The conflict with Iran has negatively affected Hamas’s standing, strategic considerations, and overall circumstances in several respects. Here are a few:
1. Losing financial transfers that Tehran was sending to the group’s offshore accounts, which were feeding different networks and helping provide indirect support to Hamas in Gaza.
2. The loss of the world’s attention away from Gaza, which is now on the back burner and out of headlines, including the serious humanitarian issues and suffering plaguing the coastal enclave, something that Hamas has always relied on to force the world to take it seriously.
3. Creating an uncomfortable dynamic with its Qatari hosts, who were targeted repeatedly by Iranian missiles that seriously harmed Doha’s economic and gas infrastructure, forcing Hamas to issue statements calling for the cessation of attacks on Gulf countries and having to walk a fine line between its political/financial backer and its chief regional ally of the “Axis of Resistance.” Some Hamas supporters, journalists, and social media warriors faced expulsion and harassment in Qatar due to their pro-Iran stances.
4. The emergence of a split within Hamas’s Politburo between those who favor a realignment with the Arab orbit and world, including Khaled Mashal and Mousa Abu Marzook, and those who prefer to stay with Iran and the traditional terror pact that includes Tehran, Shia militias, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, like Khalil al-Hayya and Osama Hamdan.
5. A panic and more reluctance about the possibility of disarmament, fearing that the Iran war made it clear about the need to have means of deterrence and fighting to have any chance of surviving, even though Hamas knows that Gaza’s prospects are paralyzed without disarmament.
6. A fear rising from the belief that if Netanyahu were able to persuade Trump to strike Iran, he could just as easily do so with Gaza, opening the door for the possibility of the war’s return.
7. A worry that because of the extensive damage caused by Iran’s strikes against Gulf nations, those countries will be spending billions on their own reconstruction and repair needs, and may be less eager to allocate funds for a risky rebuilding process in the Gaza Strip.
8. Concern that mediators and countries that were critical for reaching a ceasefire in Gaza will be preoccupied with the Iran situation and the ongoing war in Lebanon, leaving Hamas without the heavy representation it once enjoyed by Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey to engage the US administration and Israel, both of which are preoccupied as well.
1. Losing financial transfers that Tehran was sending to the group’s offshore accounts, which were feeding different networks and helping provide indirect support to Hamas in Gaza.
2. The loss of the world’s attention away from Gaza, which is now on the back burner and out of headlines, including the serious humanitarian issues and suffering plaguing the coastal enclave, something that Hamas has always relied on to force the world to take it seriously.
3. Creating an uncomfortable dynamic with its Qatari hosts, who were targeted repeatedly by Iranian missiles that seriously harmed Doha’s economic and gas infrastructure, forcing Hamas to issue statements calling for the cessation of attacks on Gulf countries and having to walk a fine line between its political/financial backer and its chief regional ally of the “Axis of Resistance.” Some Hamas supporters, journalists, and social media warriors faced expulsion and harassment in Qatar due to their pro-Iran stances.
4. The emergence of a split within Hamas’s Politburo between those who favor a realignment with the Arab orbit and world, including Khaled Mashal and Mousa Abu Marzook, and those who prefer to stay with Iran and the traditional terror pact that includes Tehran, Shia militias, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, like Khalil al-Hayya and Osama Hamdan.
5. A panic and more reluctance about the possibility of disarmament, fearing that the Iran war made it clear about the need to have means of deterrence and fighting to have any chance of surviving, even though Hamas knows that Gaza’s prospects are paralyzed without disarmament.
6. A fear rising from the belief that if Netanyahu were able to persuade Trump to strike Iran, he could just as easily do so with Gaza, opening the door for the possibility of the war’s return.
7. A worry that because of the extensive damage caused by Iran’s strikes against Gulf nations, those countries will be spending billions on their own reconstruction and repair needs, and may be less eager to allocate funds for a risky rebuilding process in the Gaza Strip.
8. Concern that mediators and countries that were critical for reaching a ceasefire in Gaza will be preoccupied with the Iran situation and the ongoing war in Lebanon, leaving Hamas without the heavy representation it once enjoyed by Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey to engage the US administration and Israel, both of which are preoccupied as well.
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