1/10
SCMP: "Kenya has reached a preliminary trade deal with China for duty-free exports of key products including coffee, tea and cut flowers – a major step towards narrowing the East African nation’s long-standing trade gap with Beijing."
via @scmpnewssc.mp/gg0zg?utm_sour…
2/10
This kind of incrementalist thinking is one of the reasons why global trade is so unbalanced and so poorly understood. China does not run a trade surplus with Kenya because of tariffs on coffee, tea and cut flowers.
3/10
It runs a massive trade surplus with the world because of equally-massive domestic imbalances. Reducing tariffs on Kenyan coffee, tea and cut flowers will have almost no effect at all on China's domestic imbalances, and so no affect on China's need for a trade surplus.
4/10
So how will this affect Kenya's historic trade deficit?
It won't. The deficit will be the same as always. Trade does not adjust incrementally. It can only adjust systemically. This trade agreement might shift exports and imports around a bit, but it won't do more than that.
5/10
But does it matter if Kenya runs a deficit?
Not at all. What matters is whether that deficit is balanced by higher Kenyan investment or by higher Kenyan consumption. This, in turn, is likely to depend on Kenya's openness to capital flows and on the nature of these flows.
6/10
If it is the former, Kenya's deficit will generate the growth needed to service the foreign investment that is financing the deficit. If the latter, Kenya will only be able to service foreign investment by squeezing future consumption, i.e. squeezing the workers.
7/10
If I were advising the Kenyan government, I'd argue that the issue isn't whether deficits, or trade with China, are good or bad. The issue is what kind of economy do Kenyans want to have.
8/10
Because Kenya has a relatively open capital account, the risk is that foreign trade, especially trade with countries that exert control over their external accounts, will drive Kenya's external imbalances which, in turn, will determine Kenya's internal imbalances.
9/10
In a world in which many major economies exert significant control over their external accounts, those that don't must end up adjusting in ways that are needed to accommodate the trade and industrial policies of those that do.
10/10
Free trade (which requires free capital flows) only enhances growth across the board when all major economies practice it. If many major economies don't, it is in Kenya's best interests not to allow its economy to become part of their adjustment process.
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1/7 EU commissioner for trade Maroš Šefčovič is absolutely right to question the usefulness of the WTO: "If the WTO is to meet today’s challenges, its rules must be fair and deliver balanced, legitimate outcomes. Currently, they do neither." ft.com/content/2ff1d4…
2/7 The fact that decades of the largest, persistent trade imbalances in history have largely been WTO compliant suggests strongly that the WTO is more about maintaining legal fictions than it is about discouraging the adverse impact of trade intervention on the global economy.
3/7 As Keynes (and many others) pointed out nearly a century ago, evidence that a country is intervening in trade shows up very clearly in the form of persistent, beggar-thy-neighbor trade surpluses. If the latter exists, then the former exists.
1/6 Reuters: "Chinese leaders have pledged to "significantly" lift household consumption’s share of the economy over the next five years, but have not given a specific target." reuters.com/world/asia-pac…
2/6 If we assume that Beijing hopes to raise the consumption share of GDP by 3-5 percentage points (roughly a third of what it would need to be a more "normal" low-consuming economy), consumption would have to grow by 1-2 percentage points faster than GDP over the period.
3/6 That's a pretty big gap, and one we have never yet seen in the past 3-4 decades of Chinese growth. The good way to manage this, of course, would be for consumption growth to accelerate, although it is not at all clear what would cause that acceleration.
1/7 Good Martin Wolf piece on the global return of mercantilism. What is new about this piece is that it seems part of a growing recognition among global opinion makers that mercantilism and trade war didn't start when deficit economies with... ft.com/content/cd68b3…
2/7 open external accounts began to implement trade restrictions and otherwise control their external accounts. It started earlier, when economies that controlled their external accounts implemented trade and industrial policies that led to beggar-thy-neighbor trade surpluses.
3/7 We are returning, in other words, to Joan Robinson and her 1937 explanation of how trade conflict emerges. What I would add is that in a hyperglobalized trading system (i.e one in which transportation costs, communications costs, and the costs of... ia802806.us.archive.org/16/items/essay…
1/6 Wall Street bankers and owners of movable capital would hate it, but if the rest of the world were to reduce its dependence on the US dollar, this would be good for the US economy, good for US manufacturing, and good for US farmers and workers. wsj.com/finance/curren…
2/6 The claim that the US benefits from the global use of the dollar is one of those things that people believe even though they can't explain why – except perhaps in terms of sanctions. None of the world's fastest-growing economies (including... foreignaffairs.com/united-states/…
3/6 advanced economies like the US in the 100 years before the 1970s, Germany in the same time period, or post-war Japan, Taiwan and South Korea) had major reserve currency status, and yet they all had rapidly growing economies driven by even more rapid growth in manufacturing.
1/4 Bloomberg: "“Even with strong determination and sufficient resources, transforming China’s economy into one driven by consumption and services will take years,” Goldman said. “With a more reluctant, measured approach, it could take decades.”" bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/4 Goldman is right, of course, unless a debt crisis, or a serious acceleration of trade war, forces a much faster, disruptive adjustment. While the latter might happen, the former is, for now at least, pretty unlikely.
3/4 A long adjustment, however, means a Japanese-style adjustment over two or three decades, in which consumption growth continues at more or less the same pace it had in the past while GDP growth drops sharply, and investment growth goes negative.
1/4 Aggregate financing in China, the most widely-used proxy for total debt, ended 2025 at RMB 442.12 trillion, an 8.3% increase over last year's outstanding amount. This is a relatively small increase in total debt compared to earlier years. english.news.cn/20260115/3e5af…
2/4 But of course nominal GDP growth is also much lower, so the RMB 35.6 trillion increase in aggregate financing in 2025 represents a 12 percentage-point increase in China's debt-to-GDP ratio. This is higher than the 11 percentage-point increases in 2024 and 2023.
3/4 China's debt data isn't always comparable over time, but I think only the COVID year of 2020 saw a higher increase in China's debt-to-GDP ratio, and because this was partially reversed in 2021, the average annual increase over the two years was only ten percentage points.