๐๐ก๐ ๐๐ซ๐ ๐ฎ๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ญ ๐๐ซ๐จ๐ฆ ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ง๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐๐ฅ ๐๐๐ฎ๐ฌ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง
๐๐๐ฎ ๐๐ก๐ก ๐๐ช๐ข๐๐ฃ ๐๐ญ๐ฅ๐๐ง๐๐๐ฃ๐๐ ๐ฅ๐ค๐๐ฃ๐ฉ๐จ ๐ฉ๐ค ๐ฉ๐๐๐๐จ๐ข
I think about David Hume a lot.
Probably more than I should.
I suppose itโs because most atheists are appealing to his arguments whether they known it or notโฆ so itโs important to be familiar with where all these ideas come from.
Anyways, I was thinking about David Hume and his famous argument against miracles a few days ago and a new thought occurred to me.
I was thinking about how Hume argued that we have no experience of miracles ever occurring, but we do have abundant experience of people being mistaken, lying, or misinterpreting events.
Therefore, he argued, itโs always more reasonable to believe that someone is wrong about witnessing a miracle than that a genuine suspension of the laws of nature has taken place.
Iโve responded to Humeโs argument against miracles elsewhere, but what struck me was the logic of it allโฆ That logic, taken by itself, is sound.
โIf we only see evidence of X and we have no evidence of Y, we should think X.โ
As I reflected on this, I realized that this same principle, when applied consistently, actually leads straight to theism.
The more I thought about this, the clearer it became that this simple observation, rooted in the same principle Hume used against miracles, has profound implications.
If we only ever observe minds causing things, and we never see non-minds doing so, then the only rational inference is that the first cause of everything was also a mind.
What began as a passing thought has turned into what could become a significant argument for God. Iโve tried to write it out carefully and clearly here. Iโll warn you now that some parts are technical, but Iโve aimed to keep it accessible.
Letโs begin with the syllogism ๐งต
๐๐๐ฎ ๐๐ก๐ก ๐๐ช๐ข๐๐ฃ ๐๐ญ๐ฅ๐๐ง๐๐๐ฃ๐๐ ๐ฅ๐ค๐๐ฃ๐ฉ๐จ ๐ฉ๐ค ๐ฉ๐๐๐๐จ๐ข
I think about David Hume a lot.
Probably more than I should.
I suppose itโs because most atheists are appealing to his arguments whether they known it or notโฆ so itโs important to be familiar with where all these ideas come from.
Anyways, I was thinking about David Hume and his famous argument against miracles a few days ago and a new thought occurred to me.
I was thinking about how Hume argued that we have no experience of miracles ever occurring, but we do have abundant experience of people being mistaken, lying, or misinterpreting events.
Therefore, he argued, itโs always more reasonable to believe that someone is wrong about witnessing a miracle than that a genuine suspension of the laws of nature has taken place.
Iโve responded to Humeโs argument against miracles elsewhere, but what struck me was the logic of it allโฆ That logic, taken by itself, is sound.
โIf we only see evidence of X and we have no evidence of Y, we should think X.โ
As I reflected on this, I realized that this same principle, when applied consistently, actually leads straight to theism.
The more I thought about this, the clearer it became that this simple observation, rooted in the same principle Hume used against miracles, has profound implications.
If we only ever observe minds causing things, and we never see non-minds doing so, then the only rational inference is that the first cause of everything was also a mind.
What began as a passing thought has turned into what could become a significant argument for God. Iโve tried to write it out carefully and clearly here. Iโll warn you now that some parts are technical, but Iโve aimed to keep it accessible.
Letโs begin with the syllogism ๐งต
Premise 1: A necessary being exists and initiated the causal sequence that is responsible for all of reality.
Premise 2: This necessary being either has intentionality or it does not.
Premise 3: If the necessary being has intentionality, then God exists. If it does not have intentionality, then God does not exist.
Premise 4: In all human experience, minds initiate causal sequences; non-minds do not.
Premise 5: Therefore, all evidence supports that the necessary being has intentionality.
Premise 6: If there is overwhelming evidence for one theory and zero evidence for the only other possible theory, it is rational to believe the first and irrational to believe the second.
Conclusion: Therefore, within the domain of causation, there is no evidence that supports atheism and overwhelming evidence that supports theism.
Premise 2: This necessary being either has intentionality or it does not.
Premise 3: If the necessary being has intentionality, then God exists. If it does not have intentionality, then God does not exist.
Premise 4: In all human experience, minds initiate causal sequences; non-minds do not.
Premise 5: Therefore, all evidence supports that the necessary being has intentionality.
Premise 6: If there is overwhelming evidence for one theory and zero evidence for the only other possible theory, it is rational to believe the first and irrational to believe the second.
Conclusion: Therefore, within the domain of causation, there is no evidence that supports atheism and overwhelming evidence that supports theism.
๐๐ฎ๐ฌ๐ญ๐ข๐๐ข๐๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐จ๐ซ ๐๐ซ๐๐ฆ๐ข๐ฌ๐ ๐
Premise 1: A necessary being exists and initiated the causal sequence thatโs responsible for all of reality.
