The Houthi-hijacked .YE domain isn't just about websites. It's a weaponized tool used to control Yemen's health sector.
This system of digital capture enables corruption and mismanagement with lethal outcomes. The cost is measured in Yemeni lives🩸🧵
#FreeDotYE
The instruments of this capture are official state domains, now under militia authority.
Houthi-controlled health domains:
- Ministry of Health: moh[.gov.ye]
- Supreme Board of Drugs and Medical Appliances: sbdma[.gov.ye] & sbd-ye[.org]
- Supreme Medical Council: ysmc[.gov.ye]
These operate as extensions of the Houthi militia, not neutral public institutions.
Meanwhile, Yemen's actual health authorities are digital exiles, forced onto non-governmental domains:
- Legitimate Ministry of Health: moh-ye[.org]
- The Supreme Board of Drugs and Medical Appliances: ysbda[.com]
- Supreme Medical Council: smc-ye[.org]
This split forces parallel systems, undermining legitimate authorities' digital sovereignty.
This digital capture has deadly consequences.
In Oct 2022, at least 10 children with leukemia died at Kuwait Hospital in Sana’a after receiving expired chemotherapy drugs. Dozens more fell ill. Oversight failures traced to Houthi-run agencies like moh[.gov.ye] and sbdma[.gov.ye]. Calls for investigation remain unanswered.
The deception is international.
In February 2025, Jordan signed then immediately canceled a pharmaceutical cooperation MoU with Houthis "Supreme Board for Drugs" (sbdma[.gov.ye]), after discovering it was Houthi-led and impersonating Yemen's legitimate authority. The Yemeni embassy confirmed the reversal due to the fraud.
The pattern is undeniable:
- Hijack state institutions & their .ye domains.
- Turn critical sectors like health into revenue streams.
- Use the veneer of digital legitimacy to deceive the world.
The same militia responsible for censorship online is complicit in deaths offline.
.YE is not just technical. it's a tool for Houthis to feign statehood, exploit aid, and endanger lives in health and beyond.
ICANN/IANA's inaction since 2015 redelegation pleas equals enabling this hijack.
كيف تستخدم ميليشيا الحوثي هوية اليمن الرقمية لتشرعن هجماتها العالمية؟
في هذه السلسلة من المنشورات نستعرض كيفية بنائهم بنية تحتية رقمية كاملة للابتزاز العسكري. 🧵
#FreeDotYE
أولاً، سيطروا على مؤسسة وطنية حقيقية وحرفوها.
موقع saba[.ye] كان تابع لوكالة الأنباء اليمنية الرسمية(سبأ). اليوم، أصبح منصة سياسية دعائية لجماعة الحوثي.
في المقال المنشور توجه الملاحة البحرية إلى بريد تابع للميليشيا info@navy[.gov.ye]، منتحلين صفة البحرية اليمنية.
ثم تصاعد الأمر إلى تهديدات عسكرية مباشرة.
كما ورد في تقرير لرويترز اعادت نشره @IndyArabia، استخدموا بريداً آخر ينتهي بـ .gov.ye لتهديد شركة شحن يونانية، هذه المرة منتحلين صفة "مركز عمليات إنسانية" تابع للحكومة اليمنية. لكن التضليل أعمق من ذلك.
How does a militia hijack the identity of Yemen itself to legitimize its global attacks?
Their weapon is the country's digital identity: the hijacked .YE domain.
Here is the undeniable evidence of how they built a digital infrastructure for military extortion. 🧵
#FreeDotYE
First, they corrupted a real national institution.
Once a genuine national institution, saba[.ye] was Yemen’s official news agency. Under Houthi control it has become a propaganda outlet.
In this news report, it goes further: directing international maritime traffic to info@navy[.gov.ye], an email under a hijacked government domain. This impersonates the Yemeni Navy and uses the national domain system to legitimize the militia.
From co-opting old institutions, they escalated to creating new fake ones for military threats.
As reported by @reuters, they used another .gov.ye email to threaten a Greek shipping company, this time posing as a Yemeni government "Humanitarian Operations Center." But the deception goes deeper.
After 2014, Houthis captured TeleYemen, YemenNet & Yemen Mobile. They purged staff & installed loyalists supervised by Iran's IRGC and Hezbollah, giving them total control over state infrastructure.
#FreeDotYE
Step 2: Eliminate the Private Sector.
- Sabafon was confiscated.
- Y-Telecom was nationalized.
- MTN was forced out & replaced by YOU-Telecom.
As @RegainYemen documents, the entire telecom market now serves the Houthis militia.
We formally requested @ICANN & @theiana to redelegate Yemen’s .YE domain. Why? Because it’s hijacked by a militia, used for propaganda, censorship & repression. Full letter: #FreeDotYEfreethedotye.org/letter
saba.ye = Houthi “state” news mmy.ye = Houthi military media
Both under .YE, both projecting false legitimacy. This is not neutral management
it’s propaganda infrastructure.
Houthis don’t just censor. They surveil, hack, kidnap. Journalists have been detained & killed. UN staff abducted. A ccTLD steward linked to these abuses cannot be trusted.
🚨 نطاق اليمن .YE مستولى عليه من قبل الحوثيين. منذ 2015، يسيطر الحوثيون عبر "تيليمن" على كل مواقع .ye و .gov.ye و .edu.ye.
الحكومة الشرعية فشلت في استعادته، ولهذا أطلقنا نحن كأفراد هذه الحملة.
#FreeDotYE 🔗 freethedotye.org
يستخدم الحوثيون نطاق .YE لمنح أنفسهم شرعية زائفة.
مواقع مثل saba.ye و mmy.ye ليست مؤسسات حكومية، بل مجرد منصات دعائية تحت سيطرة ورقابة المليشيا. #FreeDotYE
صحفيون مستقلون خُطفوا أو اختفوا أو قُتلوا في مناطق الحوثي. موظفو الأمم المتحدة والمنظمات محتجزون. ومع ذلك، يسمح لنفس هذه الجماعة الإرهابية أن تدير نطاق اليمن الرسمي. #FreeDotYE
🚨 Yemen’s national domain .YE is hijacked. Since 2015, Houthis have controlled it via TeleYemen, running every .ye, .gov.ye & .edu.ye site.
The recognized government failed to reclaim it. So we, as individuals, are raising our voices.
#FreeDotYE 🔗 freethedotye.org
Houthis use .YE to project false legitimacy.
Websites like saba.ye & mmy.ye pretend to be government institutions.
In reality, they’re propaganda outlets, monitored and censored by a militia.
#FreeDotYE
Yemen’s recognized government does not use .YE.
They’ve been forced onto .org .com and .net.
Weak leadership and lack of will left .YE entirely in Houthi hands.
We cannot wait for them.
#FreeDotYE