For well over a century, India’s nationalists and leftist political activists claimed that British-ruled India made excessive payments to Britain, calling it ‘drain’ or wasted/lost national savings.
The word ‘drain’ had a long pedigree. Edmund Burke, a fierce critic of the East India Company, first used it. Burke’s drain persisted in assessments of public finance. In 1859, W.H. Sykes called military heads of expenditure ‘the chief drain upon the Indian Exchequer’.
The modern definition owes to Dadabhai Naoroji, who implied that India’s balance of trade surplus with Britain was money Britain swindled out of India. Leftist historians Utsa and Prabhat Patnaik have adopted this flawed and ideological interpretation (Monthly Review, 2021).
Naoroji’s economics was unsound. A trade surplus in India funded payments for services. The only valid measure of economic drain is this: the value these services added to national income was less than what was paid for them. No believer in drain asks if this was the case.
This point was made by critics, Kirti Chaudhuri and Theodore Morrison. The Left continues to push its narrative by deliberately ignoring criticisms. Evidence: Patnaiks do not cite any critical writing, and the Monthly Review referees did not think that was a misrepresentation.
Read recently: Bishnupriya Gupta’s An Economic History of India: Growth, Income and Inequalities from the Mughals to the 21st Century (CUP 2025). A major new book by a major scholar.
With careful data analysis, the book explores key questions in economic history, what drives growth, how inequality develops, and how living standards have changed over time. The book reveals patterns of change that need a serious look. Three examples below.
(1) Wage-based estimates of income, which Gupta and her team developed, indicate depressed per capita income starting early 1600s. This trend predates colonialism and industrialisation, challenging conventional narratives and demanding attention from historians of Mughal era
Can anyone measure colonial drain, the tribute the British Empire extracted from India? There is nothing wrong with the concept of drain (payment without return). But there is no credible measure. There are no numbers to show the drain was large, as some people claim.
The measure commonly used starts from the balance of payments and follows Holden Furber: The ‘drain .. was the excess of exports from India for which there was no equivalent import.’ Trade surplus = extraction. This definition is wildly wrong.
If not, countries with regular trade surpluses (China, Germany) are victims of exploitation. Trade surplus usually balances a net outflow; in British India, that was payment for services bought. Until one shows that the services yielded no benefit, export surplus ≠ extraction.
Read recently: A.R. Venkatachalapathy’s Swadeshi Steam (Allen Lane 2023). The book tells the fascinating and under-researched story of an Indian shipping company around 1900 within the larger context of global maritime trade, international shipping, and colonialism.
Shipping was crucial to the first wave of globalization. Indian firms struggled against British monopolies due to high capital costs and limited state support. The book is about one such enterprise, V.O. Chidambaram Pillai's (VOC) Swadeshi Steam Navigation (SSN), started in 1906.
The rich and engaging narrative is both business history and biography. It brings alive the time and the business world around Tuticorin port, connects regional economics, nationalist politics, and elite networks. Above all, it is about VOC’s struggles to make it work.
In the 1980s, historians of 19th c India were primarily interested in the British Empire. But they were also interested in economic history. The question was: Could economic change derive mainly from the intentions and capacities of the British Empire and the imperial state?
Many thought the question had no easy or sensible answer. The Empire did not follow a blueprint, an announced aim, and its capacity was constrained by political alignments, geography, limited tax, indigenous businesses, and local society, which it did not want to meddle with.
Cambridge School historians and influential writers like M.D. Morris illustrated this view, which shaped the plan of Cambridge Economic History of India (1983). The editor, Dharma Kumar, purged any discussion of the British Empire and instructed contributors to stick to facts.
Oxfam joins the display of mindless illiteracy with which leftist activists discuss impact of the British Raj. In a report called “Takers not Makers”, they claim that imperialist Britain “extracted” 85 tr $ from India, adding for drama, “enough to carpet London with 50£ notes”.
The core of the claim of extraction is a net flow of money from India to Britain from the late-18th century (decades before most of India was colonized) to the 1920s. This outflow is blown up by activists posing as scholars using dishonest tools posing as “methods”.
No economics in the world will tell you that an outflow makes a country poor. That assessment depends on what value the payment creates at home and if it could be obtained more cheaply by other means. Activist economic history doesn't acknowledge these issues.
Britain’s drain of India, which inspires outlandish claims by leftist historians, is a concept based on flawed method. Only one definition of drain in international transactions is possible: country pays more (or receives lower price) for a transaction due to its colonial status.
This is the price-gap definition of exploitation. In a 2018 paper in European Review of Econ. History, Federico Tadei applied it to measure ‘extraction’ in colonial West Africa. There can be no other sensible definition of ‘extraction,’ ‘drain,’ ‘loot’ or ‘unilateral transfer’.
Note two things: (1) data to measure the price-gap usually does not exist. Tadei could do it because there were coercive laws in place, a very special condition. If one can remotely hope to measure price gap for commodities, it is practically impossible to measure it for services