InfantryDort Profile picture
Oct 14 27 tweets 5 min read Read on X
The Military and the Press: Two Centuries of Push–Pull

Ok guys, I see a lot of press hysteria about the new Pentagon rules. I’m going to lay out the history for you, objectively.

From 1812 to now, here’s how military reporting in America has actually evolved: when access expanded, when it tightened, and why.

This isn’t designed to generate rage. It’s to help everyone (especially the media) see the pattern. It’s an ebb and flow that’s been part of American history for over 200 years.

Strap in. It’s a long one. But I think it explains how we got here. 🧵
1) Overview

People keep saying new Pentagon press rules are “unprecedented” and “anti-First Amendment.”

History says otherwise.

America’s default is a free press—but access to military spaces and operations has always been managed. Let’s walk the 200-year arc.
2) War of 1812: the seed of control

News moved slowly, but commanders still tried to shape it. After New Orleans, Gen. Andrew Jackson briefly banned publication without approval and even jailed an editor (we obviously don't do this today).

Courts pushed back—but the point stands: from the start, commanders tightened info when they thought lives were at stake.
3) Mexican-American War (1846–48): tech rises, rules lag

Telegraph and fast couriers turbocharged competition, but there was no formal system yet.

Soldiers printed “camp papers,” civilians filed vivid dispatches, and Washington accepted more risk—because timeliness still rarely jeopardized ongoing ops. Freedom high; structure light.
4) Civil War (1861–65): first big clash

Reporters operated near the lines, telegraphs sped news, and leaks hurt. Lincoln seized telegraph lines at times; War Dept threatened courts-martial for publishing sensitive movements.

Sherman expelled reporters he thought endangered troops. No lasting gag law—but ad hoc control was real.
5) Spanish-American War (1898): early shutdown

To protect invasion plans, the government barred reporters from battle zones and even cut undersea cables.

Leaks still happened, but policy was clear: first U.S. attempt at a near-blackout from an active front. Control swung hard to security.
6) World War I: law + bureaucracy

Congress passed the Espionage and Sedition Acts; Wilson created the CPI. To reach the front, reporters needed credentials and agreed to submit dispatches to military censors.

Press freedom persisted—but inside the war machine it was structured and screened.
7) World War II: maximum access, maximum rules

Thousands of accredited correspondents lived with troops—but under the Code of Wartime Practices and field censors. No future-ops, no exact locations, no weather, no sensitive tech. It was the template: escort + ground rules + security review. And America still had the freest wartime press.
8) Korea (1950–53): brief openness → quick re-tighten

Early months were loose; then DoD revived WWII-style rules when leaks and battlefield reversals mounted. Takeaway: as risk rises, controls return. Courts didn’t force more access; commanders set the conditions.
9) Vietnam (’60s–’73): the high-water mark of openness

No formal censorship. Reporters moved widely, filed without prior review, and aired the war’s realities nightly. The First Amendment thrived—but the military left the conflict believing uncontrolled visuals and timing eroded public support. The pendulum was destined to swing back.
10) Grenada 1983: zero access, national backlash

Press kept out of the invasion’s opening phase. The uproar led to the Sidle Commission and invention of press pools—a compromise to prevent total blackouts and protect OPSEC when speed and secrecy demanded it.
11) Panama 1989 → Gulf War 1991: pools mature

Pools, escorts, and security review of pool copy/photos became standard at the start of ops. Reporters sued for a right to roam; courts didn’t grant one. The message: publish freely, yes; demand unescorted access to combat, no.
12) 1992 Principles: a negotiated middle

DoD + media agreed: open and independent reporting is the norm; pools only when necessary and short-lived; clear ground rules protect forces.

Media resisted pre-pub review; DoD reserved the option if lives/ops were at risk. The system recognized two goods: press freedom and troop safety.
13) Iraq/Afghanistan 2001–2011: the embed era

Hundreds of embeds lived with units under signed ground rules (no future ops, delay specifics, protect TTPs, wait on NOK for KIA imagery).

No blanket pre-pub censors, but break the rules and you’re out. It worked: intimate reporting + preserved OPSEC.
14) Courts on “press rights” inside the military

Key line from the D.C. Circuit (Flynt v. Rumsfeld): journalists have no First Amendment right to ride with troops or access military spaces on demand.

The Constitution protects publishing—not guaranteed entry to secure operations or facilities. Access is a policy choice, not a constitutional entitlement.
15) Inside the building: Pentagon culture vs. law

For decades, Pentagon correspondents enjoyed unusually free movement—offices in-building, hallway chats, daily briefings. That was custom, not a right.

