Thread by @TrumpWHUpdates

HERE’S WHAT’S IN THE NEWLY RELEASED EPSTEIN FILES

We used AI to process the entire release.

Thread below (🧵)
VIEWER DISCRETION ADVISED

Just NINE DAYS prior to Jeffrey Epstein’s reported suicide, Bureau of Prisons documents report he was NOT a suicide risk.

The first document is a report on the investigation into the facility in which Jeffrey Epstein was held, and in which he died.

The executive summary outlines the findings of the Department of Justice Inspector General's investigation into the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ handling of Jeffrey Epstein’s custody and care at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York. It highlights systemic failures including staffing shortages, inadequate supervision, and policy violations, particularly leading up to Epstein’s death by suicide in August 2019. The report notes an earlier suicide attempt on July 23, inconsistencies in cell checks, and insufficient adherence to suicide watch protocols.

The report details the days leading up to Jeffrey Epstein's death, highlighting significant lapses in prison protocol, including failure to assign him a new cellmate, falsified logs, and inadequate monitoring. Despite having recently signed a new will and showing signs of distress, staff failed to conduct mandatory checks, and on August 10, Epstein was found hanging in his cell. The timeline of events reveals procedural violations, miscommunications, and a lack of appropriate response, culminating in his death and subsequent autopsy confirming suicide by hanging.

The OIG concluded that Epstein’s death was a result of compounded failures by MCC New York staff, including malfunctioning security cameras, falsified records, and disregard for mandated inmate supervision protocols. While evidence confirmed suicide and ruled out foul play, the investigation revealed procedural lapses, inadequate surveillance, and insufficient adherence to BOP policies. The report highlights systemic issues in SHU operations and notes that although criminal charges were brought against two staff members for falsifying records, broader prosecutorial action was declined.

The OIG reaffirmed that no evidence supported foul play in Epstein's death and emphasized that surveillance footage, inmate and staff interviews, and physical evidence were all consistent with suicide. However, the report strongly criticized MCC New York for repeated systemic failures—including lack of inmate supervision, staff negligence, and disregard for BOP policies—that created conditions enabling Epstein to die by suicide. The report concluded with eight recommendations for the BOP, urging accountability and reform to prevent such lapses from recurring.

Chapter 1 outlines the scope and purpose of the OIG investigation into the Bureau of Prisons’ failures surrounding Jeffrey Epstein's custody and death while detained at MCC New York. It reiterates the systemic issues previously identified across BOP institutions—such as understaffing, broken security systems, and policy violations—which were again evident in Epstein’s case. The chapter describes the circumstances of Epstein’s death, including the discovery of his body on August 10, 2019, and the immediate staff and medical response.

The concluding page reinforces that Jeffrey Epstein’s cause of death was ruled a suicide by hanging, and confirms that the FBI found no evidence of criminal wrongdoing. The OIG identified multiple policy violations and staff failures, including not assigning Epstein a required cellmate, allowing an unmonitored phone call, and falsifying records to conceal the lack of inmate checks. These systemic oversights and misconduct enabled conditions for Epstein to die by suicide while under federal custody, despite prior suicide concerns.

This section details how MCC New York staff failed to conduct mandated inmate counts and 30-minute rounds in the SHU between the evening of August 9 and the morning of August 10, 2019, falsely certifying logs to claim they had. These failures left Jeffrey Epstein unmonitored and locked in his cell for hours, with excessive bedding material later used in his suicide. While the OIG found clear misconduct and policy violations, it confirmed the FBI's finding that there was no evidence of foul play, corroborated by surveillance footage, staff interviews, and inmate testimonies.

This section reiterates that Epstein’s autopsy findings support death by suicide, not homicide, citing the lack of defensive injuries. It underscores the systemic and repeated failures by BOP personnel—such as falsified records, under-staffing, and neglect of suicide prevention protocols—that allowed Epstein the opportunity to die by suicide while in federal custody. The OIG emphasizes the urgency for DOJ and BOP leadership to address these long-standing institutional deficiencies, which have compromised the safety and integrity of the prison system.

Chapter 2 provides background on Jeffrey Epstein’s criminal charges, his arrest on July 6, 2019, and subsequent detention at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) New York due to being deemed a flight risk and danger to the community. It describes MCC New York’s function as a pretrial detention center and details Epstein’s placement in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) due to the publicity surrounding his case. The chapter also notes that Correctional Officer Tova Noel and Material Handler Michael Thomas were responsible for submitting falsified count and round logs the night Epstein died.

