the case on the Ukrainian side. Generally, Russians who enlist in the military are deployed to the front within a few weeks at most.
Ukrainian soldiers told us that sometimes such a person dies on the frontline just days after signing a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense. A short training period certainly doesn't prepare them for what will happen on the front in Ukraine.
The second stream, which we don't really know much about, but certainly exists, is young Russians who are conscripted in Russia and who are forced through beatings and various forms of torture to sign contracts.
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- One stream is still based on volunteers, meaning those seeking a substantial bonus for enlisting in the military. They receive this bonus, undergo training lasting from several days to several weeks, and are then assigned to a specific unit. We don't know if they undergo additional training within their unit—this is the case on the Ukrainian side. Generally, Russians who enlist in the military are deployed to the front within a few weeks at most.
Ukrainian soldiers told us that sometimes such a person dies on the frontline just days after signing a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense. A short training period certainly doesn't prepare them for what will happen on the front in Ukraine.
The second stream, which we don't really know much about, but certainly exists, is young Russians who are conscripted in Russia and who are forced through beatings and various forms of torture to sign contracts.
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- A jakie są główne problemy po stronie Ukraińców?
- Let me start with what has changed for the better in recent months. It's about training. Ukrainian soldiers do indeed undergo 30-day, sometimes six-week, training, and additionally receive so-called assimilation training in their units, which is meant to prepare them for what awaits them.
However, when it comes to Ukrainian soldiers, the biggest problem is that they simply... don't exist. This is related to the very high rate of desertion and leaving units without consent. This creates a dangerous situation: if we consider soldier losses on the front line, as well as desertions and leaving units without consent, the number of soldiers on the Ukrainian side is decreasing month by month. Although Ukrainians officially mobilize 20,000-30,000 people per month, a large portion of them do not end up on the front lines.
This is a very significant structural problem that has remained unresolved for a long time, and there is no indication that this will change anytime soon. Other problems include the quality of command, the personal equipment these soldiers receive, the characteristics of the Ukrainian high-ranking commanders, and also the phase of the war.
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- Let me start with what has changed for the better in recent months. It's about training. Ukrainian soldiers do indeed undergo 30-day, sometimes six-week, training, and additionally receive so-called assimilation training in their units, which is meant to prepare them for what awaits them.
However, when it comes to Ukrainian soldiers, the biggest problem is that they simply... don't exist. This is related to the very high rate of desertion and leaving units without consent. This creates a dangerous situation: if we consider soldier losses on the front line, as well as desertions and leaving units without consent, the number of soldiers on the Ukrainian side is decreasing month by month. Although Ukrainians officially mobilize 20,000-30,000 people per month, a large portion of them do not end up on the front lines.
This is a very significant structural problem that has remained unresolved for a long time, and there is no indication that this will change anytime soon. Other problems include the quality of command, the personal equipment these soldiers receive, the characteristics of the Ukrainian high-ranking commanders, and also the phase of the war.
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- In what sense?
- It's a completely different experience joining the military when it's winning and there's a good chance, or at least hope, that the war will end soon, than joining an army whose morale is sinking and which retreats daily and weekly under the onslaught of Russian forces. This can also probably be explained the other way around. Russians are more inclined to join the military because they expect this war to finally end because the Russian army is winning.
This is, of course, somewhat exaggerated, as Russians don't really realize what stage the war is at. But the overall mood among the Russian people, and the Russian Ministry of Defense's portrayal of the situation, is that this war won't last much longer.
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- It's a completely different experience joining the military when it's winning and there's a good chance, or at least hope, that the war will end soon, than joining an army whose morale is sinking and which retreats daily and weekly under the onslaught of Russian forces. This can also probably be explained the other way around. Russians are more inclined to join the military because they expect this war to finally end because the Russian army is winning.
