There is a great retrospective in the WSJ today on how the UK's post-Brexit experiment with big increases in legal immigration went wrong.
Their mistakes yield some important policy lessons for supporters *and* critics of skilled immigration. Let's dive in:
(tl;dr: What was intended to be a skilled immigration surge made the catastrophic mistake of setting visa criteria based on college degrees and workers filling so-called "labor shortages," ultimately leading instead to a surge in low-skilled, rather than high-skilled, immigration.)
Post-pandemic Britain dramatically increased net migration, shifting away from the EU and towards migrants from outside Europe.
Visa issuance went up across the board: work visas, study visas, and particularly dependent visas.
The plan was initially supposed to be a limited, targeted, skilled immigration surge. The UK, post-Brexit, would be free to go out and attract top talent from anywhere. But things went wrong quickly. What constituted "skilled" work included roofers (!) alongside business executives.
The system was then blown apart by businesses claiming "labor shortages." Rather than raise pay, businesses appealed for special carve-outs in areas like construction. Basing their visa programs on filling so-called shortages invited this kind of lobbying. Nobody agrees on what a labor shortage actually means. The UK has a technocratic body meant to identify them, but it's ultimately just vibes and raw interest group battles all the way down.
Next, the UK rubber-stamped visas for students and their dependents regardless of the quality of the program or school in which they enrolled. There was a subsequent explosion in low-quality degree programs catering to foreign students (and their dependents) to take advantage of this option. From the article:
"While some students went to well-known universities such as Oxford or Cambridge, the number of students undertaking one-year master’s degrees from lesser known British universities shot up. And unlike pre-Brexit, many more stayed on in the U.K. after graduating.
The fruits of that recruitment drive are visible today. In east London sit two modern high-rises, the Import Building and the Export Building, which house three different universities’ London campuses stacked next to each other."
Designing student visa programs this way created an enormous incentive for both colleges and students to expand + take advantage of low-quality degree programs.
This is something Tory MP Neil O'Brien covered well in this 2023 Substack post, "The Deliveroo Visa Scandal":
The political backlash to all this is growing and, in my view, the UK will end with enormous, long-lasting cuts to immigration in part because of these mistakes (and not building housing, but that's another conversation...).
So what lessons does this have for how the US should design skilled immigration policy? Here are a few:
1. Skilled immigration programs need to be ruthlessly and narrowly focused on admitting the highest-paid applicants. High salaries are hard to game or fake. It's the most transparent criteria you can set.
2. Ignore appeals to "labor shortages." This is something that both many proponents and opponents of skilled immigration get wrong. There is no widespread agreement on what an industry or occupation-specific labor shortage actually means. Nor is there much reason to think that filling "shortages" is any better than simply trying to attract the most talented, well-paid people.
3. Do not outsource your immigration system to university admissions offices. Their incentives are not aligned with maximizing the long-term economic and fiscal benefits to the country. "Stapling green cards to diplomas," a longtime zombie proposal from my fellow pro-high-skilled immigration advocates, would create perverse incentives that would be difficult to combat.
These are many of the same lessons my colleagues and I wrote about in January in our report, Exceptional By Design, which laid out in detail a new vision for America's high-skilled immigration system. I'm biased, of course, but I think everything we've seen since reinforces what we wrote here. I highly encourage you to check it out:
NEW: You've probably seen this viral NY Fed chart on unemployment for recent grads by major. It's a table that's spawned a thousand hot takes about higher ed funding, the death of CS, and even immigration.
But look under the hood and you'll find it's deeply misleading. 1/
The data comes from the 2023 ACS.
This table filters for college grads 22-27 with one of 180+ majors. The sample sizes are absolutely tiny.
Using special weights from Census, we can calculate the confidence intervals for these unemployment rates. They're *HUGE*.
2/
The headline unemployment rate for computer engineering majors is 7.5%. That's high, and set off alarm bells.
But we can only say with 95% confidence that the unemployment rate for these majors is between 4% and 11%.
3/
Rising unemployment among recent college graduates is not correlated with exposure to AI, per a new @InnovateEconomy paper from @ngoldschlag + @SarahEckha89223.
Recent grads most exposed to AI actually have much *lower* unemployment.
@InnovateEconomy @ngoldschlag @SarahEckha89223 More from Nathan and Sarah's piece:
AI is not pushing the most exposed workers out of the labor force.
@InnovateEconomy @ngoldschlag @SarahEckha89223 If AI were causing job displacement, we'd expect to see the most exposed workers switching occupations at a higher rate. That's not happening.
They have a high baseline occupation-switching rate, but it hasn't budged in the GPT era.
Devastating takedown of Bidenomics/"the post-neoliberal delusion" from @jasonfurman
He writes:
-ARP was 3x too big
-The manufacturing agenda whiffed on creating jobs and low-end wage growth
-Fear of environmentalists nuked the value of infrastructure $
@jasonfurman Furman points out that manufacturing's employment share continued its long-run decline.
As @ModeledBehavior and I showed in October, neither the promise of benefits for China Shock-ed places nor a revival of unionized manufacturing jobs materialized. agglomerations.substack.com/p/manufacturin…
The failure to take permitting reform seriously until 2024 — and having no infrastructure cost control agenda whatsoever — even undercut the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, which was supposed to be a signature accomplishment quickly delivering tangible benefits.
New: Demographic collapse has arrived in major American cities.
Between 2020 and 2023, large urban counties' under five population fell 8%. In NYC, it fell 18%. Los Angeles, 14%. Cook County, IL, 15%.
1/x
Falling birthrates mean the number of young kids nationwide is falling, but it's falling much more quickly in large urban counties.
Only the exurbs are seeing growth in their under-five population post-pandemic.
2/x
The "urban family exodus" has slowed since the dog days of the pandemic, but it's still happening. The number of young kids in large urban counties fell twice as fast last year as in the country overall.
Here’s what those sectors look like. It’s broad, yes. We would like to see more work done defining which industries are strategic, which are deserving of reshoring or friendshoring, etc. But for now, here’s what our definition looks like.
First, D.C. faced one of the largest shocks to population totals--as measured by share of April '20 population--of the top 25 largest cities in America. Only five cities saw larger population declines between through July 2022.