Before I justify this premise letโs get something out of the way immediately. When we speak of a BEING, we simply mean โsomething that exists.โ The word does not mean personality, consciousness, or agency. A rock, a tree, or a cloud is a being in this basic metaphysical sense.
Many atheists misunderstand this point and assume that when philosophers use the word โbeing,โ theyโre already assuming some kind of personhood or divinity. Thatโs not the case. If something is โa beingโ that simply means it has existence, in other words: โto be = being.โ
Now that we have that out of the way letโs discuss types of being. Among all possible beings, there are only two fundamental kinds: contingent beings and necessary beings. A contingent being depends on something else for its existence. It could have failed to exist, and it requires a cause or explanation outside of itself. Everything we observe around us fits this description. A necessary being, by contrast, exists by its very nature. It does not depend on anything else and cannot fail to exist. It exists independently and eternally.
These are the only two possible kinds of beings that can exist. The dichotomy is complete: a being is either contingent or necessary.
We clearly see contingent beings all around us. They come into existence, change, and pass away. None of them can explain their own existence. Each points beyond itself to something else that caused or sustains it. If everything that exists were contingent, then each being would require a cause, and the collection of all contingent beings would itself require an explanation.
To illustrate this, imagine drawing a large circle that contains every contingent being. Everything within this circle depends on something else for itโs existence. Because of this we must now ask: what caused all the things inside the circle to exist? The cause cannot itself be within the circle, because everything inside the circle is contingent and requires a cause. The cause must therefore be outside of the circle, and it cannot itself be contingent, since all contingent beings are already accounted for within the circle. There is only one possible answer. The cause must be a necessary being. Something that exists by its own nature and depends on nothing else for its existence.
A necessary being is not one more thing among many; it is the foundation of all other existence. Its nature is to exist without a cause and to provide the ultimate explanation for why anything exists at all.
Another way to picture this is with a chain that you see suspended in the air. Each link represents a contingent being, and each is held up by the link above it. But no matter how far up you go, the entire chain must be held by something that is not itself a linkโsomething that holds the chain in place. If there were only links, the chain would have nothing to hang from and would not exist at all. The same is true of the universe: the chain of contingent beings must be caused by something non-contingent, a necessary being.
Therefore, since contingent beings exist, and a complete regress of contingent causes cannot explain itself, there must exist a necessary being that initiated and grounds the entire causal sequence of reality.
Premise 1: A necessary being exists and initiated the causal sequence thatโs responsible for all of reality.
Before I justify this premise letโs get something out of the way immediately. When we speak of a BEING, we simply mean โsomething that exists.โ The word does not mean personality, consciousness, or agency. A rock, a tree, or a cloud is a being in this basic metaphysical sense.
Many atheists misunderstand this point and assume that when philosophers use the word โbeing,โ theyโre already assuming some kind of personhood or divinity. Thatโs not the case. If something is โa beingโ that simply means it has existence, in other words: โto be = being.โ
Now that we have that out of the way letโs discuss types of being. Among all possible beings, there are only two fundamental kinds: contingent beings and necessary beings. A contingent being depends on something else for its existence. It could have failed to exist, and it requires a cause or explanation outside of itself. Everything we observe around us fits this description. A necessary being, by contrast, exists by its very nature. It does not depend on anything else and cannot fail to exist. It exists independently and eternally.
These are the only two possible kinds of beings that can exist. The dichotomy is complete: a being is either contingent or necessary.
We clearly see contingent beings all around us. They come into existence, change, and pass away. None of them can explain their own existence. Each points beyond itself to something else that caused or sustains it. If everything that exists were contingent, then each being would require a cause, and the collection of all contingent beings would itself require an explanation.
To illustrate this, imagine drawing a large circle that contains every contingent being. Everything within this circle depends on something else for itโs existence. Because of this we must now ask: what caused all the things inside the circle to exist? The cause cannot itself be within the circle, because everything inside the circle is contingent and requires a cause. The cause must therefore be outside of the circle, and it cannot itself be contingent, since all contingent beings are already accounted for within the circle. There is only one possible answer. The cause must be a necessary being. Something that exists by its own nature and depends on nothing else for its existence.
A necessary being is not one more thing among many; it is the foundation of all other existence. Its nature is to exist without a cause and to provide the ultimate explanation for why anything exists at all.
Another way to picture this is with a chain that you see suspended in the air. Each link represents a contingent being, and each is held up by the link above it. But no matter how far up you go, the entire chain must be held by something that is not itself a linkโsomething that holds the chain in place. If there were only links, the chain would have nothing to hang from and would not exist at all. The same is true of the universe: the chain of contingent beings must be caused by something non-contingent, a necessary being.
Therefore, since contingent beings exist, and a complete regress of contingent causes cannot explain itself, there must exist a necessary being that initiated and grounds the entire causal sequence of reality.
What About โBrute Factsโ?
Some atheists attempt to avoid this conclusion by saying that perhaps reality simply exists as a โbrute fact.โ A brute fact is a fact that exists without any explanation.
However there are multiple problems with the Brute Fact theory.
