As the situation in Pokrovsk becomes critical, and AFU reinforces the pocket to stabilize the flanks, there's considerable attention now to how this battle is unfolding. A few thoughts on the situation. 1/
The situation around Pokrovsk deteriorated over time as Russian forces kept infiltrating through the southern part of the city. Ukrainian positions grew increasingly thin. Worsening weather enabled Russian troops to get more men into the city in recent weeks. 2/
Earlier in the summer AFU units were working to stem the infiltration. The Russian advance at Dobropillia to some extent forced a shift of attention & resources. A lack of operational reserves has long resulted in a ‘firefighting’ approach to counter advances across the line. 3/
Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Response Corps, which took over the situation in July, has had the unenviable task of stabilizing the situation given deteriorating conditions, lack of reserves, and manning levels of deployed units. The geometry of the battle has long been unfavorable. 4/
As Russian forces accumulated in Pokrovsk they increasingly began to bring in drone teams, and operate drones from the city itself, widening the contested area around the city and interdicting logistics. 5/
Ukraine has brought in reinforcements and elite units to stabilize the flanks, but this may not be enough given the extent of Russian infiltration at this stage. 6/
If Pokrovsk falls so does Myrnohrad, and the pocket closes. The immediate result is Russian forces will operate drones from Pokrovsk, using the city to displace AFU units further back. Ukraine has defensive lines to withdraw to, and can reset its defense. 7/
The conditions are arguably better than the circumstances around Avdiivka in 2024. Russian forces lack momentum and the way they have been fighting won’t generate it. Infiltration yields a creeping offensive but can’t yield operationally significant breakthroughs. 8/
The challenge is that drones now effect fire control in 15-20km depths such that it is not possible to withdraw equipment, and much harder to extract people from pocket (especially from any forward positions). 9/
The city holds operational value. Its loss widens the Russian axis of advance in Donetsk west of the Kramatorsk conglomeration of towns, but it does not open those cities to be quickly taken. Hence the impact of losing Pokrovsk should not be overstated. 10/
Russia’s advance this year has been lackluster, especially along the axes they prioritized. The costs have been high as well relative to the amount of terrain gained. But Pokrovsk can be an unfortunate postscript to that story, especially if it results in unnecessary losses. 11/
Perhaps remarkably the city has been held for over a year, forcing Russian forces to go around it. Though over time it turned from a defensive anchor to another salient, which has proven increasingly difficult to maintain. /12
Pokrovsk is not insignificant, but the economic and logistical value of the city was lost long ago last fall. Losing the city now is far less critical than preserving the force to ensure a sustainable defense in the medium to long term. 13/
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Russia’s advance near Dobropillia reflects the broader problematic dynamic, characterized by a lack of cohesive defensive lines, and undermanned units holding terrain, which can result in gradual then seemingly sudden shifts. Thread /1 (DeepStateMap)
The situation is still developing and hopefully will not result in a larger operational breakthrough, but this is a symptom of challenges and problems that many have been speaking to. I sought to cover them in this lengthy thread two weeks ago. /2
Advances around Pokrovsk had been blamed on RF diversionary-reconnaissance groups. But these are often just small assault infantry groups of 2/4/6 men, or motorcycle/buggy groups, which can bypass the porous defensive line if they can get past the drone coverage. 3/
An update on the war following a recent trip. As Russian offensive presume mounts, the front is not at risk of collapse, though salients have formed. More concerning is that Russian improvements in drone employment have reduced Ukraine’s advantages. Long thread. 1/
In 2024 AFU expanded drone units within the force. This helped offset Russia’s materiel advantage, while compensating for the AFU’s continued manpower deficit. These initiatives are now well known and I covered them in previous threads. 2/
Drones became responsible for most day-to-day casualties at the front, attriting Russian forces at 0-15km, and serving as the main force multiplier for the AFU. This enabled a low-density defending force to hold the 1200km+ front line, establishing defeat and denial zones. 3/
An update on the war following a recent trip. The situation has improved compared with Fall 2024. Russian offensive momentum slowed significantly over the winter, though it is premature to claim that the front has stabilized, especially following AFU withdrawal in Kursk. /1
Russian advances were stalled for three reasons: materiel exhaustion from losses in the fall, effective Ukrainian adaptation to how Russian forces were prosecuting offensive operations, and winter weather conditions which affected the pace of operations. 2/
This dynamic may not hold as we get further into the spring. Russian forces appear to be regrouping for renewed offensive operations. Ukrainian forces have improved tactically at countering how RF fight, employing UAS to compensate for a deficit of manpower at the front. 3/
The suspension of U.S. assistance for Ukraine is a very unfortunate and significant development, but it may not have immediate impact. Ukraine is far less dependent on the U.S. for day to day battlefield needs in 2025, than it was in earlier periods of the war. 1/
Ukraine’s current approach to defensive operations combines mines, strike drones, and traditional artillery fires to attrit Russian forces at 0-30km. Most of the casualties are now inflicted with mines, and drones, which are produced in Ukraine. 2/
Traditional artillery fires are less relevant at the moment, and there is a relative parity between the two sides. In combination with munitions recently delivered by the U.S. in recent months, which frontloaded supplies, Europeans could sustain Ukraine through this year. 3/
Brief thoughts on a European force for Ukraine. I think there is a degree of requirements paralysis. It doesn’t have to be hundreds of thousands of troops, or cover a 1200km contact line. Where it is deployed, and in what role, is more important than the overall size. 1/
The force does not need to be everywhere. It needs to be in country with battalions deployed on maybe 4 operational directions, and sufficient mobility to redeploy as necessary along the front. This can be as few as 3 brigades or their equivalents. 2/
A future Russian attack is going to come along a few predictable directions, and today most of the fighting is concentrated typically along 4-5 sectors of the front at a time. 3/
A long thread on the war and the current situation. Although the worst-case scenarios didn’t materialize in 2024, it was the most difficult period since spring 2022. There were positive developments, and bright spots, but the current trajectory is negative. 1/
First, a brief retrospective. Last winter things looked bleak. Ukraine was dealing with a deficit of manpower, low supplies of ammunition, and was only starting to establish a network of fortifications. Russia held the initiative, and the materiel advantage going into 2024. 2/
Even though Avdiivka fell, by summer it became clear that a collapse of UA frontlines was unlikely. Russia’s Kharkiv offensive was unsuccessful, and they couldn’t capitalize on the strain imposed. Early results from UA mobilization in June-July seemed positive. 3/