On January 24th, China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced that CMC Vice Chairman, General Zhang Youxia, and CMC Joint Staff Department (JSD) Chief of Staff, General Liu Zhenli, were placed under investigation by the CCP’s Central Committee for “serious violations of discipline and law.”
Both generals were also absent from the opening ceremony of the Study Session for the Provincial and Ministerial-Level Leading Cadres on Implementing the Spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CCP Central Committee on January 20th.
The PLA Daily released an editorial that provided additional details on why the Central Committee decided to place Zhang and Liu under investigation.
They stated that their investigation and punishment would be a “major achievement in the Party and the PLA’s anti-corruption struggle” as well as of “great significance for winning the overall, protracted, decisive battle against corruption in the military.”
Zhang and Liu “severely trampled on and undermined” the CMC Chairman’s responsibility system, fostering corruption and political problems that weakened the CCP’s absolute leadership over the PLA as well as severely impacting the ideological and political foundation of the unity and fore-ahead spirit of all officers and soldiers.
The article asserted that Zhang and Liu’s investigation will revitalize and promote the PLA’s rebirth as well as inject a strong impetus into the “development of a strong military.”
The investigation of Zhang and Liu by the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission (CMCDIC) is due to political and military reasons rather than corruption.
However, Zhang and Liu’s removal from their positions will have a profound impact on the PLA’s combat readiness as well as its modernization process.
The CMCDIC’s investigation is the first step of Zhang and Liu’s eventual dismissal from the CCP and the PLA. Corruption, however, is a common label used in investigations and likely not the reason for Zhang and Liu’s removal.
Zhang was likely removed as Vice Chairman because his powerbase was viewed by Xi as an obstacle to his control over the PLA and more recently as a hindrance to its modernization.
Liu was removed because of his link to Zhang, as they participated in the Battle of Laoshan with different units.
The generals were outliers in the PLA because they were among the few with combat experience from the Battle of Laoshan and the Sino-Vietnamese War.
Zhang’s experience is why Xi allowed him to serve after he reached the PLA’s mandatory retirement age and to maintain his powerbase despite viewing him as a political liability.
Xi decided to remove Zhang and Liu due to their failure to rapidly advance the PLA’s combat readiness and modernization efforts to meet his expectations. Xi viewed the slow progress as detrimental to achieving the goal of transforming the PLA into a world class military by 2049.
However, Zhang and Liu’s removal would negatively impact the PLA’s combat readiness and broader modernization efforts because it now lacks two individuals with experience in conducting real world operations.
Zhang and Liu’s slow progress likely stems from their understanding that it takes time to develop the PLA into a combat effective force, which cannot be expedited.
Liu’s removal, however, would especially be felt in the JSD because it is tasked with operational planning, developing military requirements and strategies, and guiding joint training and combat readiness development.
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In this Quick Take for the China Landpower Studies Center, I explain how the 112th Heavy Combined Arms Brigade (HCAB) will receive the ZTZ-99B Main Battle Tank (MBT) to develop the doctrine to effectively employ it during combat operations.
In mid-January, the crew from the Type 054B/Jiangkai III class frigate, the Luohe, conducted a live-fire shore bombardment exercise that involved the use of UAVs to correct the ship’s fire.
The Luohe utilizes the drones to gather targeting data so the ship can conduct fire missions at the targeted positions using its H/PJ-87 100mm naval cannon.
The frigate’s crew developed a training camp for drone pilots to create the TTPs and SOPs for how to employ the UAVs for fire missions.
In early February, an image of a J-15T carrier based multirole aircraft flying with two YJ-15 Anti Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) on its air intake hardpoints in Lingshui, Hainan province.
The J-15T was conducting a training mission so the pilot could learn how to handle the aircraft while armed with heavy munitions, such as the YJ-15. More importantly, the training flight also enabled the pilot to understand the parameters for when they would launch the YJ-15.
The YJ-15 was designed to be a low-cost ASCM compared to larger hypersonic ones such as the YJ-17, YJ-19, and YJ-21 and will replace the YJ-83K and YJ-83KH. The missile is a scaled-down version of the YJ-12, which also incorporated aspects of the Kh-31 and YJ-91.
My article about the PLANMC tank companies and how it enhances the branch’s expeditionary capabilities is out now with the China Landpower Studies Center’s Quick Takes.
I would like to thank Joshua Arostegui for providing me with this opportunity to publish my research regarding a topic I am passionate about.
The PLANMC’s establishment of tank companies illustrates how the branch is developing the necessary capabilities to conduct self-sustained, expeditionary operations without support from other PLA branches.
China loves teasing China watchers with the video and other media from the Fujian’s commissioning ceremony on November 5th. The government should announce the carrier’s commissioning tomorrow though.
Workers removed the streamers tied to the Fujian aircraft carrier after the ceremony, as seen in the first image on November 6th. In an image from November 5th, the streamers were still tied to the carrier before the ceremony.
The ceremonial stand located on the pier in between Shandong and Fujian was also removed on the same day.
On November 5th, SAR imagery from @esa indicated that the Shuiqiao class Landing Platform Utility (LPU) barges returned to Yuhuan Naval Piers after completing a 21-day exercise at Hepu Dasha Beach, located on Nantian Island.
The barges in the November 5th image match similar satellite imagery taken of Yuhuan in September and October, when they were moored at their regular spots on the piers.
The LPUs left Hepu Dasha Beach on October 31st and returned to the naval piers by November 1st.