1. It doesnโt escape the necessary/contingent dilemma
For any brute fact that is claimed to exist we can simply ask โcould this thing have failed to exist?โ If the answer is โyesโ then it is contingent again, and if the answer is โnoโ then it is necessary. This question forces the brute fact to stop being brute and resume its rightful place as one of the two coherent categories.
2. It is self-defeating because it destroys knowledge
As modern philosophers like Alexander Pruss and Robert Koons have correctly argued, brute facts destroy the foundations of knowledge itself. As they write in The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment:
โWithout some sort of a Principle of Sufficient Reason, it is not possible to know that we have any extra-mental empirical knowledge. If there could be brute natural facts, our perceptual experiences could be brute as well, and no inference from them would count as knowledge.โ
In other words, if brute facts are possible, then any belief we hold could itself be a brute fact (thereโd be no way to know for sure). It could be uncaused, unintelligible, and groundless. This would make reason itself a worthless project, since reasoning depends on the assumption that things happen for reasons.
3. There is no inductive evidence for brute facts
All of our experience testifies that things have explanations. Every field of study from physics to biology rests on the assumption that reality is intelligible. What once seemed inexplicable, such as lightning, disease, or planetary motion, was eventually explained through discovery. Inductively, the evidence is extremely strong: things occur for reasons. Things have sufficient explanations. We have never observed a genuine brute fact, nor do we have reason to expect one. The entire success of science depends on rejecting them.
4. It violates the Principle of Proportionate Causality
The โprinciple of proportionate causalityโ states that an effect cannot contain more actuality or perfection than is found, at least potentially, in its cause. Whatever properties are found in an effect must in some way be present in its cause.
We apply this principle instinctively. When we see a massive crater in the ground, we immediately infer that whatever caused it must have been immensely powerful. The cause must possess at least the potential for the kind of energy required to produce the effect of a giant crater in the ground. In the same way, when we find intelligence, information, or order, we rightly infer that the cause must contain the potential for intelligence, information, or order.
A brute fact, by contrast, asserts that something comes from nothing. But โnothingโ has no power, no potential, and no properties whatsoever. It cannot cause, influence, or produce anythingโmuch less the entire universe. To say that nothing caused something is to abandon the very logic of causation.
In summary:
The concept of brute facts fails on every level. It cannot escape the necessary/contingent dichotomy, it destroys the basis of rational knowledge, it has zero inductive support, and it violates the principle of proportionate causality. For these reasons, brute facts are not a third kind of being but a denial of explanation itself. Only two categories of being exist: contingent and necessary. And the necessary being alone provides the rational foundation for the world we find ourselves in.
From this it follows: A necessary being exists and initiated the causal sequence that is responsible for all of reality.
Some atheists attempt to avoid this conclusion by saying that perhaps reality simply exists as a โbrute fact.โ A brute fact is a fact that exists without any explanation.
However there are multiple problems with the Brute Fact theory.
1. It doesnโt escape the necessary/contingent dilemma
For any brute fact that is claimed to exist we can simply ask โcould this thing have failed to exist?โ If the answer is โyesโ then it is contingent again, and if the answer is โnoโ then it is necessary. This question forces the brute fact to stop being brute and resume its rightful place as one of the two coherent categories.
2. It is self-defeating because it destroys knowledge
As modern philosophers like Alexander Pruss and Robert Koons have correctly argued, brute facts destroy the foundations of knowledge itself. As they write in The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment:
โWithout some sort of a Principle of Sufficient Reason, it is not possible to know that we have any extra-mental empirical knowledge. If there could be brute natural facts, our perceptual experiences could be brute as well, and no inference from them would count as knowledge.โ
In other words, if brute facts are possible, then any belief we hold could itself be a brute fact (thereโd be no way to know for sure). It could be uncaused, unintelligible, and groundless. This would make reason itself a worthless project, since reasoning depends on the assumption that things happen for reasons.
3. There is no inductive evidence for brute facts
All of our experience testifies that things have explanations. Every field of study from physics to biology rests on the assumption that reality is intelligible. What once seemed inexplicable, such as lightning, disease, or planetary motion, was eventually explained through discovery. Inductively, the evidence is extremely strong: things occur for reasons. Things have sufficient explanations. We have never observed a genuine brute fact, nor do we have reason to expect one. The entire success of science depends on rejecting them.
4. It violates the Principle of Proportionate Causality
The โprinciple of proportionate causalityโ states that an effect cannot contain more actuality or perfection than is found, at least potentially, in its cause. Whatever properties are found in an effect must in some way be present in its cause.
We apply this principle instinctively. When we see a massive crater in the ground, we immediately infer that whatever caused it must have been immensely powerful. The cause must possess at least the potential for the kind of energy required to produce the effect of a giant crater in the ground. In the same way, when we find intelligence, information, or order, we rightly infer that the cause must contain the potential for intelligence, information, or order.
A brute fact, by contrast, asserts that something comes from nothing. But โnothingโ has no power, no potential, and no properties whatsoever. It cannot cause, influence, or produce anythingโmuch less the entire universe. To say that nothing caused something is to abandon the very logic of causation.
