David Blagden Profile picture
Oct 20 15 tweets 3 min read Read on X
Chagos bill in Parliament today. Here’s a reminder of some its flaws…

🧵
1. It costs a fortune
2. The fact that it costs a fortune makes it (a) harder to do other worthy things with UK tax revenues and (b) more likely that people intent on gutting those worthy things win in 2029
3. The closest thing to a case in its favour was that it was necessary to get a trade deal with India (Mauritius’ key ally) - but India did such a trade deal anyway, because they thought it’d make them richer
4. The second-closest thing to a case in its favour is that it was necessary to secure Indian cooperation for containment of China (which is why the US pushed the UK to do some sort of deal) - but India wants to cooperate with the US on that anyway, because it’s scared of China
5. Mauritian interest in the territory is overtly economic (hence why they held out for a larger payment) - so whatever they say now, that uniquely pristine Marine Protected Area is likely to be ransacked
6. Mauritius isn’t a close Chinese ally (contrary to much hyperbole on here). It’s closer to India…for now. But it needs cash, and can be wooed by those with it…like Beijing/Moscow. Loss of UK sovereignty makes it easier for others to menace the base by buying off Port Louis.
7. This deal isn’t actually ‘decolonisation’. It’s simply handing control to a different imperial power, which has treated the Chagossians even worse than the UK (at least recently).
8. This deal betrays British citizens - not just those in the UK who’ll pay for it, but specifically those displaced from the islands in the first place (whose dissent Mauritius criminalised). A UK-supported right of return would’ve addressed the injustice much more directly.
9. Contrary to some bluster and bloviation from the right - who instigated this deal in the first place, out of deference to the US - ceded sovereignty will be very costly to reverse. Never say never, but the price would be steep.
10. Once sovereignty’s ceded, it’s also much easier for Mauritius to (a) complicate the base’s use (e.g. for Chinese cash), (b) generate pressure for eventual withdrawal, (c) cut the UK out to deal directly with the US, or (d) demand more rent (perhaps under threat of (a))
11. Following (c) above, UK sovereignty is one of the strongest cards in its dealings with America’s mad king…and the coercive US policymakers who will follow him (irrespective of whether they’re more polite about it). With that gone, UK power in the relationship is even less.
13. The legal case for Mauritian ownership is (ironically) an artefact of empire…specifically, that the French administered Chagos from Mauritius, for mere efficiency’s sake (an arrangement the UK continued until Mauritian independence). The two aren’t one people torn asunder.
14. The theory of some UK believers in the necessity of deferring to international legal opinion - that it will cast the UK in a favourable light, and thus align more with UK interests - relies on a purported causal logic that has never yet been seen in the wild.
15. The argument that if a deal wasn’t done now the international legal/normative pressure would become intolerable is circular. Such pressure’s only “intolerable” if you lack the resolve to tolerate it. The UK is unique among the UNSC P5 in its fear of such criticism.

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More from @blagden_david

Feb 15
Notions of a Euro-NATO security guarantee for Ukraine face at least three major challenges, even notwithstanding the difficulty of generating such a commitment in the first place. Doesn’t mean they’re insurmountable…but they’d need addressing.

🧵
1. Such a guarantee requires adversaries to assess that the guarantors are resolved to fight on their ally’s behalf. But NATO states have spent 3 years demonstrating that they aren’t willing to fight on Ukraine’s behalf. So, there’s a credibility problem from the outset.
2. For a ‘tripwire’ to work, it needs to actually be tied to something, i.e. some larger force that’s rapidly pulled in. But without US involvement, that doesn’t presently exist in Europe. Not insurmountable, but resolving it carries a hefty price-tag.*
Read 7 tweets
Feb 5
Another flurry of Chagos incredulity on here, yet with some from the left asking ‘does anyone really care?’ or ‘will it actually cut through outside Twitter?’

Well - irrespective of whether it cuts through off Twitter - here are a few left-leaning problems with the deal.

🧵
1. It’s not actually decolonisation. It’s giving the Chagossian homeland to a different imperial power that never previously governed the islands, and which has - at least in recent years - treated the Chagossians worse than the UK.
2. That different imperial power has behaved illiberally. Most obviously, by criminalising dissent against its sovereignty claim, including by those overseas…which, perversely, could lead to Chagossians who’ve voiced such dissent facing sanction if they attempt to return.
Read 17 tweets
Jan 15
This is why HM Govt’s enthusiasm for this deal is so baffling: you don’t have to be right-wing to dislike it.

It basically only satisfies the following constituencies: … 1/7
- FCDO, NGO, and lawyer types who think it’s Terribly Important that the UK obey an ICJ opinion, (a) on principle and (b) because that will encourage others to obey international law (despite all evidence to the contrary, including from the US*, i.e. the base’s main occupant).
- FCDO, NGO, and (some) think-tank sorts who think that it’ll remove a major source of friction in UK/US regional relations, thereby encouraging regional states to line-up with our interests (i.e. hoping that being bullied out of a position will somehow grow our ‘soft’ power).
Read 7 tweets
Oct 24, 2024
Lessons here for all sides. Conservative nostalgists who imagined “reinvigorating” the Commonwealth post-Brexit need to recognise that it’s just an assemblage of graspingly self-interested states, like any other such bloc, not a ‘family’.

And…

1/4
bbc.com/news/articles/…
…liberal idealists who hope that pursuing “soft power” or deferring to an imagined “rules-based liberal order” will make others like the UK need to recognise that no amount of fawning will change their interests. Instead, they’ll just infer you’re irresolute and shake you down.
Obviously, the central political fact is that any UK govt that concedes a potentially bottomless ‘reparations’ claim - especially while cutting benefits/services at home - will be electorally holed…especially a Labour one that will always face charges of insufficient patriotism.
Read 4 tweets
Oct 3, 2024
A big win for Mauritius: not only will the UK pay Port Louis for ‘taking back’ an archipelago it’d never held sovereignty* over, but they’ll now be able to extract lots of juicy Chinese aid in exchange for complicating** US/UK use of Diego Garcia…

1/6
gov.uk/government/new…
* Unless you count the Chagos Islands being administered from the nearest French and then British imperial authorities, which happened to be in a larger island 1,300 miles away, up to the point of Mauritian independence.
** UK control of Diego Garcia is retained for 99 years, but Mauritius is now able to do what it wants with the other islands. And you can bet a whole pot of aid money that those other islands will be of great interest to PRC intelligence / special ops…
Read 6 tweets
Aug 22, 2024
On the UK Strategic Defence Review’s ‘External Reviewer’ model…

Heartened by @FTusa284’s optimism, but there are two key risks to this approach that need mitigating:
1. The peril of groupthink, and
2. The very notion of outsourced ‘Reviewers’

To tackle the latter first…
1/23
An SDR must tackle fundamental political questions: about what society construes as a threat, what we want to be able to do about it, and how much resource (at the expense of other things) we want to assign to our military ‘insurance policy’.
The SDR therefore entails necessarily political choices, to be taken by a government drawn from society’s elected legislature and scrutinised by that legislature. They can’t just be outsourced to three Reviewers who’re (effectively) just fixed-term senior civil servants.
Read 24 tweets

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