An under-appreciated reason why voters oppose dense new housing, especially in less-dense neighborhoods: they think it looks ugly and want to prevent that, even in other neighborhoods.
Some of what we think is NIMBYism might not be!
🧵
The US housing shortage is acute & driven by policy. The prevailing explanations for why voters oppose new supply focus on two things:
"NIMBYism": Neighbors fearing local nuisances (traffic, parking) in their "backyard."
These theories have clear merits, but also gaps:
Difference between homeowners & renters often aren't large.
& noting that NIMBYism is real leaves open the question of the content of NIMBY concerns and how they can be mitigated.
We propose a third explanation: Sociotropic Aesthetic Judgments.
Voters form automatic judgments about whether a building is visually appealing or "fits in."
Importantly, they apply these aesthetic standards broadly—not just on their own block, but wherever housing is proposed.
As motivation, look at this puzzle
Existing theories predict homeowners in dense areas should be the biggest opponents of more density in already-dense areas--it's their backyard!
But homeowners on corridors are actually *most* supportive of AB 2011-style upzoning of corridors!
We think two things are going on here:
1. People self-select into neighborhoods that match their aesthetic tastes. If you live in density, you likely have a "taste" for it.
2. Voters prefer development that "fits in" with the existing built environment....
We found widespread support for 5-story apartments along commercial corridors (where they fit), but sharp opposition in single-family neighborhoods (where they clash).
Even people who live in dense areas support density more where they live than elsewhere!
This may explain the political success of "commercial corridor" upzoning policies (like CA's AB 2011). It's not just about avoiding NIMBY homeowners; it's that voters view density as aesthetically appropriate in already-dense areas, regardless of where they personally live.
How much does "ugliness" actually matter compared to other concerns? A lot.
We surveyed voters on various objections to housing. As Figure 3 shows, the belief that "Cities look nicer when they have fewer tall apartment buildings" is a top predictor of opposition.
Is "aesthetics" just a pretext for excluding lower-income residents? We tested this by comparing support for apartments vs. similarly sized office buildings. If it was about residents, people should prefer offices. But they oppose offices even more. Physical structure matters.
We then ran an experiment varying attributes of a proposed building: taxes, parking, and the architect's design reputation.
Result 1: The aesthetic quality of the project was a massive driver of support--outweighing concerns about parking or tax revenue.
Result 2...
Drop in support from the project being "on your block" is half the size of it being in a non-dense vs. already-dense area elsewhere
Perhaps part of why single family homeowners oppose local density isn't NIMBYism, but a widely shared view density should go in already-dense areas
In a second vignette, we showed respondents images of buildings.
The results also confirm that both visual appeal and fit in context powerfully drive support for housing, and seemingly far more than affordability concerns.
These are the building designs we used in the second experiment.
NB: I used to live in building (b), and it passed SF's design review. Voters hate it and don't want to approve housing like it! Maybe our design review processes should be better.
These judgments are *sociotropic*. Voters didn't just oppose ugly buildings on their own block; they opposed policies that would allow "ugly" buildings anywhere. Just as people support redistribution for the "greater good" they support aesthetic regulation for the "greater good"
To provide a different kind of causal leverage, we also tested this with video. Watching a short clip that framed modern "boxy" architecture as ugly reduced support for upzoning. Aesthetic complaints create opposition to supply-side reforms.
What are the policy implications?
First, design matters. If the YIMBY movement wants to build broad coalitions, it cannot ignore aesthetics. Policies that ensure better design or "fitting in" (like form-based codes) might reduce political friction.
Second, this explains why "missing middle" housing or upzoning commercial strips is often more politically feasible than general upzoning. It respects the voter's desire for visual congruence—putting taller buildings where they "look right."
We don't claim homeowner self-interest or NIMBYism don't matter.
But our findings suggest that "fear of an ugly America" is an underrated driver of the housing crisis and could contribute to what has been called NIMBYism. Addressing it could unlock new support for more housing.
You can read the full paper here:
We look forward to hearing everyone's feedback!osf.io/kz4m8
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🚨NEW PAPER: Why are Members of Congress so extreme?
We conducted a 4-wave panel of thousands of voters in 27 districts during last year’s primary AND general elections to trace polarization’s roots
The results challenge conventional wisdom… and suggest lessons for parties🧵👇
Conventional wisdom blames:
• Primary voters who closely follow politics & prefer extremists
• General election voters who are too ignorant of candidate positions—or too “intoxicated” by party loyalty—to vote for moderates over extremists
But our data tells a different story…
We monitored debates, websites, & news in real time during the 2024 primary and general elections to identify issues & endorsements where the candidates *in each district* differed. We then conducted pre-election surveys 2-3 mo before each election & re-surveyed again on e-day.
🚨 NEW PAPER: When low-income Americans get $1,000/month for 3 years, what happens to their political views & behavior?
The OpenResearch Unconditional income Study reveals surprising findings about the effects of income on politics... 🧵
Reminder: in the study 1k low-income Americans got $1k/mo for 3 yrs, & were compared to a randomized 2k-person control group. Total of ~$40MM given away.
First, it's hard to overstate how widespread the view is among political scientists that *we already know* voters regularly use interest group ratings to infer what their representatives did in office.
Basically every review of the literature on accountability says we know this.
The problem: there's almost no data!
Few studies look at how voters use group cues to make inferences about politicians.
Most data is about how voters use them to make inferences about issues (e.g., Lupia '94), but in these cases we don't know what the "right" inference is.