In summary:
The concept of brute facts fails on every level. It cannot escape the necessary/contingent dichotomy, it destroys the basis of rational knowledge, it has zero inductive support, and it violates the principle of proportionate causality. For these reasons, brute facts are not a third kind of being but a denial of explanation itself. Only two categories of being exist: contingent and necessary. And the necessary being alone provides the rational foundation for the world we find ourselves in.
From this it follows: A necessary being exists and initiated the causal sequence that is responsible for all of reality.
๐๐ฎ๐ฌ๐ญ๐ข๐๐ข๐๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐จ๐ซ ๐๐ซ๐๐ฆ๐ข๐ฌ๐ ๐
Premise 2: This necessary being either has intentionality or it does not.
Intentionality refers to the ability of a being to direct itself toward ends, to act with purpose or understanding. To lack intentionality means to have no awareness or self-direction, to act without purpose or comprehension. These two descriptions exhaust all logical possibilities.
Every conceivable form of existence must fall into one of these two categories. A being either has the ability to act with intention, or it does not. There is no third kind of being that is somehow both or neither.
This is a true dichotomy and from it follows: This necessary being either has intentionality or it does not.
Premise 2: This necessary being either has intentionality or it does not.
Intentionality refers to the ability of a being to direct itself toward ends, to act with purpose or understanding. To lack intentionality means to have no awareness or self-direction, to act without purpose or comprehension. These two descriptions exhaust all logical possibilities.
Every conceivable form of existence must fall into one of these two categories. A being either has the ability to act with intention, or it does not. There is no third kind of being that is somehow both or neither.
This is a true dichotomy and from it follows: This necessary being either has intentionality or it does not.
๐๐ฎ๐ฌ๐ญ๐ข๐๐ข๐๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐จ๐ซ ๐๐ซ๐๐ฆ๐ข๐ฌ๐ ๐
Premise 3: If the necessary being has intentionality, then God exists. If it does not have intentionality, then God does not exist.
This premise simply identifies what follows from the dichotomy established in Premise 2. If the necessary being that is responsible for reality possesses intentionality, then it is by definition what we mean by God. God, in classical theism, is not one being among many, but the ultimate, necessary being who created and sustains everything else. To say that the necessary being has intentionality is to say that it is conscious, intelligent, and capable of self-directed action, which is precisely what is meant by God.
On the other hand, if the necessary being lacks intentionality, then it would be mindless and mechanical. It would not act purposefully or knowingly, but rather as a blind, unthinking cause. In that case, the foundation of reality would not be a mind at all, and God would not exist.
This premise, like the one before it, is not making a claim about which of the two is true. It simply defines what follows logically from each option. If the first cause has a mind, then God exists. If the first cause has no mind, then we have atheism/naturalism. These are the only two coherent possibilities.
From this it follows: If the necessary being has intentionality, then God exists. If it does not have intentionality, then God does not exist.
Premise 3: If the necessary being has intentionality, then God exists. If it does not have intentionality, then God does not exist.
This premise simply identifies what follows from the dichotomy established in Premise 2. If the necessary being that is responsible for reality possesses intentionality, then it is by definition what we mean by God. God, in classical theism, is not one being among many, but the ultimate, necessary being who created and sustains everything else. To say that the necessary being has intentionality is to say that it is conscious, intelligent, and capable of self-directed action, which is precisely what is meant by God.
On the other hand, if the necessary being lacks intentionality, then it would be mindless and mechanical. It would not act purposefully or knowingly, but rather as a blind, unthinking cause. In that case, the foundation of reality would not be a mind at all, and God would not exist.
This premise, like the one before it, is not making a claim about which of the two is true. It simply defines what follows logically from each option. If the first cause has a mind, then God exists. If the first cause has no mind, then we have atheism/naturalism. These are the only two coherent possibilities.
From this it follows: If the necessary being has intentionality, then God exists. If it does not have intentionality, then God does not exist.
๐๐ฎ๐ฌ๐ญ๐ข๐๐ข๐๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐จ๐ซ ๐๐ซ๐๐ฆ๐ข๐ฌ๐ ๐
Premise 4: In all human experience, minds initiate causal sequences; non-minds do not.
This is the most important part of the argument and the most contentious. The entire case turns on the truth of this premise, because it distinguishes between the kind of cause we know can initiate new effects and the kind of cause that can only continue existing ones. Since this premise goes directly against the naturalistic assumption that all causation is ultimately mindless, we must give it careful attention.
I. Causal Chains: Participation vs. Initiation
First we need to talk about what a causal chain is and how it works. A causal chain is a sequence of causes and effects, each linked to the next. Every event we observe belongs to such a chain. Most things, however, only participate in these chains, while others have the ability to initiate them.
To participate in a causal chain means to act only when acted upon. For example, a rock moves when it is pushed, a coin falls when it is dropped, etc. Each of these examples shows participation: something is set in motion by something else. Something acts because it is acted upon. Most causality we see falls within Newtonโs First Law of Inertia, โA body remains at rest or in uniform motion in a straight line, unless acted upon by an external force.โ
On the other hand, to initiate* a causal chain means to begin a new sequence of causes that would not have occurred otherwise. This type of causation starts something genuinely new rather than simply continuing a previous sequence.
