1/14
Barry Eichengreen warns, correctly, that "The dollar’s international primacy isn’t eternal. To be sustained, it has to be actively fostered and preserved."
But why sustain the dollar’s international primacy? Is this merely a modern monetary fetish? wsj.com/finance/curren…
2/14
While the primacy of the dollar is certainly good for bankers, financiers, and very wealthy owners of movable capital, what's much less obvious is the extent to which it benefits or harms American workers, manufacturers and middle class households.
3/14
Some analysts will argue that being able to transact in dollars benefits American exporters and importers by reducing currency hedging costs, but the more honest ones will acknowledge that the benefits are tiny, at best, and that their lack doesn't seem to hamper rivals.
4/14
More importantly, USD primacy doesn't just mean that American businesses transact in dollars, something which occurs anyway in most very large economies. It means that the US dollar dominates International trade and capital flows in a way never before seen in history.
5/14
It means that when a Belgian company sells chemicals to Argentina, it does so in dollars, and when Argentina pays for these by selling soybeans to China, it does so in dollars. It also means that developing countries borrow mostly in dollars (even though they would be...
6/14
much better off diversifying away from the volatility associated with borrowing in one currency).
But while these transactions may benefit American banks, it is hard to see how American workers, manufacturers or middle-class households benefit at all from any of this.
7/14
What's missed in this fetishization of USD primacy are the costs. In order to maintain USD primacy, the US must, among other policies, maintain a completely open capital account in a global trading regime in which many of its most important trade partners and rivals...
8/14
restrict their capital accounts, manage their currencies, and intervene in trade.
We live, in other words, in a world in which countries have chosen radically different positions in the tradeoff between economic sovereignty and global integration.
9/14
But every country's external and internal imbalances must be consistent, and every country's external imbalance must be consistent with the external imbalances of its trade partners. This means that the domestic economies of countries that have chosen...
10/14
more global integration (like the US) must accommodate the industrial policies of countries that have chosen more economic sovereignty. Dollar primacy is part of a system that requires that the US economy accommodate external imbalances. carnegieendowment.org/china-financia…
11/14
Is it worth the cost? In 1925, England returned to pre-War gold parity because of an almost mystical belief in gold parity. This return was aggressively supported by London bankers, eager to restore national pride and the prestige of London's financial sector.
12/14
But it came at a huge cost to British manufacturing and mining, including high unemployment and falling wages. Keynes criticized England's willingness to subordinate its economy to the needs of its financial sector as being based on little more than a kind of gold "fetish".
13/14
Many Americans today are equally willing to subordinate the needs of the economy to USD primacy (which also includes sanctioning capacity and a little bit of dubious national pride), but this too may involve little more than a near-mystical commitment to a monetary fetish.
14/14
I'd argue that the purpose of US monetary policy should be to support growth and reduce fragility in the domestic economy. The role of the US dollar in the global trade and capital regime should just be a residual that reflects the health of the US economy.
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1/10
Interesting new IMF paper on the extent of industrial policy subsidies to Chinese manufacturers and SOEs (to the extent information is available) and their impact on productivity. imf.org/en/Publication…
2/10
It measures national-level cash subsidies, tax benefits, subsidized credit, and subsidized land, which collectively amount, it says, to a high 4% of GDP. The authors note that other subsidies exist, including sub-national subsidies, but these are harder to measure.
3/10
I'd include in the latter what is perhaps among the biggest subsidies, which is over-spending on logistical infrastructure. To the extent that these cost more in resources than they create in economic value, they represent a large transfer to the users of the infrastructure.
1/5 Is the expansion in robotaxis driven by the needs of the economy or by policy decisions? This is not a topic on which I have much information or knowledge, but last week I told a Chinese friend of mine (a well-known economist) that I had heard that as many as 30% of the...
2/5 cars in Beijing streets were Didi drivers (China's Uber). This struck me as an incredibly high number.
He told me that he thought in fact 30% might actually be a low estimate. He also told me that he believed Didi drivers aren't able to get more than one fare an hour.
3/5 Whatever the real numbers are, no one seems to doubt that driving Didi or delivering packages has become the job of last resort for a worryingly high number of urban dwellers. If that's the case, it's not clear how improvements in the productivity of taxis or of...
1/7 Although August CPI deflation widened year on year to -0.4%, compared to 0.0% in July and well above expectations of -0.2%, leading many analysts to worry that deflation in China is accelerating, I think prices actually did fine. en.people.cn/n3/2025/0910/c…
2/7 CPI was driven down mostly by a 4.3% decline in food prices, with core inflation up 0.9%, its sixth straight month of higher year-on-year prices. More importantly, in my opinion, month-on-month CPI prices were flat in August, after rising 0.4% in July.
3/7 The fight against “involution” may be responsible for at least part of the deceleration in deflation in the past two months, although if this is the case, it leaves open the question of how long Beijing can keep deflation at bay.
1/7 NYT: "Through August, China exported $141 billion to Africa, while importing $81 billion. The widening trade imbalance with Africa stems from surging exports of Chinese-made batteries, solar panels, electric vehicles and industrial equipment." nytimes.com/2025/09/08/bus…
2/7 "The swell in exports to Africa," it continues, "along with record volumes of goods sold to Southeast Asia and Latin America, underscores the resilience of Chinese manufacturers in finding new markets for the products they continue to churn out in enormous quantities."
3/7 Meanwhile, as Chinese trade surpluses surge, so do American trade deficits. This is not mainly because of transshipments, as many assume. It is because countries with expanding trade surpluses with the US use their higher revenues to fund deficits with the rest of the world.
1/7 For all the talk of rebalancing domestic demand in China, Chinese exports continue to climb much faster than imports in 2025. In the first seven months of 2025, exports were up 6.9% in RMB terms, while imports were up 1.2%. english.news.cn/20250908/e41cd…
2/7 For just the month of August, exports were up 4.4% year on year to $321.8 billion while imports were up 1.3% to $219.5 billion, leaving China with a trade surplus of $102.3 billion, its fifth trade surplus this month of over $100 billion, with five out of...
3/7 its nine monthly trade surpluses in excess of $100 billion having occurred in 2025. Year to date, China’s trade surplus is $787.5 billion, a whopping 29% increase over the same period last year.
1/6 I often make fun of the sheer hysteria that tariffs generate amount academic economists, but Navarro's comment is just as hysterical, even if in the opposite way. Tariffs are not tax cuts.
2/6 They are, like many other policies, a mechanism for transferring income from one sector of the economy to another, in this case from households to producers. In that sense they work like a currency devaluation, by taxing imports and subsidizing exports.
3/6 They have broadly the same impact as policies that restrain wage growth, or that lower credit costs to producers. In each of those cases, as I explain in the article below, they work by changing the relationship between production and consumption. imf.org/en/Publication…