Sensitive zones always required escorts. The U.S. was an outlier in openness among major powers.
16) 2020s shift: escort-first, affirm the rules

The latest policy tightens roaming, formalizes escorts, and asks for written acknowledgment of long-standing OPSEC rules. Controversial? Yes. Unprecedented? No.

It’s the peacetime echo of a pattern used in every major war: manage physical access to protect operations and people.
17) “But the First Amendment!”—the clean answer

The First Amendment prevents prior restraint on publication except in the rarest cases. It does not force the military to admit anyone to secure spaces, nor to let cameras roam command corridors.

That’s why past lawsuits failed: courts defer on base access and force protection.
18) The American balance—freer than peers

Even with escorts, the U.S. still runs the most transparent defense press system of any great power.

Reporters investigate procurement, readiness, casualties, even leadership failures—and publish. The constraint is inside the perimeter, not on the printing press.
19) Contrast: Russia & China HQs

Russia criminalized “false” war reporting; independent military reporters face prison. China’s PLA/CMC is opaque; coverage is state-directed, foreign journos are blocked or surveilled.

No one roams their defense HQ hallways looking for off-the-record chats.
20) Contrast: allies

Israel legally operates a military censor; sensitive security stories require submission. The U.K. uses D-Notices (voluntary but heavy) and never lets reporters wander MoD unescorted. In the 1982 Falklands, pool + censorship dominated. The U.S., historically, has allowed far more proximity.
21) The real “ebb and flow”

High control: Spanish-American War blackout; WWI/WWII censorship; Grenada pools; early Gulf War review.

High openness: Civil War field reporting; Vietnam unfettered; 2003 mega-embeds (no blanket pre-pub review).

Middle paths: 1992 Principles; routine embeds with revocation for violations.

Pattern: risk ↑ → control ↑. Then it loosens again.
22) What today’s policy is and isn’t

Is: a facility-access rule (badging, escorts, OPSEC acknowledgments).

Isn’t: a prior restraint on publishing, a ban on criticism, or criminalization of reporting. Reporters can still break stories via briefings, scheduled interviews, FOIA, Hill sources, veterans, and whistleblowers protected by law.
23) Why a change now? (operational logic)

Modern risks = smartphones, live-streams, metadata geolocation, insider leaks, and instantaneous virality.

HQs fuse planning and live ops. Escorting and signed rules are the administrative layer that makes existing security policy real in a building designed before iPhones.
24) Takeaway for critics

U.S. history doesn’t support the claim that escorting reporters in secure military HQs is new or unconstitutional. What’s new is the tech and tempo.

The test isn’t “roam free or gagged.” It’s whether DoW pairs tight perimeter rules with real transparency in forums built for it.
25) Bottom line

America still runs the freest defense press ecosystem on earth. The pendulum has swung for two centuries—and it will swing again. Protect troops and secrets inside the wire. Tell the truth outside it. That’s the American balance.
I stand ready for correction, comments, or concerns.

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More from @infantrydort

Sep 21
🧵When the Game Breaks: Why "Defection" Destroys Neutrality in the Military

I get a lot of grief on my takes these days. After talking with @LibertySuperman today, I found some inspiration in trying to explain the problem.

He will deep dive it soon. But this is important. 👇 Image
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The military is meant to be apolitical. That was the status quo: both sides cooperated by keeping partisan politics out of the ranks. It wasn’t perfect, but the trust held. That is, until defection toward ideology occurred.
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In game theory, this is the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

If both sides cooperate → stability.

If one defects while the other plays fair → the defector wins.

If both defect → chaos.

The U.S. military’s neutrality was based on cooperation.
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Aug 2
🧵The Evolution of Post-War Military Promotions🧵

I get a lot of questions asking what happened to the great leaders of the Second World War.

Because the machine always resets to comfort.

George Marshall’s purge of deadweight colonels and generals was a wartime anomaly, a moment when the brutal clarity of existential war forced the Army to prioritize combat effectiveness over seniority, connections, or credentials.

But after the war, peacetime priorities crept back in like rot through a cracked hull.

Here’s why Marshall’s system faded, and how we ended up with the mess we have today:👇Image
🕊️ 1. Victory Bred Complacency
After WWII, the U.S. emerged as the undisputed superpower. That success, ironically, planted the seed of decline.

The Army no longer had to be ruthless, there was no imminent threat to force hard choices.

