1/5 Good Setser piece on rising global imbalances. Thanks in part to his work, central bankers and mainstream economists are slowly beginning to acknowledge that rising global imbalances can be a problem for the global economy.
2/5 Most mainstream economists know that every country's internal imbalances are always perfectly consistent with its external imbalances, just as its external imbalances are always perfectly consistent with the external imbalances of its trade partners.
3/5 But they are rarely able to understand the implications. When each country's external economy is linked through nearly-frictionless trade and capital flows, each country's domestic economy is also linked through the same mechanism. A country with deep internal imbalances...
4/5 that controls its trade and capital accounts creates the opposite external imbalances among its trade partners. These, in turn, must be accommodated by changes in their domestic economies. Distortions in one country automatically create distortions in its trade partners.
5/5 Huge trade surpluses, in other words, don't just reflect deep domestic imbalances and distortions within the surplus economy. They also create the reverse imbalances and distortions among their more open trade partners.
In a hyper-globalized world, it couldn't be otherwise.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
1/4 Caixin: "A significant increase in the household consumption ratio hinges on Beijing’s ability to solve a chronic problem of low household spending, a challenge rooted in sluggish income growth, widening inequality and inadequate public services."
2/4 It is by now widely recognized among academics and policy advisors that China's weak consumption is a function of a low household income share of GDP, and that the solution is to implement "demand-side measures to boost employment, income and confidence."
3/4 What still isn't much discussed, at least publicly, is the structural relationship between China's supply-side strength and its demand-side weakness. For all the talk of boosting domestic demand, in other words, no one has really wanted to discuss...
1/5 FT: “German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has backed protectionist measures to shield the country’s ailing steel industry from cheap Chinese imports, in a striking departure from the country’s traditional commitment to free trade.”
via @ftft.com/content/a02d77…
2/5 I’d argue that what Germany traditionally displayed wasn’t a commitment to free trade so much as the standard trade-surplus country’s insistence that their trade partners don’t intervene against their abilities to run trade surpluses.
3/5 Germany’s post-2003 trade surplus, after all, didn’t emerge from free trade. It emerged from labor reforms that effectively pushed down the household share of GDP, combined with the role of the newly-created euro in preventing “normal” currency and interest rate adjustments.
1/10
NYT: "China has offset the decline from America with breathtaking speed. Shipments to other parts of the world have surged this year, demonstrating that China’s manufacturing dominance will not be easily slowed." nytimes.com/interactive/20…
2/10
"That’s because." the New York Times explains, "China was prepared. It has been seeking out new customers for years, and its massive manufacturing investment allows it to sell goods at low prices."
This explanation shows just how confused analysts remain about trade.
3/10
It also illustrates why my mentor at Columbia, Michael Adler, threatened to fail any student who mentioned bilateral trade imbalances. In a our hyperglobalized world of extremely low transportation costs, bilateral trade imbalances tell us almost nothing about trade pressures.
1/4 Interesting article by Yanmei Xie: "Why does involution defy repeated attempts to purge it?" she asks. "Because the foundational structure of China’s political economy breeds it." ft.com/content/e768df…
2/4 She's absolutely right. "Involution:" is just the latest name for a decades-old problem arising from a development model built around the need to keep increasing investment in capacity, even when capacity is already excessive. carnegieendowment.org/posts/2025/08/…
3/4 Xie points out that what creates this excess capacity is simply the flip side of the very thing that creates global competitiveness, concluding that "what begins as glut at home could end as supremacy abroad."
1/8 Yale's Stephen Roach says China must raise the household consumption share of its GDP by ten percentage points over the next decade. In August PKU economics professor Lu Feng, said that China should raise it by 5 to 10 percentage points over the.. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/8 next 5 to 10 years, while Peng Sen, chairman of the China Society of Economic Reform, said it should raise it by more than 10 percentage points.
A 10-percentage-point increase, by the way, would still leave China with among the lowest consumption shares of any major economy.
3/8 While by now pretty much every serious economist in and out of China agrees that China must urgently raise the consumption share of its GDP, and by a lot more than analysts had at first assumed, what they aren't yet doing is explaining why it will be so difficult.
1/7 The NYT on US (and probably EU) over-reliance on China for the chemicals involved in manufacturing drugs. They argue that it is the combination of lower unit labor costs and a greater tolerance for environmental degradation that makes the difference. nytimes.com/2025/10/15/hea…
2/7 If this isn't too much of an oversimplification, a rational trade policy could easily address both issues. The purpose of such a policy would not be to protect specific sectors except to the extent that they have national security implications.
3/7 It would be simply to ensure broadly balanced trade. Once trade is balanced, after all, countries cannot run surpluses to externalize the costs of their domestic policies. For example if a country chooses to become globally competitive in a particular sector, perhaps in...