This is, of course, somewhat exaggerated, as Russians don't really realize what stage the war is at. But the overall mood among the Russian people, and the Russian Ministry of Defense's portrayal of the situation, is that this war won't last much longer.
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- The Russians have no shortage of men, and this is a pressing problem in the Ukrainian army. What else can be seen on the front?
- A significant change we've observed over the past few months is the appearance of drone teams on the front lines, belonging to Rubikon. This is the Russian Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems. It trains drone operators, tests new technologies, and implements them on the front lines. Their actions are highly coordinated and methodical, and their appearance in any part of the front heralds an increase in the intensity of drone attacks and the systematic weakening of Ukrainian positions.
The entire Ukrainian defense over the past year has relied on drones. When there was a lack of artillery ammunition, the Ukrainians used drones. When they lacked manpower, they used drones to fill gaps. Now, this Ukrainian advantage, not only in terms of quality but also in the training of drone pilots, has been nullified, and there are situations where the Russians are gaining a local advantage in the use of drones. What's more, they're using so much of it that it's impacting Ukrainian joint operations.
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- A significant change we've observed over the past few months is the appearance of drone teams on the front lines, belonging to Rubikon. This is the Russian Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems. It trains drone operators, tests new technologies, and implements them on the front lines. Their actions are highly coordinated and methodical, and their appearance in any part of the front heralds an increase in the intensity of drone attacks and the systematic weakening of Ukrainian positions.
The entire Ukrainian defense over the past year has relied on drones. When there was a lack of artillery ammunition, the Ukrainians used drones. When they lacked manpower, they used drones to fill gaps. Now, this Ukrainian advantage, not only in terms of quality but also in the training of drone pilots, has been nullified, and there are situations where the Russians are gaining a local advantage in the use of drones. What's more, they're using so much of it that it's impacting Ukrainian joint operations.
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- What does that mean?
- Over the past year, Ukrainians have defended their positions using drones, artillery, and infantry. However, the number of Russian drones is currently so high that Ukrainian units often forgo the use of artillery, as drones constantly hover around their deployment areas. In areas of the front where artillery does open fire, Russian counter-battery fire is responded to within one or two minutes, and within a few minutes, swarms of FPV drones appear in the area, targeting and destroying detected artillery.
Furthermore, the Russians are conducting exceptionally effective counter-drone operations, focusing on countering both Ukrainian reconnaissance and attack drones. Because most Ukrainian logistics currently rely on drones, systematically eliminating them poses a significant challenge. At the battalion level, 70-80 percent of Ukrainian logistical effort is allocated to supplying drone units, and only 20-30 percent to infantry support. Maintaining drone capabilities is a higher priority for Ukrainians than securing the operations of front-line units.
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- Over the past year, Ukrainians have defended their positions using drones, artillery, and infantry. However, the number of Russian drones is currently so high that Ukrainian units often forgo the use of artillery, as drones constantly hover around their deployment areas. In areas of the front where artillery does open fire, Russian counter-battery fire is responded to within one or two minutes, and within a few minutes, swarms of FPV drones appear in the area, targeting and destroying detected artillery.
Furthermore, the Russians are conducting exceptionally effective counter-drone operations, focusing on countering both Ukrainian reconnaissance and attack drones. Because most Ukrainian logistics currently rely on drones, systematically eliminating them poses a significant challenge. At the battalion level, 70-80 percent of Ukrainian logistical effort is allocated to supplying drone units, and only 20-30 percent to infantry support. Maintaining drone capabilities is a higher priority for Ukrainians than securing the operations of front-line units.
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- Does this mean that artillery, tanks and armored vehicles become of little value on the battlefield?
- The so-called "dronosis" is a result of neither side being able to achieve a breakthrough early in the war. Significant offensive operations were halted, primarily through the rapid deployment of unmanned reconnaissance vehicles and their use to conduct effective artillery fire. Later, FPV drones entered the scene. This led to a situation where any armored attack was quickly destroyed. However, the Russians will continue to expand their armored forces. They currently produce 250–300 T-90M tanks per year, and this production will likely increase year by year.