Promotions reverted to being based on time in grade, politics, and who checked the right boxes.

The institutional attitude shifted from:
“Who can win the next war?” to “Who deserves their turn?”
🏛️ 2. The Bureaucracy Hardened
Marshall used personal judgment, informal feedback, and bold maneuvers to bypass the bureaucracy. But he was the exception, not the rule.

After he left, systems calcified: Promotion boards were bound by OERs, time in service charts, and quotas.
The “plucking boards” were disbanded. Risk aversion became institutional policy.

General officer promotions became a delicate dance of politics, often more about optics than outcomes.

You could game the system without ever being good at war.
Read 8 tweets
Jul 8
🧵 We Need A New Census

What keeps me up at night isn’t politics. It’s preventing American bloodshed. And I believe we’re getting dangerously close.

This post will be controversial. But if we care about preserving the fabric of our Republic, we need to act.👇 Image
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The U.S. Constitution says we must count the “whole number of persons” every ten years for congressional representation.

But that word "persons" has a dark origin.

It wasn’t about fairness. It was about slavery.
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The Framers chose “persons” over “citizens” because Southern states demanded to count their slaves. People who had no rights, no vote, and no freedom. All to inflate their power in Congress.

The infamous Three-Fifths Compromise was born.
Read 12 tweets
Jun 28
Nah, you guys know what? I’m just gonna come out and say it. And when I’m done saying it, tell me if it’s “blatant Islamophobia” or just…. you know… reality.

Let me explain to you some of the things I witnessed with my very own eyes in multiple Muslim countries. This will not be for the weak or faint of heart.

1. They didn’t just massacre one another in Baghdad, they chopped each other up into little pieces and stuffed them in underground vats. SPC Plocica was the only one with a strong enough stomach to fish the pieces out with a coat hanger so we could confirm the report. Don’t worry @Primz94933160 was there too as a witness. Rib cages with rotted flesh, pieces of legs with shoes attached, arms, hands, you name it. It was the most disgusting thing I’ve seen with my two eyes.

2. The obsession with having sex with children or feminine men. The saying over there was women are for breeding and men are for fun. We had to protect our fairer looking male Soldiers from being molested CONSTANTLY. But that isn’t the worst part. I once stumbled upon an Afghan colonel r*ping his 11 year old assistant, I heard the unholy noises emanating from his tent on our FOB. When I moved to interdict I was stopped for fear of a Green on Blue incident. And then we were all “educated” on the fact that this was CULTURALLY ACCEPTABLE FOR THEM TO DO. It was as normal as breathing.

3. Women are less than nothing to them. I would always ask how many children elders had for small talk. They could have 10 kids. 7 daughters and 3 sons. What will they tell you? They have 3 sons. I watched a man carrying his dead daughter in his arms to my FOB. She died due to a malfunctioned bomb we dropped. That didn’t matter to him. He dropped her on the ground with a stone cold face and demanded we pay him. She was f*****g NOTHING to him. He left the body with us and walked away counting his money.

4. Some of them have sex with animals. Ask me if I saw a man from COP 763 in east Baghdad mount a donkey in the middle of the night through a RAID FLIR camera. Because the answer will be yes.

5. They did heinous things in battle. Suicide bombings. Using their own wives as human shields. Using children as shields. Shooting from mosques. Spitting at our working dogs… or worse.

This all sounds crazy right? And I bet my comment section will flow with similar horror stories. It almost sounds like I’m making it up huh? I wish I was. I really do.

I know good Muslims in America. One of them is among my closest friends. But he’s passed through the American filter…HEAVILY. I can safely say he is literally one of us.

My question for you is, how are you not “Islamophobic”? My assessment comes from 4 total years immersed in multiple Islamic nations.

I wish I could say I’m sorry that I’m an inconvenient truth teller against your agenda.

But I’m not sorry at all. You must open your eyes. You MUST see this is a problem. Don’t you? How can you not?
I’m barely interested in this “Zohran” person, that’s for NY to figure out. I do however take issue with being labeled “Islamophobic” lazily and without context.

And I just gave you the context. It is informed with experience.
How can you tell me what I’ve seen with my own eyes was just a fluke? GWOT isn’t an excuse. Most of my observations stem from watching them just…. living everyday life.
Read 5 tweets
May 28
You know what I find interesting?

During the GWOT surge, I had violent criminals in my formation I couldn’t get rid of. One failed five urinalyses with different substances. Took moving mountains to chapter him.

Fast forward to 2025: We have non-criminals begging to stay. Just asking for a clean record to keep serving.

