1/ Wow. There's stupid. There's really stupid. And then there is this crap from NYT opinion.
nytimes.com/2025/09/15/opi…
nytimes.com/2025/09/15/opi…
2/ First, in "analyses" like this it is always important to note what's not invoked: there's no mention of Japan or Philippines, or any other regional power that will be affected if the PRC occupies Taiwan. No mention of the PRC's promised follow on wars.... notably...
3/... the PRC military build up is glanced at, but is not presented as a factor driving events -- though that is the fundamental issue that has changed, not the behavior of Taiwan presidents....
4/ 2 profound errors here: (1) if a weapons system provokes, that means it deters (d'oh!) and (2) Beijing choses what provokes it, meaning that if our defense policy is to remove things that provoke Beijing, the PRC controls our defense policy. D'oh! 
5/ A disingenuous reading of US policy. The US *acknowledges*, but does not *recognize*, the PRC claim. The US position is that the status of Taiwan is unresolved. Either the writer has no clue what US policy is, or is being deliberately misleading. This signals a pro-PRC slant
6/Things changed not because of Tsai, who was very low-key, but because the PRC navy is now the most powerful in the region, if not the world. When the US could crush the PRC in a war, it could have any Taiwan policy it wanted. Now it can't. The driver of change is PRC....
7/ Biden was affirming longstanding US policy, well known to the PRC, which has built mock-ups of US carriers in its deserts for practice. Pelosi's visit was a good example of how (1) the PRC uses US actions as pretexts for previously decided escalation and....
8/ ... (2) how the PRC increases tensions intending to drive US policy and -- haha -- dominate and control people who talk about Taiwan. Here the writer not only falls for that, but also regurgitates the PRC narrative about the Pelosi visit. Shameful.
9/ Having eliminated Tokyo, Manila, and all other nations from the narrative, the writer can now posit that Taiwan is only important for its symbolic value and semiconductors. This narrative is an upside-down bubble world divorced from geopolitical reality....
10/ In the real world Taiwan is the cork in the bottle preventing a series of hegemonic regional wars. ....
11/ Lai's stance is the same as Tsai's. Not more confrontational. The writer's sources are very obviously pro-KMT/PRC. "Refrain from inflaming Beijing" means that the US should back down whenever Beijing wants it to -- conceding all Taiwan/US freedom of action. Note again....
12/ ...no recognition that the major factor driving the changing situation out here is PRC naval build up coupled with US decline -- if the writer wants to secure Taiwan freedom, should be recommending that the US build shipyards and shower Taiwan with missiles and drones....
13/ Instead, the writer recommends reducing weapons/training here. Yes! As history shows, great powers are always deterred by reductions in force deployments. *rolls eyes*
14/ This piece is more fit to 2005 than 2025 as it (1) blames Taiwan for its predicament (2) argues that silence and weapons reductions will keep Taiwan safe (3) oh so coyly hints that Taiwan should be abandoned -- again a position only viable if history stops....
15/ ....when Taiwan is occupied and no other nations exist.
In short, one expects this sort of pro-PRC writing from a certain flavor of thinktank. The real question is why, in world crowded with good ideas, the NYT wasted space on this essay crowded with dead ideas. /n
In short, one expects this sort of pro-PRC writing from a certain flavor of thinktank. The real question is why, in world crowded with good ideas, the NYT wasted space on this essay crowded with dead ideas. /n
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