Thread by @amenka

The Iran war coverage focuses on oil. The slower, more consequential story is fertilizers. A near-shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz is triggering a supply shock that will show up in food prices 6-9 months from now. Putin's gains here may be more long-term than simply lining his pockets with petrodollars

According to Lloyd's List Intelligence, Post-March 1 commercial traffic: 105 transits, 8.7m dwt. Same period in 2025: 1,870 transits, 167.9m dwt. That's a 94% collapse - not "disruption." The Gulf produces ~49% of global urea exports and ~30% of ammonia. Nearly all of it is stuck.

Consequences already material. Urea up 25-30% since Feb 28. Gulf producers have declared force majeure on contracts to South America and Asia. ~1 million metric tons of fertilizer physically stranded in the Gulf. Force majeure means contracts are legally severed -not delayed. Buyers must find alternatives now.
agweb.com/news/policy/po…

This is where Russia enters. Russia is a key supplier of ammonia and nitrogen fertilizers worldwide and, along with Belarus, covers about 40% of the global potash market. Russia, along with Qatar, is the prime exporter of urea to the US, and Russia exports the bulk of its fertilizer — more than 45 million tons a year — to the Global South. Nigerian and Ghanaian importers are already placing Q3 pre-orders with Russian suppliers

The timeline runs in three waves. Wave 1 (now): fertilizer price spike, contract disruption. Wave 2 (Q3-Q4 2026): reduced planting, lower yields — worst in Africa and South Asia where pre-purchasing is impossible. Wave 3 (2027): food price inflation hitting retail in import-dependent economies carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2026/…

The 2022 comparison matters, but has a critical asymmetry. Then: Russia was sanctioned, the Gulf was fine, and grain prices spiked simultaneously so farmers could offset input costs with revenue. Now: Russia is fully operational, the Gulf has stopped, and grain prices are not surging like in 2022. Higher costs, flat revenue.

Kremlin hawk Patrushev frames the war as destroying "the system of global trade-economic relations," signalling that Moscow sees this not as a crisis but as an opportunity for realignment. He does not mention Ukraine, but suggests that merchant ships may be escorted by Russian Navy vessels. It should be noted that Patrushev’s son is a deputy prime minister of the Russian government responsible for agriculture and fertilisers. kommersant.ru/doc/8514927?fr…

Russia's Position in Each Wave
Wave 1: Revenue. Higher prices and higher volumes sold simultaneously.
Wave 2: Market share. Supply contracts being rewritten now will direct purchasing toward non-Gulf, non-Hormuz sources. Russia is the largest available alternative for nitrogen and potash globally.

Wave 3: Geopolitical leverage. Countries dependent on Russian fertilizer for their food supply do not vote against Russia in multilateral forums, do not join sanctions coalitions, and provide the political constituency for the "Global South neutrality" narrative Moscow has been cultivating since 2022.

the Iran war will probably be over before most people connect it to the food prices they're paying in 2027. Russia will be positioned as the indispensable supplier that kept the lights on. That positioning wasn't planned. But it would be actively harvested.