In all our experience, most things in nature are only participating in causal chains, they are not initiators of causal chains. So the central question, then, is this: what kind of being has the power to initiate causality rather than merely participate in it?
II. Minds as Initiators of Causal Chains
As it so happens, we have direct and exclusive experience that minds can initiate causality. Everything we decide to do with our intentionality begins new causal chains. Our intentions are not participating with a causal chain, they initiate causal chains. When you get out of bed in the morning nothing acted upon you to cause this, you acted and caused it. When your hand moves in an intentional way, you are the one causing it to move. These decisions arise from within the mind itself, not from an external force pushing it to act. As beings with minds, we can walk against the wind.
We see this truth reflected in how we understand moral responsibility. If a person intentionally pushes a boulder down a hill and causes a rock slide that damages property or injures others, they are rightly held responsible. They initiated that causal chain through their intentional, deliberate choice.
But if a person is asleep on a mountaintop and a strong wind blows them into the same boulder, causing the same destruction, we all recognize that they are not responsible. In this instance, they were acted upon by the wind. They participated in the causal chain, but they did not initiate it.
This moral distinction shows that we intuitively recognize the difference between being an initiator and being a participant. If people with minds could only participate in causal chains and never initiate them, the idea of moral responsibility and culpability would be incoherent.
Premise 4: In all human experience, minds initiate causal sequences; non-minds do not.
This is the most important part of the argument and the most contentious. The entire case turns on the truth of this premise, because it distinguishes between the kind of cause we know can initiate new effects and the kind of cause that can only continue existing ones. Since this premise goes directly against the naturalistic assumption that all causation is ultimately mindless, we must give it careful attention.
I. Causal Chains: Participation vs. Initiation
First we need to talk about what a causal chain is and how it works. A causal chain is a sequence of causes and effects, each linked to the next. Every event we observe belongs to such a chain. Most things, however, only participate in these chains, while others have the ability to initiate them.
To participate in a causal chain means to act only when acted upon. For example, a rock moves when it is pushed, a coin falls when it is dropped, etc. Each of these examples shows participation: something is set in motion by something else. Something acts because it is acted upon. Most causality we see falls within Newtonโs First Law of Inertia, โA body remains at rest or in uniform motion in a straight line, unless acted upon by an external force.โ
On the other hand, to initiate* a causal chain means to begin a new sequence of causes that would not have occurred otherwise. This type of causation starts something genuinely new rather than simply continuing a previous sequence.
In all our experience, most things in nature are only participating in causal chains, they are not initiators of causal chains. So the central question, then, is this: what kind of being has the power to initiate causality rather than merely participate in it?
II. Minds as Initiators of Causal Chains
As it so happens, we have direct and exclusive experience that minds can initiate causality. Everything we decide to do with our intentionality begins new causal chains. Our intentions are not participating with a causal chain, they initiate causal chains. When you get out of bed in the morning nothing acted upon you to cause this, you acted and caused it. When your hand moves in an intentional way, you are the one causing it to move. These decisions arise from within the mind itself, not from an external force pushing it to act. As beings with minds, we can walk against the wind.
We see this truth reflected in how we understand moral responsibility. If a person intentionally pushes a boulder down a hill and causes a rock slide that damages property or injures others, they are rightly held responsible. They initiated that causal chain through their intentional, deliberate choice.
But if a person is asleep on a mountaintop and a strong wind blows them into the same boulder, causing the same destruction, we all recognize that they are not responsible. In this instance, they were acted upon by the wind. They participated in the causal chain, but they did not initiate it.
This moral distinction shows that we intuitively recognize the difference between being an initiator and being a participant. If people with minds could only participate in causal chains and never initiate them, the idea of moral responsibility and culpability would be incoherent.
III. There is No Evidence That Non-Minds Initiate Causality
We have direct experience of minds initiating causality, and we have no evidence that non-minds have ever initiated causality. Every instance of causation involving non-minds shows dependence on prior causes. The movement of physical matter, the reactions of chemicals, and the forces of nature all depend on conditions that precede them.
Non-minds act only when acted upon. Their activity is always reactive, never original. There are no examples in our experience of a rock, river, or star deciding to begin a new causal chain from itself. Every non-mind acts as an effect of something prior, never as the first cause in a new sequence.
The complete absence of evidence for non-minds initiating causality is significant. If all of our experience shows that minds can initiate causal chains and non-minds cannot, then the burden of proof lies entirely on anyone who claims otherwise.
IV. Evidence That Non-Minds Only Participate in Causality
Not only is there no evidence that non-minds initiate causal chains, we have strong evidence that non-minds only participate in them. There is an important difference between lacking evidence for something and having evidence that it doesnโt occur. What Iโm now arguing is not that we merely lack evidence that non-minds can initiate causation, but that we have good evidence and good reason to believe that they cannot.
Imagine if we had only ever heard about ants, or seen them a few times in passing, so we know they exist but we donโt know what theyโre capable of. In that scenario we would simply have an absence of evidence that ants could make computers. We would not know enough about them to make any judgment either way. But if we spent decades or even centuries observing ants, studying their behavior, and we never once saw them do anything remotely like building a computer, then we would rightly conclude that we have good evidence and good reason to believe that ants cannot build computers. That is no longer just an absence of evidence; we now have evidence of absence.
