Thread by @OlenaWave

The #Ukrainian analytical resource #Resurgam has outlined its predictions for the development of events and #Russia's behavior in light of the latest attack by Russian drones on #Polish territory.

Some of the thoughts are worth to translate:

Putin Will Test NATO Article 5 to Continue War in Ukraine.

💬 All the escalation that is currently gaining momentum from the Kremlin — and will continue to do so — is both an attempt to scare Europe away from the intentions that have finally reached consensus in leading

European capitals, and to convince Xi Jinping to provide better assistance than what is currently available.

Article 5 can be tested not only through direct military invasion, as this is a high risk for the Kremlin, but also by using hybrid methods that

deliberately fall short of the “necessary level of escalation” (direct war), but gradually blur the boundaries of Article 5.

Internal interventions in European politics will be carried out not on the basis of “hard/soft power”, but using “sharp power”. In the end, little by little, in small steps, reducing the risk for itself (the Kremlin), Moscow will try to destroy trust in NATO, because any

agreement is based not on a signature on paper, but on trust and confidence in its implementation.

That is, in general, we are not talking about an invasion of Finland or the Baltics, but about such methods as: flying UAVs and missiles, border provocations, sabotage on European territory, demonstrative aggressive actions and statements combined with interference in European

elections,bribing elites,etc.

And then these small steps in the long term will collectively become one big step towards the destruction of NATO—undermining trust without the risks of direct war for the Kremlin.

So why does Putin need to accelerate an undeclared war on NATO now?

The answer is paradoxical - to continue the war in Ukraine, despite the fact that the Kremlin is forced to divert resources from Ukraine for such operations against NATO.

The point is that in 2026 Putin will face a key problem:

• either reduce the resources allocated to the war, which will further slow down the pace of achieving the set military goals;
• or freeze the war for a respite (primarily economic).

If you choose the first option, it means destroying the economy and plunging it into the state of the 90s.

🔄 But there is a third option - to reduce support for Ukraine, then, accordingly, fewer resources will be needed for military purposes in Ukraine, and, accordingly, the

To achieve this goal, the Kremlin focused on: Trump and the expansion of the conflict space, to which the West (Europe) would be forced to react.

The Kremlin's bet was on Trump's arrival, and as a result, a complete cessation of support for Ukraine in 2025 (even the support provided by Biden).

Trump has reduced support for Ukraine and done a lot in favor of the Kremlin, but due to the fact that European support has

significantly increased both in quantitative and qualitative dimensions of cooperation, most of the American losses are being covered, and Ukraine's critical needs have actually been "bought from the Americans at European expense."

➡️ So the combination of financial, military (for example,in 2025 Europe itself will transfer 2 million ammunition from production + 1 million under the "Czech initiative") and political support provides stability of resources for UA in 2026 and lays the

foundation for the years ahead.

The Kremlin's attempts to stretch Europe in other directions have not yielded results. The operations to destabilize the Balkans through Dodik, as well as the attempt to destabilize Gagauzia in Moldova, were preemptively destroyed, as was

the attempt in the Caucasus. On the other hand, the effect and attention of Europe to the war in the Middle East has decreased due to the specificity of Israel's actions and lower intensity.

The Kremlin cannot afford to open a "second front" - because there are simply no resources, since 90% of its forces have been concentrated in Ukraine since the end of 2022.

Hybrid threats, through provoking local conflicts, are becoming a more difficult task for the Kremlin due to the decline in the quality of influence, the quality of agents, and the gradual "vaccination" of Europe through the "Moscow virus" (threats): as stated in 2024 by the

then head of the CIA, Burns, and the head of British intelligence, Richard Moore, at a joint event.

At an open event for journalists, they emphasized that the quality of Moscow agents has dropped significantly and the Kremlin's main force is becoming not professionals, but

criminals and teenagers.
So the Kremlin needs a conflict to which Europe would react and, as a result, reduce its support for Ukraine.

➡️ And such a solution is Taiwan 🇹🇼

A potential Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan, according to Taiwanese intelligence, should take place in 2027. But not only is this too late for the Kremlin, but 2027 is now in doubt regarding China's intentions. For Xi Jinping, an

invasion or blockade of Taiwan is of existential importance, and therefore there is no way to "lose" there.

For this, Beijing needs three components:

🛑1. Speed ​​to avoid reactions and consequences — to avoid repeating the Kremlin's mistakes.

🛑2. Lack of consolidated support for Taiwan from the US and Europe
🛑3. China's military balance of power with US forces and their allies

Due to a number of China's economic problems,the modernization of the naval component to the level of the US is not possible before the '30s

Beijing needs to get out of the crisis, as the largest budget deficit this year has been increased again. Beijing recently increased the budget deficit for 2025 from 3% to 4% of GDP, or by $179 billion. The total budget deficit in 2025 is $786 billion.

Therefore, a significant proportion of analysts in the region believe that Beijing will not be ready for aggression against Taiwan before the 2030s.

But Putin needs it sooner.

It is worth noting that the escalation by the Kremlin is taking place against the backdrop of impunity on the part of the US, but also against the backdrop of events after the SCO meeting.