How does a militia hijack the identity of Yemen itself to legitimize its global attacks?
Their weapon is the country's digital identity: the hijacked .YE domain.
Here is the undeniable evidence of how they built a digital infrastructure for military extortion. 🧵
#FreeDotYE
First, they corrupted a real national institution.
Once a genuine national institution, saba[.ye] was Yemen’s official news agency. Under Houthi control it has become a propaganda outlet.
In this news report, it goes further: directing international maritime traffic to info@navy[.gov.ye], an email under a hijacked government domain. This impersonates the Yemeni Navy and uses the national domain system to legitimize the militia.
From co-opting old institutions, they escalated to creating new fake ones for military threats.
As reported by @reuters, they used another .gov.ye email to threaten a Greek shipping company, this time posing as a Yemeni government "Humanitarian Operations Center." But the deception goes deeper.
They built an entire digital shadow state.
The Houthis launched hocc[.gov.ye], a complete website for their fake "Humanitarian Center," claiming to be a legal entity acting on behalf of the Republic of Yemen.
This fake state body now runs a parallel maritime authority.
It has official .gov.ye emails for everything from "inquiries" (info@) to "safe transit clearances" (clearances@) and even "delisting" from their own sanctions list (delisting@).
The purpose of this sophisticated facade is explicit. Their own website states that any vessel violating their "ban" will be subject to "military targeting."
They are using the hijacked identity of Yemen to conduct military extortion.
This is the ultimate consequence of digital state capture. The hijacked .YE domain is being used to threaten international shipping, undermine maritime law, and create a parallel government that claims to be Yemen.
The responsibility for this global security risk lies with @ICANN.
The identity of Yemen belongs to its people, not a militia. The world's internet authorities must act.
We demand the redelegation of .YE.
Share this thread to show how a hijacked domain enables these threats to global security.
كيف تستخدم ميليشيا الحوثي هوية اليمن الرقمية لتشرعن هجماتها العالمية؟
في هذه السلسلة من المنشورات نستعرض كيفية بنائهم بنية تحتية رقمية كاملة للابتزاز العسكري. 🧵
#FreeDotYE
أولاً، سيطروا على مؤسسة وطنية حقيقية وحرفوها.
موقع saba[.ye] كان تابع لوكالة الأنباء اليمنية الرسمية(سبأ). اليوم، أصبح منصة سياسية دعائية لجماعة الحوثي.
في المقال المنشور توجه الملاحة البحرية إلى بريد تابع للميليشيا info@navy[.gov.ye]، منتحلين صفة البحرية اليمنية.
ثم تصاعد الأمر إلى تهديدات عسكرية مباشرة.
كما ورد في تقرير لرويترز اعادت نشره @IndyArabia، استخدموا بريداً آخر ينتهي بـ .gov.ye لتهديد شركة شحن يونانية، هذه المرة منتحلين صفة "مركز عمليات إنسانية" تابع للحكومة اليمنية. لكن التضليل أعمق من ذلك.
After 2014, Houthis captured TeleYemen, YemenNet & Yemen Mobile. They purged staff & installed loyalists supervised by Iran's IRGC and Hezbollah, giving them total control over state infrastructure.
#FreeDotYE
Step 2: Eliminate the Private Sector.
- Sabafon was confiscated.
- Y-Telecom was nationalized.
- MTN was forced out & replaced by YOU-Telecom.
As @RegainYemen documents, the entire telecom market now serves the Houthis militia.
We formally requested @ICANN & @theiana to redelegate Yemen’s .YE domain. Why? Because it’s hijacked by a militia, used for propaganda, censorship & repression. Full letter: #FreeDotYEfreethedotye.org/letter
saba.ye = Houthi “state” news mmy.ye = Houthi military media
Both under .YE, both projecting false legitimacy. This is not neutral management
it’s propaganda infrastructure.
Houthis don’t just censor. They surveil, hack, kidnap. Journalists have been detained & killed. UN staff abducted. A ccTLD steward linked to these abuses cannot be trusted.
🚨 نطاق اليمن .YE مستولى عليه من قبل الحوثيين. منذ 2015، يسيطر الحوثيون عبر "تيليمن" على كل مواقع .ye و .gov.ye و .edu.ye.
الحكومة الشرعية فشلت في استعادته، ولهذا أطلقنا نحن كأفراد هذه الحملة.
#FreeDotYE 🔗 freethedotye.org
يستخدم الحوثيون نطاق .YE لمنح أنفسهم شرعية زائفة.
مواقع مثل saba.ye و mmy.ye ليست مؤسسات حكومية، بل مجرد منصات دعائية تحت سيطرة ورقابة المليشيا. #FreeDotYE
صحفيون مستقلون خُطفوا أو اختفوا أو قُتلوا في مناطق الحوثي. موظفو الأمم المتحدة والمنظمات محتجزون. ومع ذلك، يسمح لنفس هذه الجماعة الإرهابية أن تدير نطاق اليمن الرسمي. #FreeDotYE
🚨 Yemen’s national domain .YE is hijacked. Since 2015, Houthis have controlled it via TeleYemen, running every .ye, .gov.ye & .edu.ye site.
The recognized government failed to reclaim it. So we, as individuals, are raising our voices.
#FreeDotYE 🔗 freethedotye.org
Houthis use .YE to project false legitimacy.
Websites like saba.ye & mmy.ye pretend to be government institutions.
In reality, they’re propaganda outlets, monitored and censored by a militia.
#FreeDotYE
Yemen’s recognized government does not use .YE.
They’ve been forced onto .org .com and .net.
Weak leadership and lack of will left .YE entirely in Houthi hands.
We cannot wait for them.
#FreeDotYE