This section details the criminal charges brought against Correctional Officer Noel and Material Handler Thomas for falsifying records and failing to conduct required inmate counts and rounds, creating the false appearance of Epstein being monitored. Both entered deferred prosecution agreements, admitting to their misconduct and fulfilling conditions such as community service and cooperation with authorities; charges were later dismissed. The OIG found broader administrative failures beyond these two individuals, identifying widespread misconduct and negligence among MCC New York staff.

The OIG reviewed extensive evidence—including over 127,000 documents, surveillance footage, electronic communications, and medical and institutional records—to investigate Jeffrey Epstein’s custody and death. It also conducted interviews with 54 witnesses and forensic analysis of digital devices, but noted that some key witnesses, including Epstein’s fellow inmates and attorney, declined to cooperate. The section begins transitioning into the legal standards governing BOP staff conduct, referencing federal ethics rules designed to uphold integrity in government service.

This section outlines the ethical and professional standards of conduct required of Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employees, emphasizing integrity, truthful cooperation in investigations, and proper use of government resources. It explains the legal implications of making false statements under federal law and the expectations for candor during official inquiries. Additionally, it describes the purpose and regulations governing Special Housing Units (SHUs), where inmates like Epstein may be placed for safety, disciplinary, or administrative reasons, separate from the general prison population.

This section details the conditions and operational requirements for inmates housed in the SHU, including limited time out of cells, mandatory showers, supervised movement, and strict procedures for food and visitor security. BOP policies mandate mental health assessments after 30 consecutive days in SHU and require staff to complete quarterly SHU-specific training. It also outlines rigorous inmate accountability protocols, including five daily counts—some requiring inmates to stand—and dual-officer verification to prevent discrepancies or unauthorized movement.

This section expands on inmate accountability protocols in SHUs, including how counts must be verified, documented, and reconciled with the master count by control officers and lieutenants. It emphasizes mandatory 30-minute inmate observation rounds, daily documentation of inmate status and transfers, and weekly housing unit searches to uphold safety and order. The page also introduces the requirement for psychological screening of pretrial inmates, noting that initial assessments must be conducted within 48 hours of arrival.

This section describes the Bureau of Prisons’ suicide prevention protocols, which mandate immediate screening and observation for inmates identified as at-risk, particularly within SHUs. Inmates believed to be imminently suicidal are placed on suicide watch with 24-hour observation, minimal furnishings, and specific attire like smocks and blankets to prevent self-harm. Psychological observation, a less restrictive form of monitoring, follows suicide watch and was used at MCC New York to assess inmates’ readiness to return to regular housing.

This section outlines BOP’s emergency suicide response procedures, requiring immediate resuscitation efforts even in cases where death appears certain—protocols relevant to Epstein’s discovery on August 10, 2019. It also covers inmate discipline policy, noting that “self-mutilation” (which could encompass wrist-cutting or suicide attempts) is categorized as a serious offense. In Epstein’s case, an earlier incident on July 23 prompted questions of self-harm, but MCC staff ultimately declined to pursue disciplinary charges due to insufficient evidence and his subsequent placement on psychological observation.

This page details BOP telephone and property policies relevant to Epstein’s case, including the rare allowance of monitored calls outside the Inmate Telephone System during crises—such as the unrecorded, unauthorized phone call Epstein was permitted to make the night before his death. It also describes SHU restrictions on inmate property, including limits on linens, which contrasts with the excessive number of sheets found in Epstein’s cell—some fashioned into nooses—after his suicide. These lapses highlight failures in adhering to protocols meant to prevent access to potential suicide tools.

This timeline page outlines key events leading to Epstein's incarceration, including his July 2, 2019 indictment for sex trafficking and his July 6 arrest and placement at MCC New York. On July 7, due to concerns about his mental state and high-profile status, Epstein was assigned to the Special Housing Unit (SHU). The timeline also references prior upgrades to MCC's malfunctioning security camera system, which later failed to capture key footage during the time of Epstein's death.

This page provides a detailed timeline of Epstein’s psychological assessments following his July 8 arraignment, during which he denied suicidal thoughts but was placed on psychological observation due to his high-profile status. He underwent a formal suicide risk evaluation on July 9, was assigned a cellmate on July 10, and had brief follow-ups with psychologists on July 11 and July 16. Despite a scheduled 30-day psychological review for SHU inmates on July 18, Epstein was not included as he was no longer under observation at the time.

