🚾🚽How @kromark , @pustota and I found the commander of Russia's secret UAV Rubicon unit and geolocated their base, and how Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov helped us to do it (thanks to poor-quality blurring and WC sign). Thread
1/ A little further down, I will tell about the structure of the Rubicon and why it is so effective. Many thanks to @RALee85 for the conversation and for providing useful info on this topic. But first, let's get back to Solovyov and the WC sign.
2/ A total of three videos showing the ‘secret base’ of the Rubicon centre were published on the internet: one was published by the Ministry of Defence, the second by propagandist Vladimir Solovyov, and the third by Rubicon itself.
3/ In two videos, any details that could reveal the location of Rubicon's base and training centre have been carefully blurred or pixelated.
4/ But Solovyov's video allows us to determine the location of the filming: the halls of the Patriot Exhibition and Convention Centre in the Moscow region.
5/ His editors forgot to blur the sign above the entrance to the restroom with its distinctive design and the illuminated display above it.
6/ In addition, as Solovyov walks through the hall, the blur ‘slides’ to the side, revealing a column with the same cameras and loudspeaker as seen in numerous publicly available photos and videos from exhibitions at the Patriot Exhibition Centre.
7/ Footage shots in the same interiors can be also found in Rubicon's video.
8/ The Ministry of Defence video, published in October 2024, also contains several details indicating that it may have been filmed at the Patriot Exhibition Centre: for example, metal hatches in the floor with technical holes.
9/ We also discovered a garage with Rubicon equipment: it is located not far from the main centre, on the territory of the ‘Cluster VPK’ (55.56385657672371, 36.82528353671368).
10/ This is evident from the distinctive columns and the netting on the building in propagandist Solovyov's video.
11/ @pustota also found the schedule of the Patriot Centre – starting in September 2024, it will host regular ‘scientific and technical’ meetings of the Russian Ministry of Defence's Directorate for Prospective Interdisciplinary Research and Special Projects.
12/ This directorate is headed by Evgeny Shmyrin, who also appears in Solovyov's video.
13/ We were also told by a recruiter of the unit that the initial selection process for Rubicon takes place in Moscow. The one-off payment that Rubicon uses to attract new recruits is equivalent to the amount paid for signing a contract in Moscow – 2.3 million rubles.
14/ A poster on the wall in one of the videos about the unit also shows Rubicon's connection to the Moscow government.
15/ Therefore, we believe that Rubicon is permanently based at Patriot, and that the base shown in Solovyov's report was not a one-off event for a propagandist's report.
16/ @kromark and @pustota also identified the commander of the centre thanks to his commendation letters (and again, Solovyov's video). Please go and read about it from Mark.
17/ Now I will explain a little why Rubicon is so often praised by Ukrainian military personnel.
18/ For example, the Hero of Ukraine and commander of the K-2 UAV regiment Kyrylo Veres called them ‘the best and top guys.’ ‘Where they work, I don't envy our units. I just hope they don't expand.’
19/ Rubicon is not just a unit, but a higher-level structure responsible for centralized procurement and development of unmanned systems, implementation of tactics, techniques and procedures for the use of land and sea drones, as well as training operators, @RALee85 says.
20/ Rubicon receives substantial funding for research and development, and implements a strict selection process. As of spring 2025, they had seven known detachments, each with approximately 130–150 members.
21/ Six of them are subordinate to groups of forces that Russia has: Rubicon-D is, for example, Dnipro, V - Vostok, and so on. Plus, they had one reserved detachment for the overall joint forces for the war.
22/ Rubicon's strength lies in its narrowly focused organised structure with highly specialised operators, notes Rob Lee.
23/ Some units focus on FPV strikes, others on countering Ukrainian reconnaissance UAVs, others on countering night bombers, and still others use Molniya strike drones.
24/ Thus, if the Rubicon team, which specialises in UAV counterintelligence, for example, is deployed on the part of the front line, Ukrainian troops there face precisely this type of threat, but do not face attacks from FPV drones.
25/ The expert says that Rubicon's distinctive feature is its powerful radio-electronic reconnaissance, which helps to effectively locate Ukrainian drones and their operators.