The same logic applies here. At one time, we might have said that we simply lacked evidence that non-minds could initiate causality. But thatโs not the situation we find ourselves in. We have observed the natural world in detail for thousands of years. We have studied matter, motion, and energy at every conceivable scale. And in every single case, we see the same pattern: non-minds only act when acted upon.
All physical phenomena exhibit this same pattern. Rocks move only when they are pushed. Rivers flow because of gravity. Fire burns because as they react with fuel and oxygen. Every natural process requires something else to set it in motion or to sustain its activity.
This is not mere ignorance. It is a consistent and universal observation. It is positive, empirical evidence that non-minds do not initiate causal chains; they only participate in them. Matter interacts according to laws, but those laws describe participation, not initiation. There is no evidence of anything within the non-conscious world ever beginning a new causal chain.
Because of these observations we donโt merely lack evidence that non-minds can cause new effects; instead we have strong, positive evidence and good reason to believe that they cannot.
We have direct experience of minds initiating causality, and we have no evidence that non-minds have ever initiated causality. Every instance of causation involving non-minds shows dependence on prior causes. The movement of physical matter, the reactions of chemicals, and the forces of nature all depend on conditions that precede them.
Non-minds act only when acted upon. Their activity is always reactive, never original. There are no examples in our experience of a rock, river, or star deciding to begin a new causal chain from itself. Every non-mind acts as an effect of something prior, never as the first cause in a new sequence.
The complete absence of evidence for non-minds initiating causality is significant. If all of our experience shows that minds can initiate causal chains and non-minds cannot, then the burden of proof lies entirely on anyone who claims otherwise.
IV. Evidence That Non-Minds Only Participate in Causality
Not only is there no evidence that non-minds initiate causal chains, we have strong evidence that non-minds only participate in them. There is an important difference between lacking evidence for something and having evidence that it doesnโt occur. What Iโm now arguing is not that we merely lack evidence that non-minds can initiate causation, but that we have good evidence and good reason to believe that they cannot.
Imagine if we had only ever heard about ants, or seen them a few times in passing, so we know they exist but we donโt know what theyโre capable of. In that scenario we would simply have an absence of evidence that ants could make computers. We would not know enough about them to make any judgment either way. But if we spent decades or even centuries observing ants, studying their behavior, and we never once saw them do anything remotely like building a computer, then we would rightly conclude that we have good evidence and good reason to believe that ants cannot build computers. That is no longer just an absence of evidence; we now have evidence of absence.
The same logic applies here. At one time, we might have said that we simply lacked evidence that non-minds could initiate causality. But thatโs not the situation we find ourselves in. We have observed the natural world in detail for thousands of years. We have studied matter, motion, and energy at every conceivable scale. And in every single case, we see the same pattern: non-minds only act when acted upon.
All physical phenomena exhibit this same pattern. Rocks move only when they are pushed. Rivers flow because of gravity. Fire burns because as they react with fuel and oxygen. Every natural process requires something else to set it in motion or to sustain its activity.
This is not mere ignorance. It is a consistent and universal observation. It is positive, empirical evidence that non-minds do not initiate causal chains; they only participate in them. Matter interacts according to laws, but those laws describe participation, not initiation. There is no evidence of anything within the non-conscious world ever beginning a new causal chain.
Because of these observations we donโt merely lack evidence that non-minds can cause new effects; instead we have strong, positive evidence and good reason to believe that they cannot.
V. The Self-Defeating Nature of Denying Mental Initiation
Iโm well aware that some people, like determinists, might want to deny that minds can initiate causal chains. They may bite the bullet and say that even our thoughts, decisions, and arguments are not the result of mental activity. This would mean that our reasoning, including the act of denying this very premise, is the blind product of prior, mindless causes.
But this move is self refuting and destroys rationality. If it were true, then no argument, belief, or act of reasoning could be considered rational or intentional. It would all be the result of non-intelligent processes, no more meaningful than a gust of wind moving a leaf.
This view undermines rationality itself. If minds cannot initiate causal sequences, then no one is responsible for their reasoning, their arguments, or their conclusions. The claim collapses into self-contradiction, because it uses the very thing it deniesโmental initiationโto make its case.
Not only this, but think about how absurd it is to suggest that we are not causing our actions but that what we do is happening TO us. When you move your hand, you didnโt move it, your hand moved because of chemical reactions and laws of physics. When youโre driving your car on the highway, youโre not driving the car, nature is.
If we accept the determinist position then thing like personal discipline, moral responsibility, rationality, and even epistemology all go out the window. The price tag that comes with determinism is insanity. Sane people canโt afford it.
Conclusion of Premise 4
All of human experience confirms that minds initiate causal chains, while non-minds only participate in them. Minds act with purpose; non-minds act only when acted upon. There are countless examples of the first and none of the second. Moreover, denying this truth destroys the foundation of reason itself.
Therefore, the evidence overwhelmingly supports the claim that minds initiate causality and non-minds do not.
