How Estonia/NATO responds (and responded today) to air space violations by Russia. A quick calm down for those who scream "why did not you shoot them down".
Short answer is - there was no need, this time.
Who commands and controls?
The Baltic Air Policing mission is a NATO peacetime QRA mission covering Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Allied fighter detachments rotate in (typically from Šiauliai, Lithuania and Ämari, Estonia), ready 24/7.
The CAOC (=Combined Air Operations Centre) with authority to task Baltic QRA is CAOC Uedem (Germany) for the area; CAOCs plan, task and direct air assets, working with national CRCs and QRA units.
The practical sequence (as it happened today)
1. Detect & Assess
NATO sensors (radar network, CRC inputs, AWACS, and liaison contacts) detect an inbound track approaching or inside Baltic sovereign airspace. The CAOC/CRC evaluates transponder, flight plan and behavior. NATINADS provides the integrated picture.
2. Scramble QRA fighters
If identification/intent is unclear or the track violates or threatens sovereign airspace, the CAOC/CRC orders the QRA on alert (based at Ämari/Šiauliai or other regional QRA) to scramble and intercept. Fighters can be airborne in minutes. F-35s at Ämari responded.
3. Identification and initial contact
Interceptors perform BVR identification (radar datalink / IFF) then close for visual ID (VID) if needed. They attempt radio contact on guard and ATC frequencies and monitor transponder/squawk. All contact attempts and imagery/video are recorded as evidence.
4. Visual signals & escort
Standard internationally recognized visual signals (wing-rock, rocking of ailerons, hand signals from the cockpit, and specific manoeuvres) are used to order the intruder to follow or to land. The interceptors then escort the aircraft out of the sovereign airspace (as happened today) or to a designated airfield if compliance is achieved.
5. Escalation ladder / ROE application
NATO follows a graduated response: radio warnings → visual signals/escort → more assertive manoeuvres (e.g., getting between intruder and sensitive assets).
Use of force (shoot-down) is an extreme, last measure and normally requires national political/military authorization and a clear hostile act or intent (necessity + proportionality). National rules of engagement provide the legal basis and CAOC coordinates the intercept. Historical NATO ROE guidance allows national action in self-defence.
Fighters are presumed potentially armed (weapons can be internal, stowed, or jettisoned). Behaviour, location, transponder status and compliance drive threat assessment
Final authority to use lethal force rests with national command. Interceptors act under national ROE and standing NATO direction; an immediate self-defence response can be taken by pilots if under attack, but otherwise kinetic measures require higher authorization. NATO
Evidence preservation and political handling matter. Radar tracks, radio calls, and gun-camera/HUD footage are captured to support diplomatic protest, Article 4/5 consultations or legal follow-up. Today, the Estonian government decided to trigger NATO Article 4 consultations.
6. NATO Baltic-specific practicalities & risks
QRA aircraft are coalition jets (rotational). CAOC Uedem tasks them but the national government, currently Italian, owning those jets retains ultimate ROE/command for use of force. That means political/national calculation happens fast.
The environment is congested (busy corridors, civilian traffic, close proximity to Russian bases). Intercepts are routine — NATO stresses professionalism and minimum necessary force to avoid miscalculation.
Bottom line
In the Baltics, MiGs entering NATO airspace — even without visible weapons — will trigger a NATO QRA intercept ordered by CAOC Uedem and flown by the rotational detachment (Ämari/Šiauliai). The intercept follows a graded ladder: identify, contact, visual signals, escort out — and only escalate to force under strict national ROE and only on clear hostile intent or act.
Today self-defence by our pilots was not needed, clear hostile intent was not evident. This does not mean we will not reconsider next time.
businessinsider.com/nato-f35-steal…
Short answer is - there was no need, this time.
Who commands and controls?
The Baltic Air Policing mission is a NATO peacetime QRA mission covering Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Allied fighter detachments rotate in (typically from Šiauliai, Lithuania and Ämari, Estonia), ready 24/7.
The CAOC (=Combined Air Operations Centre) with authority to task Baltic QRA is CAOC Uedem (Germany) for the area; CAOCs plan, task and direct air assets, working with national CRCs and QRA units.
The practical sequence (as it happened today)
1. Detect & Assess
NATO sensors (radar network, CRC inputs, AWACS, and liaison contacts) detect an inbound track approaching or inside Baltic sovereign airspace. The CAOC/CRC evaluates transponder, flight plan and behavior. NATINADS provides the integrated picture.
2. Scramble QRA fighters
If identification/intent is unclear or the track violates or threatens sovereign airspace, the CAOC/CRC orders the QRA on alert (based at Ämari/Šiauliai or other regional QRA) to scramble and intercept. Fighters can be airborne in minutes. F-35s at Ämari responded.
3. Identification and initial contact
Interceptors perform BVR identification (radar datalink / IFF) then close for visual ID (VID) if needed. They attempt radio contact on guard and ATC frequencies and monitor transponder/squawk. All contact attempts and imagery/video are recorded as evidence.
4. Visual signals & escort
Standard internationally recognized visual signals (wing-rock, rocking of ailerons, hand signals from the cockpit, and specific manoeuvres) are used to order the intruder to follow or to land. The interceptors then escort the aircraft out of the sovereign airspace (as happened today) or to a designated airfield if compliance is achieved.
5. Escalation ladder / ROE application
NATO follows a graduated response: radio warnings → visual signals/escort → more assertive manoeuvres (e.g., getting between intruder and sensitive assets).
Use of force (shoot-down) is an extreme, last measure and normally requires national political/military authorization and a clear hostile act or intent (necessity + proportionality). National rules of engagement provide the legal basis and CAOC coordinates the intercept. Historical NATO ROE guidance allows national action in self-defence.
Fighters are presumed potentially armed (weapons can be internal, stowed, or jettisoned). Behaviour, location, transponder status and compliance drive threat assessment
Final authority to use lethal force rests with national command. Interceptors act under national ROE and standing NATO direction; an immediate self-defence response can be taken by pilots if under attack, but otherwise kinetic measures require higher authorization. NATO
Evidence preservation and political handling matter. Radar tracks, radio calls, and gun-camera/HUD footage are captured to support diplomatic protest, Article 4/5 consultations or legal follow-up. Today, the Estonian government decided to trigger NATO Article 4 consultations.
6. NATO Baltic-specific practicalities & risks
QRA aircraft are coalition jets (rotational). CAOC Uedem tasks them but the national government, currently Italian, owning those jets retains ultimate ROE/command for use of force. That means political/national calculation happens fast.
The environment is congested (busy corridors, civilian traffic, close proximity to Russian bases). Intercepts are routine — NATO stresses professionalism and minimum necessary force to avoid miscalculation.
Bottom line
In the Baltics, MiGs entering NATO airspace — even without visible weapons — will trigger a NATO QRA intercept ordered by CAOC Uedem and flown by the rotational detachment (Ämari/Šiauliai). The intercept follows a graded ladder: identify, contact, visual signals, escort out — and only escalate to force under strict national ROE and only on clear hostile intent or act.
Today self-defence by our pilots was not needed, clear hostile intent was not evident. This does not mean we will not reconsider next time.
businessinsider.com/nato-f35-steal…
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