26/ Attacks on Ukrainian UAV crews in some areas are having a significant effect: according to Lee, during one week of Rubicon's operation in one area, up to 70 per cent of the UAV positions of one of the Ukrainian brigades were destroyed, Rob Lee says.
27/ Rubicon also uses almost all of the main strike and reconnaissance drones in service with the Russian army, except for the Shahed and Geran.
28/ These include conventional and fibre-optic FPV drones such as the VT-40, KVN, Molniya and Lancet strike drones, ZALA reconnaissance UAVs, Orlan drones, Supercam drones, and specialised air defence drones.
29/ In the summer, naval drones were added to this list. On 28 August, the Russian MoD announced an attack by an unmanned boat on the Ukrainian reconnaissance ship Simferopol at the mouth of the Danube – this was the first time the RU army had used UAVs to strike military targets
1/ What is known about the new Russian jet drone ‘Geran-3’? Spoiler: its actual characteristics may be lower than stated.
2/ This is an analogue of the Iranian Shahed-238 (on photo) drone, the production of which in Russia is not currently at the mass production stage and is not fully localised.
3/ According to documents published by hackers, the new jet drone reached a speed of 600 kilometres per hour during a demonstration test, which is more than three times faster than the widely used Geran-2 drones.
🇺🇦⚔️To what extent can the goals of the Kursk operation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine be considered accomplished, and the operation itself - successful? On the anniversary of its beginning, we discuss these questions with @KofmanMichael, @J_JHelin and Viktor Kevlyuk.
1/ To save your time, I will not retell the chronology of the operation itself; you can read about it in my article. smarturl.click/oVwgD
2/ In September 2024, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrsky presented his vision of the operation's goals. We will primarily analyze these tasks:
🪖The shortage of infantry in the Armed Forces of Ukraine has been cited for several years as one of the main problems in the army, along with systematic errors in army management and, to a lesser extent, a shortage of ammunition and weapons.
1/ Discussed this issue with several Ukrainian military personnel, including @samotniyskhid and a soldier from one of Ukraine's elite brigades, as well as with analyst @Tatarigami_UA
2/ The first and most obvious problem for the Armed Forces of Ukraine is the difference in population between the two countries: as of 2021, Ukraine had a population of 44 million, while Russia had 144 million, a difference of more than three times.
🇺🇸🇪🇺🇷🇺Together wh @CITeam_ru verified @SecGenNATO's statement that Russia produces 12 (!!!) times more artillery ammunition annually than all NATO countries combined. Also compared the situation with other major types of weapons. Big (really) thread
1/ Our research covers six categories of weapons: artillery, ammunition, tanks, aircrafts, long-range weapons (missiles and drones), as well as air defence systems and interceptor missiles.
2/ We did not include Turkiye in our calculations of arms production in NATO countries. 🇹🇷 is also a member of the alliance and has considerable production capacity, but it also has an ambivalent position and may remain neutral in potential conflict.
In June 2024, six residents of Kyiv were injured as a result of Russian attacks. A year later, in June 2025, the number of people killed by RU drones and missiles exceeded 40, with more than 200 injured. Why have Russian strikes on Kyiv become more deadly? Here are some stats.
1/ In June 2024, the Russian army launched 332 Shahed/Geran drones and 124 missiles at Ukraine. 314 drones (95%) and 84 missiles (74%) were shot down or jammed by Ukrainian air defence systems.
2/ At that time, Russian attacks were not yet daily occurrences, and the total number of missiles and drones used in attacks rarely exceeded one hundred at a time.
🛢🪖Maybe the last, but also the most extensive article for @RFERL. Together with @Tatarigami_UA , @GeoConfirmed and a group of volunteers, we analyzed more than 100 satellite images and found out that the total damage to 🇷🇺 energy sector from 🇺🇦 strikes was at least $886 mil
1/ I won't retell the part of Tatarigami and his team - he analyzed mostly military damage🪖. I highly suggest subscribing to their Substack and reading their findings! frontelligence.substack.com/p/melting-the-…
2/ But what about gas and oil?🛢 Ukrainian drones hit oil refineries and gas processing plants (NPZ and GPZ) and oil/gas storages at least 25 times in the six months we have been looking at.