Iโm well aware that some people, like determinists, might want to deny that minds can initiate causal chains. They may bite the bullet and say that even our thoughts, decisions, and arguments are not the result of mental activity. This would mean that our reasoning, including the act of denying this very premise, is the blind product of prior, mindless causes.
But this move is self refuting and destroys rationality. If it were true, then no argument, belief, or act of reasoning could be considered rational or intentional. It would all be the result of non-intelligent processes, no more meaningful than a gust of wind moving a leaf.
This view undermines rationality itself. If minds cannot initiate causal sequences, then no one is responsible for their reasoning, their arguments, or their conclusions. The claim collapses into self-contradiction, because it uses the very thing it deniesโmental initiationโto make its case.
Not only this, but think about how absurd it is to suggest that we are not causing our actions but that what we do is happening TO us. When you move your hand, you didnโt move it, your hand moved because of chemical reactions and laws of physics. When youโre driving your car on the highway, youโre not driving the car, nature is.
If we accept the determinist position then thing like personal discipline, moral responsibility, rationality, and even epistemology all go out the window. The price tag that comes with determinism is insanity. Sane people canโt afford it.
Conclusion of Premise 4
All of human experience confirms that minds initiate causal chains, while non-minds only participate in them. Minds act with purpose; non-minds act only when acted upon. There are countless examples of the first and none of the second. Moreover, denying this truth destroys the foundation of reason itself.
Therefore, the evidence overwhelmingly supports the claim that minds initiate causality and non-minds do not.
๐๐ฎ๐ฌ๐ญ๐ข๐๐ข๐๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐จ๐ซ ๐๐ซ๐๐ฆ๐ข๐ฌ๐ ๐
Premise 5: Therefore, all evidence supports that the necessary being has intentionality.
This premise follows directly from everything thatโs already been established. In premise one we demonstrated that a necessary being exists and that this being initiated the causal chain responsible for all of reality.
In premise four we demonstrated that we only have experience that minds can initiate causal chains, and that non-minds do not. We have no evidence that a non-mind can initiate causality, and we have strong evidence that non-minds only participate in causal chains.
Given the truth of these premises, it would make no sense to believe that the one causal chain that began all of reality was the single exception to everything we have ever observed.
To assume a non-mind is responsible would be like saying that because every fire we have ever observed requires heat, oxygen, and fuel, we should still think that the very first fire somehow ignited itself without any of those things. Such an assumption would not just be unsupported; it would be absurd.
The necessary being, by definition, is the one that initiated the causal sequence that brought all contingent things into existence. Since only minds initiate causal chains, and since we have never seen or have any reason to believe that a non-mind can do so, itโs entirely irrational to believe the necessary being does not have intentionality.
Therefore, all evidence supports that the necessary being has intentionality.
Premise 5: Therefore, all evidence supports that the necessary being has intentionality.
This premise follows directly from everything thatโs already been established. In premise one we demonstrated that a necessary being exists and that this being initiated the causal chain responsible for all of reality.
In premise four we demonstrated that we only have experience that minds can initiate causal chains, and that non-minds do not. We have no evidence that a non-mind can initiate causality, and we have strong evidence that non-minds only participate in causal chains.
Given the truth of these premises, it would make no sense to believe that the one causal chain that began all of reality was the single exception to everything we have ever observed.
To assume a non-mind is responsible would be like saying that because every fire we have ever observed requires heat, oxygen, and fuel, we should still think that the very first fire somehow ignited itself without any of those things. Such an assumption would not just be unsupported; it would be absurd.
The necessary being, by definition, is the one that initiated the causal sequence that brought all contingent things into existence. Since only minds initiate causal chains, and since we have never seen or have any reason to believe that a non-mind can do so, itโs entirely irrational to believe the necessary being does not have intentionality.
Therefore, all evidence supports that the necessary being has intentionality.
๐๐ฎ๐ฌ๐ญ๐ข๐๐ข๐๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐จ๐ซ ๐๐ซ๐๐ฆ๐ข๐ฌ๐ ๐
Premise 6: If there is overwhelming evidence for one theory and zero evidence for the only other possible theory, it is rational to believe the first and irrational to believe the second.
This premise expresses one of the simplest and most reliable principles of reason: when two explanations are the only possible options, and all the evidence supports one while none supports the other, it is rational to believe the supported one and irrational to believe its opposite. Rational belief must follow the weight of the evidence.
We apply this principle constantly in ordinary life and in science. Suppose we are studying reproduction in animals. There are only two possibilities when two alligators mate: either they will produce something that is an alligator, or they will produce something that is not an alligator. Across all observation and experience, we have always seen the same resultโwhen two alligators reproduce, their offspring is an alligator. We have never once observed two alligators produce something that is not an alligator.
Given this consistent pattern, it would be irrational to expect otherwise. To believe that two alligators, about to have offspring, would suddenly produce an animal that is not an alligator would go directly against all available evidence. Since every observation supports one outcome and none supports the other, reason demands that we believe what the evidence confirms and reject what it contradicts.
The same logic applies to the question of causation. There are only two possible explanations for the initiation of causal sequences: either they are initiated by minds, or they are initiated by non-minds. Every observation supports the first and none supports the second. In all human experience, minds initiate causal chains, and non-minds only participate in them.