This page documents a critical incident on July 23, 2019, when Epstein was found semi-conscious in his cell with a ligature around his neck, prompting his transfer to suicide watch. Although Epstein initially claimed his cellmate tried to kill him, he later said he did not recall the incident, and daily psychological evaluations from July 25–29 noted his consistent denial of suicidal intent. On July 29, the Psychology Department cleared him to return to the SHU, despite lingering concerns about his well-being.

On July 30, 2019, Epstein was transferred back to the SHU and housed with a new cellmate (Inmate 3), per a psychologist's directive that he be placed with a suitable cellmate. Disciplinary proceedings for alleged self-mutilation were dropped due to insufficient evidence, and Epstein continued to claim no memory of how he sustained the neck injuries. Notably, a critical disk failure in MCC’s DVR 2 security system—responsible for recording many SHU cameras—occurred around this time, but went unnoticed until after Epstein’s death.

Between August 1–9, 2019, Epstein consistently denied suicidal thoughts during multiple psychological evaluations, despite a prior “suicidal tendencies” notation by U.S. Marshals. On August 8, he secretly signed a new Last Will and Testament during a legal meeting, and on August 9, his cellmate was transferred without replacement—violating BOP policy requiring continuous cellmate assignment. That same day, MCC staff finally discovered a critical DVR system failure affecting half the SHU cameras, yet failed to restore functionality before Epstein’s death.

On the evening of August 9, 2019, Epstein was improperly allowed an unmonitored phone call and returned to his cell alone—without a cellmate—despite BOP policy requiring continuous housing with one. That night, MCC staff failed to conduct mandatory inmate counts or 30-minute rounds, leaving Epstein unsupervised. At approximately 6:30 a.m. on August 10, he was found dead in his cell, hanging from a bunk bed with a noose made from torn orange cloth.

On the morning of August 10, 2019, Epstein was found hanging in his cell and, despite immediate CPR and emergency response, was pronounced dead at 7:36 a.m. at New York Presbyterian Hospital. The DVR 2 camera system—covering Epstein’s unit—had catastrophically failed, and the FBI later confirmed no recordings were available after July 29. The Chief Medical Examiner conducted an autopsy on August 11 and publicly confirmed on August 16 that Epstein died by suicide through hanging.

Chapter 4 begins by detailing Jeffrey Epstein’s July 6, 2019 arrest upon his return from France and his subsequent detention at MCC New York. Due to media attention and the nature of his charges involving the sexual abuse of minors, Epstein was quickly transferred to the Special Housing Unit (SHU) for his protection. A federal judge denied Epstein’s request for home detention, citing the seriousness of his offenses, risk of witness tampering, and the likelihood that he would flee if released.

This page elaborates on the court's reasoning for denying Epstein’s pretrial release, citing his flight risk, foreign ties, vast assets, and lack of transparency. After his initial placement in general population, Epstein was moved to the Special Housing Unit (SHU) on July 7, 2019, due to widespread media attention and safety concerns. The SHU’s strict confinement conditions kept him locked down for roughly 23 hours per day, and Epstein spent most of his time meeting attorneys in a dedicated conference room during his detention.

This page outlines the physical layout and access restrictions of MCC New York’s SHU, where Epstein was housed, emphasizing tight security measures including multiple locked doors and limited key access for Correctional Officers. Epstein’s cell was located within one of six tiers, each tier tightly controlled and isolated. Despite these stringent protocols, Epstein was able to remain unsupervised and ultimately take his life, highlighting critical breakdowns in adherence to procedures within a facility explicitly designed to prevent such incidents.

This figure provides visual context of the MCC New York Special Housing Unit (SHU) entrance on the ninth floor, where Jeffrey Epstein was held prior to his death. It includes photos of the main interior and exterior entry doors, along with a schematic showing their locations in the facility. These restricted-access entry points underscore the high-security design of the SHU—intended to limit movement and enhance monitoring, yet ultimately ineffective in preventing Epstein’s suicide.

Secondary entrance

Tiered Structure of SHU (2D)

3D Tiered Structure of where Epstein was held when he died.

Stairways leading to SHU Upper & Lower Tiers

This section details the July 23, 2019 incident in which Epstein was discovered semi-conscious in his cell with a noose made of orange cloth around his neck. Despite conflicting accounts—including Epstein’s initial claim that his cellmate tried to kill him and later denial of memory—he was immediately placed on suicide watch and moved to the Health Services Unit. Multiple BOP staff reports and interviews confirm Epstein was found with red marks on his neck, prompting CPR and continuous observation, though some staff noted inconsistencies in his statements.