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- The so-called "dronosis" is a result of neither side being able to achieve a breakthrough early in the war. Significant offensive operations were halted, primarily through the rapid deployment of unmanned reconnaissance vehicles and their use to conduct effective artillery fire. Later, FPV drones entered the scene. This led to a situation where any armored attack was quickly destroyed. However, the Russians will continue to expand their armored forces. They currently produce 250–300 T-90M tanks per year, and this production will likely increase year by year.
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- What about the deliveries of equipment to Ukraine?
- Armored equipment is still in use, but both the Ukrainian and Russian sides believe its use is currently pointless, as these vehicles quickly become easy targets and are destroyed. In the case of artillery, there are currently no reports of drastic ammunition shortages that would significantly limit firepower.
Although drones function very well and these capabilities are well-developed on the Ukrainian side, Ukrainian commanders say they will never replace artillery – it will remain crucial.
On the Ukrainian side, despite a steady increase in production to several million drones annually, quality remains a problem. There are significant differences between the equipment supplied by state-owned and private industries – in the former, the certification process at the Ministry of Defense takes several months, while private manufacturers respond much more quickly to the need for modifications. In the case of private companies, a single phone call informing them about changes in Russian electronic warfare assets or the need to increase transmitter power or drone speed is often enough to implement the appropriate corrections within a few days.
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- Armored equipment is still in use, but both the Ukrainian and Russian sides believe its use is currently pointless, as these vehicles quickly become easy targets and are destroyed. In the case of artillery, there are currently no reports of drastic ammunition shortages that would significantly limit firepower.
Although drones function very well and these capabilities are well-developed on the Ukrainian side, Ukrainian commanders say they will never replace artillery – it will remain crucial.
On the Ukrainian side, despite a steady increase in production to several million drones annually, quality remains a problem. There are significant differences between the equipment supplied by state-owned and private industries – in the former, the certification process at the Ministry of Defense takes several months, while private manufacturers respond much more quickly to the need for modifications. In the case of private companies, a single phone call informing them about changes in Russian electronic warfare assets or the need to increase transmitter power or drone speed is often enough to implement the appropriate corrections within a few days.
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- How is the state-owned arms industry in Ukraine implementing these changes?
- This takes several months, and by the time they're introduced, they're essentially obsolete. Ultimately, units are left with drones that they have to modify themselves before they can be used.
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- This takes several months, and by the time they're introduced, they're essentially obsolete. Ultimately, units are left with drones that they have to modify themselves before they can be used.
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- And what does the Ukrainian industry look like in terms of cooperation with Western arms manufacturers? There have been numerous announcements that Ukraine is collaborating with various companies.
- This largely remains a matter of media speculation. If Ukraine doesn't receive significant funding in the form of subsidies for the purchase of Western equipment, even in factories supposedly being built in Ukraine, it won't buy this equipment. We spoke with a representative of one of the ministries responsible for international cooperation. She said that if Ukrainians have a choice, for example, between purchasing one Lynx vehicle for €10 million and three or four BTR-4 vehicles manufactured by Ukrainians for the same price, they will choose the Ukrainian ones. The fact that the Western vehicles are 20-30 percent better doesn't make much difference from their perspective.
A serious problem for Ukraine is the lack of funds for the further development of arms companies producing, among other things, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and drones. Kyiv would like this production to take place in European countries through joint ventures, in which Ukraine would contribute know-how and Western partners would provide capital. In the case of missiles, concepts of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation appeared, but the Polish side did not express interest.
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- This largely remains a matter of media speculation. If Ukraine doesn't receive significant funding in the form of subsidies for the purchase of Western equipment, even in factories supposedly being built in Ukraine, it won't buy this equipment. We spoke with a representative of one of the ministries responsible for international cooperation. She said that if Ukrainians have a choice, for example, between purchasing one Lynx vehicle for €10 million and three or four BTR-4 vehicles manufactured by Ukrainians for the same price, they will choose the Ukrainian ones. The fact that the Western vehicles are 20-30 percent better doesn't make much difference from their perspective.