Therefore, when two explanations are the only possibilities, and one has overwhelming evidence while the other has none, it is rational to believe the first and irrational to believe the second.
Premise 6: If there is overwhelming evidence for one theory and zero evidence for the only other possible theory, it is rational to believe the first and irrational to believe the second.
This premise expresses one of the simplest and most reliable principles of reason: when two explanations are the only possible options, and all the evidence supports one while none supports the other, it is rational to believe the supported one and irrational to believe its opposite. Rational belief must follow the weight of the evidence.
We apply this principle constantly in ordinary life and in science. Suppose we are studying reproduction in animals. There are only two possibilities when two alligators mate: either they will produce something that is an alligator, or they will produce something that is not an alligator. Across all observation and experience, we have always seen the same resultโwhen two alligators reproduce, their offspring is an alligator. We have never once observed two alligators produce something that is not an alligator.
Given this consistent pattern, it would be irrational to expect otherwise. To believe that two alligators, about to have offspring, would suddenly produce an animal that is not an alligator would go directly against all available evidence. Since every observation supports one outcome and none supports the other, reason demands that we believe what the evidence confirms and reject what it contradicts.
The same logic applies to the question of causation. There are only two possible explanations for the initiation of causal sequences: either they are initiated by minds, or they are initiated by non-minds. Every observation supports the first and none supports the second. In all human experience, minds initiate causal chains, and non-minds only participate in them.
Therefore, when two explanations are the only possibilities, and one has overwhelming evidence while the other has none, it is rational to believe the first and irrational to believe the second.
๐๐จ๐ง๐๐ฅ๐ฎ๐ฌ๐ข๐จ๐ง: ๐๐ก๐ ๐๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐๐ฅ ๐๐๐ซ๐๐ข๐๐ญ ๐ข๐ฌ ๐๐จ๐
This argument has shown that within the entire scope of human experience, causation follows a single intelligible pattern: minds initiate causal chains, and non-minds only participate in them. Every instance of agency, creativity, or decision we observe originates in a mind. Every instance of mechanical or physical activity is reactive, dependent, and derived. There are no exceptions to this pattern.
From this, it follows that when we trace realityโs causal order back to its beginning, the only rational conclusion is that the ultimate sourceโthe necessary beingโwould have intentionality. In other words, the first cause of all things has a mind. To say that a non-mind initiated causality is to propose something that not only lacks evidence but contradicts every observation we have ever made.
Atheism, in this sense, is not merely unsupportedโit is irrational. It asks us to reject the entire structure of our experiential knowledge of how causation works. It asks us to believe that something without a mind somehow acted upon itself and produced everything else. This is not just contrary to evidence; it is contrary to reason.
The burden of proof, therefore, falls entirely on the atheist. If atheists want to be taken seriously, they must explain why we should abandon every consistent pattern of causation weโve ever observed and instead accept a completely unverified and unintelligible form of causationโone where something without intentionality acts like it has intentionality.
And even if, for the sake of argument, an atheist could somehow demonstrate that a non-mind behaves in every way like a mind, why would we not simply conclude that it is, in fact, a mind? To call something โmindlessโ when it displays mind like behavior is going to need a lot of justification before any rational person should consider such a proposition.
Therefore, the rational verdict is clear. All evidence and experience confirm that the origin of causality must be intentional. As Hume famously argued:
โIf we only see evidence of X and we have no evidence of Y, we should think X.โ
I agree. We should think God exists.
This argument has shown that within the entire scope of human experience, causation follows a single intelligible pattern: minds initiate causal chains, and non-minds only participate in them. Every instance of agency, creativity, or decision we observe originates in a mind. Every instance of mechanical or physical activity is reactive, dependent, and derived. There are no exceptions to this pattern.
From this, it follows that when we trace realityโs causal order back to its beginning, the only rational conclusion is that the ultimate sourceโthe necessary beingโwould have intentionality. In other words, the first cause of all things has a mind. To say that a non-mind initiated causality is to propose something that not only lacks evidence but contradicts every observation we have ever made.
Atheism, in this sense, is not merely unsupportedโit is irrational. It asks us to reject the entire structure of our experiential knowledge of how causation works. It asks us to believe that something without a mind somehow acted upon itself and produced everything else. This is not just contrary to evidence; it is contrary to reason.
The burden of proof, therefore, falls entirely on the atheist. If atheists want to be taken seriously, they must explain why we should abandon every consistent pattern of causation weโve ever observed and instead accept a completely unverified and unintelligible form of causationโone where something without intentionality acts like it has intentionality.
And even if, for the sake of argument, an atheist could somehow demonstrate that a non-mind behaves in every way like a mind, why would we not simply conclude that it is, in fact, a mind? To call something โmindlessโ when it displays mind like behavior is going to need a lot of justification before any rational person should consider such a proposition.
Therefore, the rational verdict is clear. All evidence and experience confirm that the origin of causality must be intentional. As Hume famously argued:
โIf we only see evidence of X and we have no evidence of Y, we should think X.โ
I agree. We should think God exists.
If you enjoyed this argument for God and want to help others to re-think how we even approach this question, please consider reposting this thread.
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