This page compiles witness accounts from MCC staff and fellow inmates about the events of July 23, 2019, when Epstein was found semi-conscious with a noose made from torn orange cloth. Epstein gave conflicting accounts—at times implicating his cellmate, later claiming no memory of the incident—and medical staff documented injuries consistent with attempted hanging. Inmate and staff statements suggest confusion over what occurred, but all point to a significant lapse in monitoring that led to Epstein being placed on suicide watch later that morning.

After being removed from suicide watch on July 24, 2019, Epstein remained under psychological observation until July 30, during which he was housed alone in the same cell. The Chief Psychologist explained that although inmates coming off suicide watch are usually recommended to be housed with a cellmate, that guidance was not always followed due to security constraints—such as in Epstein’s case. Following the July 23 incident, both psychological and disciplinary reviews were conducted, ultimately concluding there was insufficient evidence to determine if Epstein had harmed himself or been assaulted.

This page details how, following Epstein’s removal from suicide watch on July 30, 2019, the Psychology Department formally determined he should be housed with a cellmate, and this instruction was communicated to over 70 MCC New York staff. Multiple officials—including the Warden, Associate Warden, and Captain—confirmed awareness of this requirement and believed it was being enforced. Despite this, Epstein was ultimately left alone in his cell on August 9, directly violating the post-observation guidance meant to mitigate suicide risk.

Despite broad institutional awareness that Epstein required a cellmate after his release from psychological observation, he was left alone in his cell on August 9, 2019. A list of suitable cellmates had been vetted, and Epstein was assigned to cell 204-206 with Inmate 3, but no one followed up to ensure a replacement was assigned after Inmate 3 was transferred. This failure reflects a breakdown in communication and procedure, which left Epstein unsupervised in violation of the post-watch housing directive.

This page recounts statements from Inmate 3, Epstein’s final cellmate, who noted that staff dismissed his concerns about being assigned to a cell with someone recently on suicide watch. Inmate 3 was surprised by lax enforcement of rules—like being allowed to sleep on the floor—and was told to "keep an eye on" Epstein, with no formal designation as a suicide prevention advocate. Notably, the cell they shared had a direct line of sight to the SHU Officers’ Station, yet Epstein was later left alone with an unusual number of mattresses and linens, which were later used in his suicide.

This figure shows the precise location of Jeffrey Epstein’s cell within the L Tier of the MCC New York SHU, which had direct line-of-sight access from the SHU Officers’ Station. The accompanying photograph, taken by the NYC Medical Examiner’s Office, depicts the corridor outside Epstein’s cell and shows torn orange cloth on the floor—believed to be the same type used in his suicide. The image and schematic emphasize how physically close Epstein’s cell was to staff, yet he was still left unmonitored in the hours before his death.

This figure presents exterior views of Jeffrey Epstein’s cell in the L Tier of the MCC New York SHU, including a photo of the cell door sealed with evidence tape following his death. The images, accompanied by a schematic layout, help illustrate the physical security environment in which Epstein was housed. Despite being in a controlled, restricted-access area, the conditions still failed to prevent his unsupervised suicide.

NEVER BEFORE SEEN IMAGE: THIS IS THE INTERIOR OF THE NYC PRISON CELL IN WHICH JEFFREY EPSTEIN DIED

This section outlines the psychological evaluations conducted on Epstein during his time at MCC New York, beginning with a medical screening on July 6, 2019, where he denied suicidal thoughts or past attempts. A Facilities Assistant flagged Epstein as appearing "distraught" the next day, prompting a psychological intake screening on July 8 by a forensic psychologist. Throughout his detention, Epstein was assessed by various professionals and received multiple medical evaluations, including for mental health, though no acute suicidal ideation was officially documented at intake.

During initial intake screenings, Epstein denied any mental health history, suicidal ideation, or substance abuse, and was classified as a Mental Health Care Code 1—indicating no psychological concerns. However, based on his high-profile status, charges, and risk of receiving distressing court news, the Chief Psychologist placed him on psychological observation beginning July 8, 2019, under a discretionary "watch status." While on observation, Epstein was monitored in 15-minute increments, despite not exhibiting direct signs of suicide risk at the time.

Between July 9–11, 2019, MCC New York psychologists assessed Epstein multiple times, consistently noting his denial of suicidal ideation and identifying protective factors like legal optimism and engagement in self-care. While Epstein expressed concerns about housing in the SHU and requested to be "single-celled," the Chief Psychologist ultimately determined that he was psychologically stable and could be returned to regular SHU housing. Despite documented recommendations that he be housed with a cellmate, Epstein was cleared from psychological observation and moved back to the SHU without immediate enforcement of those recommendations.