And yet, I don’t know a single troop personally who’s been granted relief by @DoD_IG or BCMR.

Not one. Do you? I'm sure they exist, I just don't know any.

Am I just surrounded by an evil gang of undeserving service members? Possible. But not probable.

@DoD_USD_PR , listen: This position is untenable. And it will get worse. What happens when the suicide stories come out publicly? The ones where legitimately innocent people just....end it? Leaving behind families in the process.

Troops desperate to restore their honor, provide for their families, and they see no path forward except the business end of a rifle?

You already have the path to fix it. I’ve laid it out. Again, you didn't start this, but you can finish it.

But right now? The BCMR is trivializing the momentous, complicating the obvious, and torching warfighter trust in the process.
I'm really not trying to wear a tinfoil hat here. But if I didn't know any better, I'd think the BCMR is sabotaging the agenda of the Secretary of Defense.
You judge a system by what it does. And what does the BCMR and IG do besides say “no”?

Seriously, I want to know the answer to this, because it defies logic.
Read 5 tweets
May 4
⚔️We Used to Own the Last 100 Yards🧵

I recently dug into how we train our Infantry officers today. What I found shocked me.

Like many, my first instinct was to blame the schoolhouse. To point a finger at Fort Benning and the Infantry commandants of years past. My mind went to the Infantry Museum and its proud centerpiece, the exhibit that says we “Own the Last 100 Yards.”

But in that moment of frustration, I found myself wanting to change it. Maybe it should say:

“We once owned the last 100 yards.” Or: “We mostly own the last 100 yards under specific conditions.”

Because here's the truth: There is virtually no hand to hand training in the Infantry Basic Officer Leader Course today.

No bayonet assault course. No combatives. No night live fire. No platoon live fire. More classroom instruction. No grit building exercises. The very tools and mindset that once defined our close combat dominance are gone.

That hit me hard. Especially because I personally fought to bring the bayonet back in 2018. I saw what it did for morale, mindset, and confidence. And now, it's gone again. Quietly rescinded.

So yes, technically, we own the last 100 yards. As long as our weapons work. As long as they don’t jam. As long as we have ammo. But take any of that away? And what then?

Do you see the problem?

But then I paused, and looked deeper. I put myself in the shoes of the schoolhouse. I remembered something far bigger than any one policy or doctrine.
Manning. That’s the issue.

We’re not training warriors with no hand-to-hand because we don’t believe in it. We’re doing it because we don’t have the people to teach it. We are not manned to build the kind of Soldiers we say we want.
And that’s when everything clicked.

🧠 The Warrior Mindset: More Than Metrics

I’ve always believed that the warrior mindset is more important than any single task. You can teach tasks to someone who wants to win. You cannot teach grit to someone trained only to pass a slide deck evaluation.

The problem? Warrior spirit can’t be measured in classroom instruction.

But here’s what I argue now: Yes, you can measure it, just not immediately. You have to take the leap of faith first. Build the mindset first. Then measure outcomes:

Rifle qualification improves.
Stress shoot performance improves.
Confidence surges.
Retention rises.
Units begin to feel like units again.

We’ve forgotten that in today’s Army. In our obsession with clean metrics, we’ve lost our edge.

🪖 The Marine Corps Didn’t Forget. Take one look at the those grunts.

They still teach combatives.
They still train bayonets.
They still treat close combat as sacred.

And their Infantry Officer Course is by many accounts the finest in the world.

So what’s happening to the Army? My theory is simple:

We stopped believing in the fight. We started optimizing for safety, throughput, and bureaucratic convenience. We stopped investing in the human weapon, and started riding our best people into the ground, then wondering why quality slipped.

But this can be fixed. And it starts with manning from the @USArmy and equipping @TRADOC properly.

This post is designed to inform leaders who can make change at the highest levels: @SecDef @SecArmy @stuartscheller 👇
1/
We’re scaling back deployments.

We’re not sending brigade after brigade to fight endless wars anymore.

That means training is now our main effort.

There’s no excuse for sending unprepared Soldiers to the line. If we fail in TRADOC, we fail in combat.

Every gap in training becomes a weakness in the fight.
2/
TRADOC is still treated like it’s 2006.
🗂️ Throughput over quality
🧮 Metrics over mindset
💀 Burnout over balance

Why? Because TRADOC is undermanned. According to HQDA guidance, operational units are manned at 100%.

TRADOC? Often at 60–70%. Which might as well mean 0%
Read 11 tweets

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