A serious problem for Ukraine is the lack of funds for the further development of arms companies producing, among other things, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and drones. Kyiv would like this production to take place in European countries through joint ventures, in which Ukraine would contribute know-how and Western partners would provide capital. In the case of missiles, concepts of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation appeared, but the Polish side did not express interest.
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- So the rumors that the Ukrainian arms industry is about to conquer all of Europe are exaggerated?
- In my opinion, yes. If Western countries want to invest in drone solutions, then Ukrainians can certainly offer a lot in terms of know-how, expertise, and experience gained from contact with the armed forces of the Russian Federation.
However, I have the feeling that many Western companies and countries want to test their solutions in Ukraine but aren't necessarily interested in acquiring Ukrainian experience or having Ukrainians as business partners. We'll come, test, or even give you something, but we really don't want anything more from you. And no matter what you can offer us, we'll say no.
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- In my opinion, yes. If Western countries want to invest in drone solutions, then Ukrainians can certainly offer a lot in terms of know-how, expertise, and experience gained from contact with the armed forces of the Russian Federation.
However, I have the feeling that many Western companies and countries want to test their solutions in Ukraine but aren't necessarily interested in acquiring Ukrainian experience or having Ukrainians as business partners. We'll come, test, or even give you something, but we really don't want anything more from you. And no matter what you can offer us, we'll say no.
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- Let's leave industry aside. Where will this war be in six months?
- This is, of course, very difficult to predict. Our baseline scenario assumes continued operations as usual, but we are observing that the front is gradually beginning to "leak." The Russians have imposed a war of attrition on Ukraine, and Kyiv has decided to take up the challenge, which could lead to a sudden acceleration of events at some point. We may be entering the first stage. It remains an open question whether a breakdown will occur, or whether the Ukrainians will decide to deploy additional strategic reserves and specialized drone units to stem the Russian deluge of drones. It appears that the Ukrainien command of the Unmanned Systems Forces is closely monitoring Russian actions, and in the coming weeks and months, its priority will be destroying Rubikon units and other Russian drone formations.
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- This is, of course, very difficult to predict. Our baseline scenario assumes continued operations as usual, but we are observing that the front is gradually beginning to "leak." The Russians have imposed a war of attrition on Ukraine, and Kyiv has decided to take up the challenge, which could lead to a sudden acceleration of events at some point. We may be entering the first stage. It remains an open question whether a breakdown will occur, or whether the Ukrainians will decide to deploy additional strategic reserves and specialized drone units to stem the Russian deluge of drones. It appears that the Ukrainien command of the Unmanned Systems Forces is closely monitoring Russian actions, and in the coming weeks and months, its priority will be destroying Rubikon units and other Russian drone formations.
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- If they succeed, can we assume the Russian advance will perhaps be a bit slower? Because I understand there's no chance of a spectacular Ukrainian counteroffensive?
- As for conducting a strategic operation aimed at reversing the negative trend that the Ukrainians have been experiencing for two years, there's currently no chance. The Ukrainians are too short on troops. However, considering General Syrsky's character and personality, I wouldn't be surprised if attempts were made to launch limited offensive operations.
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- As for conducting a strategic operation aimed at reversing the negative trend that the Ukrainians have been experiencing for two years, there's currently no chance. The Ukrainians are too short on troops. However, considering General Syrsky's character and personality, I wouldn't be surprised if attempts were made to launch limited offensive operations.
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- Could more Western help make a difference here?
