🚨 We found a phishing time bomb in Yemen’s hijacked .YE ccTLD
Domain: twitter[.com.ye]
RDAP: “reserved/restricted”
DNS + MX: point straight to Houthi-run servers in Sana’a.
Infra designed to impersonate @X / Twitter. 🧵
The proof:
• A Record → 82.114.162.66 (TeleYemen, Houthis controlled)
• MX → mail1/2.yemen.net.ye mail.twitter[.com.ye] (active, live mail routing)
• Web → geoblocked, but mail infra alive.
We found a purpose built phishing machine waiting for a target.
This lets Houthis send @ twitter[.com.ye] emails to phish, steal logins, or deliver malware.
This isn't a bug; it's a feature of a hijacked TLD.
@ICANN has stayed silent since 2015, enabling a militia to weaponize a ccTLD. This is a catastrophic failure of internet trust with global implications.
Internet trust is collapsing.
We demand @EFF @AccessNow and others push for redelegation now.
@ICANN @EFF @accessnow unroll @threadreaderapp
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لأكثر من عشر سنوات هيمن نموذج فاشل على أزمة اليمن: حكومة "شرعية" في المنفى، وقطاع إغاثي ومناصرة يركز على استمرارية التمويل بدلاً من تحقيق نتائج ملموسة.
هذا الفراغ الهائل في المساءلة سمح لمشاكل قابلة للحل، مثل سيطرة الحوثيين على قطاع الإتصالات ونطاق اليمن .YE، بأن تتفاقم. 🧵
#FreeDotYE
عندما غادرت الحكومة الشرعية البلاد، استمر قياداتها وموظفيها في استلام رواتبهم نهاية كل شهر بالخارج، بينما انهارت منظومة المساءلة.
دفع اليمنيون في الداخل الثمن، وتُركت أصول الدولة الرقمية الأساسية للإهمال حتى ضاعت ودمرت واستغلت.
في الوقت نفسه، وقع جزء كبير من قطاع المناصرة والإغاثة بقصد او بدون قصد في فخ "كتابة التقارير"؛ لإرضاء المانحين، لكنها لم تغير شيئاً يذكر على الأرض.
تم تجاهل قضايا البنية التحتية المصيرية مثل الاستيلاء الرقمي على الدولة، إما لأنها "تقنية" أو لا تناسب "قوالب التمويل".
For nearly a decade, Yemen’s crisis has been shaped by a failed model: a government in exile and a humanitarian and advocacy industry focused on funding cycles, not outcomes.
This vacuum of accountability let solvable problems like the hijacked .YE domain fester. 🧵
#FreeDotYE
When Yemen's legitimate government left the country, leaders continued to collect salaries abroad while accountability collapsed.
Yemenis at home paid the price as the state's most basic digital assets were neglected and ultimately lost.
Simultaneously, much of the advocacy and humanitarian sector fell into a trap of "report-ism"; satisfying donors but changing little on the ground.
Critical infrastructure issues like digital state capture were ignored, deemed too technical or not fitting within a funding silo.
This single Google search tells the story of Yemen's hijacked digital identity.
Search "Yemen Ministry of Foreign Affairs":
✅ The legitimate gov @yemen_mofa is forced onto mofa-ye.org (a domain only created in 2017).
❌ The Houthi militia occupies the state domain: mofa[.gov.ye], which now works only inside Yemen after being hacked in July by @S4uD1Pwnz.
This is digital state capture: a militia using the official ccTLD to present itself as the state, while the recognized government is downgraded to a .org domain like an NGO.
The evidence is undeniable: The Houthi-run .YE infrastructure is both illegitimate and incompetent.
This isn’t a glitch. It’s a governance failure by @ICANN and @theiana.
National domains must belong to the people and their legitimate institutions not militias.
That’s why we demand redelegation of .YE.
The Houthi-hijacked .YE domain isn't just about websites. It's a weaponized tool used to control Yemen's health sector.
This system of digital capture enables corruption and mismanagement with lethal outcomes. The cost is measured in Yemeni lives🩸🧵
#FreeDotYE
The instruments of this capture are official state domains, now under militia authority.
Houthi-controlled health domains:
- Ministry of Health: moh[.gov.ye]
- Supreme Board of Drugs and Medical Appliances: sbdma[.gov.ye] & sbd-ye[.org]
- Supreme Medical Council: ysmc[.gov.ye]
These operate as extensions of the Houthi militia, not neutral public institutions.
Meanwhile, Yemen's actual health authorities are digital exiles, forced onto non-governmental domains:
- Legitimate Ministry of Health: moh-ye[.org]
- The Supreme Board of Drugs and Medical Appliances: ysbda[.com]
- Supreme Medical Council: smc-ye[.org]
This split forces parallel systems, undermining legitimate authorities' digital sovereignty.
كيف تستخدم ميليشيا الحوثي هوية اليمن الرقمية لتشرعن هجماتها العالمية؟
في هذه السلسلة من المنشورات نستعرض كيفية بنائهم بنية تحتية رقمية كاملة للابتزاز العسكري. 🧵
#FreeDotYE
أولاً، سيطروا على مؤسسة وطنية حقيقية وحرفوها.
موقع saba[.ye] كان تابع لوكالة الأنباء اليمنية الرسمية(سبأ). اليوم، أصبح منصة سياسية دعائية لجماعة الحوثي.
في المقال المنشور توجه الملاحة البحرية إلى بريد تابع للميليشيا info@navy[.gov.ye]، منتحلين صفة البحرية اليمنية.
ثم تصاعد الأمر إلى تهديدات عسكرية مباشرة.
كما ورد في تقرير لرويترز اعادت نشره @IndyArabia، استخدموا بريداً آخر ينتهي بـ .gov.ye لتهديد شركة شحن يونانية، هذه المرة منتحلين صفة "مركز عمليات إنسانية" تابع للحكومة اليمنية. لكن التضليل أعمق من ذلك.
How does a militia hijack the identity of Yemen itself to legitimize its global attacks?
Their weapon is the country's digital identity: the hijacked .YE domain.
Here is the undeniable evidence of how they built a digital infrastructure for military extortion. 🧵
#FreeDotYE
First, they corrupted a real national institution.
Once a genuine national institution, saba[.ye] was Yemen’s official news agency. Under Houthi control it has become a propaganda outlet.
In this news report, it goes further: directing international maritime traffic to info@navy[.gov.ye], an email under a hijacked government domain. This impersonates the Yemeni Navy and uses the national domain system to legitimize the militia.
From co-opting old institutions, they escalated to creating new fake ones for military threats.
As reported by @reuters, they used another .gov.ye email to threaten a Greek shipping company, this time posing as a Yemeni government "Humanitarian Operations Center." But the deception goes deeper.