- In my opinion, no. The fundamental problems Ukrainians are grappling with are Ukrainian problems. This includes the quality of command, the number of soldiers on the front line, the methodology for using force—both manpower and drones—and so on. The list goes on. Giving Ukrainians hundreds more ATACMS missiles won't change the nature of this war. Ultimately, to retake a town, you need infantry supported by drones and artillery. And Ukrainians are increasingly short on infantry, and artillery is being effectively targeted—Western equipment isn't a panacea for all Ukraine's problems. The most important problems Ukraine faces must be solved by the government in Kyiv, not by Western countries.
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- In my opinion, no. The fundamental problems Ukrainians are grappling with are Ukrainian problems. This includes the quality of command, the number of soldiers on the front line, the methodology for using force—both manpower and drones—and so on. The list goes on. Giving Ukrainians hundreds more ATACMS missiles won't change the nature of this war. Ultimately, to retake a town, you need infantry supported by drones and artillery. And Ukrainians are increasingly short on infantry, and artillery is being effectively targeted—Western equipment isn't a panacea for all Ukraine's problems. The most important problems Ukraine faces must be solved by the government in Kyiv, not by Western countries.
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- Finally, I wanted to ask what are the three main conclusions from this war for us, for our army?
- The absolute priority must be building intelligence and situational awareness at every level: strategic, operational, and tactical. This begins with building strategic awareness of Moscow's intentions, where it is deploying its forces, what it is planning, and so on, and ends at the platoon level, which must know who is facing it, what equipment it has, and where the enemy is heading.
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- The absolute priority must be building intelligence and situational awareness at every level: strategic, operational, and tactical. This begins with building strategic awareness of Moscow's intentions, where it is deploying its forces, what it is planning, and so on, and ends at the platoon level, which must know who is facing it, what equipment it has, and where the enemy is heading.
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- Second conclusion?
- Reconnaissance must be followed by means of attack, including from the tactical to the strategic level. From anti-tank grenade launchers to ballistic and cruise missiles. The third conclusion concerns the purely organizational level – the ability to adapt and quickly regenerate capabilities. If something isn't working, we must be aware of it and change it very quickly. If the initiatives we undertake don't work or the cost-benefit ratio is disproportionate, we must adapt quickly. And this is certainly a problem in our military.
If Russia imposes a war of attrition on the Baltic states or Poland, we must adopt a different approach than Ukraine to avoid repeating its mistakes. Our goal should be to conduct asymmetric operations that will undermine Russia's ability to wage a prolonged conflict. In addition to classic drone and missile attacks on military and industrial targets, crippling critical infrastructure – especially the oil and gas sector, rail transport, and ports used for military purposes – would be crucial. Cyber operations targeting Russia's energy, logistics, and financial systems, as well as information operations to destabilize the internal situation, would also be important. The scale of these operations would have to be significantly larger than in the case of Ukraine.
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- Reconnaissance must be followed by means of attack, including from the tactical to the strategic level. From anti-tank grenade launchers to ballistic and cruise missiles. The third conclusion concerns the purely organizational level – the ability to adapt and quickly regenerate capabilities. If something isn't working, we must be aware of it and change it very quickly. If the initiatives we undertake don't work or the cost-benefit ratio is disproportionate, we must adapt quickly. And this is certainly a problem in our military.
If Russia imposes a war of attrition on the Baltic states or Poland, we must adopt a different approach than Ukraine to avoid repeating its mistakes. Our goal should be to conduct asymmetric operations that will undermine Russia's ability to wage a prolonged conflict. In addition to classic drone and missile attacks on military and industrial targets, crippling critical infrastructure – especially the oil and gas sector, rail transport, and ports used for military purposes – would be crucial. Cyber operations targeting Russia's energy, logistics, and financial systems, as well as information operations to destabilize the internal situation, would also be important. The scale of these operations would have to be significantly larger than in the case of Ukraine.
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Tweet no. 9 - The translated question was meant to be:
"And what are the main problems on the Ukrainian side?"
"And what are the main problems on the Ukrainian side?"
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