Christian Mölling Profile picture
May 17 22 tweets 3 min read Read on X
Background:

Europe is rebuilding land-based deterrence. One of the key industrial pillars is now in play. Image
1/21 – The bigger picture
Europe is rebuilding land-based deterrence. That requires more than defence budgets. It requires industrial control over the companies that build, maintain and upgrade key land-warfare systems.
2/21 – Why this matters now
One of those companies is KNDS. It is heading towards an IPO, while the German ownership block is reportedly being approached by strategic buyers. This is not just a corporate transaction.
3/21 – What KNDS is
KNDS combines the former French Nexter and Germany’s Krauss-Maffei Wegmann. Its portfolio includes Leopard 2, Boxer, RCH 155, Panzerhaubitze 2000, artillery, armoured vehicles, maintenance and upgrades.
4/21 – The strategic issue
Whoever shapes KNDS helps shape the future industrial backbone of European land-warfare capabilities: production, spare parts, maintenance, modernisation and long-term support.
5/21 – The Chancellor’s pledge
Germany’s Chancellor has pledged to make the Bundeswehr the strongest conventional army in Europe. That pledge meets reality in the industrial base: tanks, artillery, logistics, software, upgrades and repair capacity.
6/21 – Sovereignty enables cooperation
European cooperation does not emerge from industrial self-disempowerment. A country that secures its own capabilities can offer reliable cooperation to partners.
7/21 – LeoBen and harmonisation
LeoBen, the community of Leopard-using states, shows how German systems can support European harmonisation in the land domain.
8/21 – The capability cluster
This is not only about Leopard. Around KNDS Deutschland, Rheinmetall and ARTEC, a broader land-warfare capability cluster is emerging: Leopard 2, Boxer, RCH 155 and Panzerhaubitze 2000.
9/21 – The UK RCH 155 order
The UK’s procurement of 72 RCH 155 howitzers strengthens this cluster. It links artillery, Boxer-based mobility and German-European industrial structures.
10/21 – Managed fragmentation
Europe’s land forces will not become homogeneous. But fragmentation can be managed through common platforms, training, maintenance, spare parts, upgrade paths and industrial support.
11/21 – Partner trust
Partners buying Leopard, Boxer or RCH 155 do not just buy vehicles. They rely on German standards, German industrial capacity and German political reliability.
12/21 – Ownership structure
KNDS is broadly based on a Franco-German balance: French state ownership on one side, German owner families behind KMW on the other.
13/21 – The IPO question
The planned IPO could move KNDS towards 40% France, 40% Germany and 20% free float. That only works if Germany secures its side before the listing — and if France’s reduction is legally reflected.
14/21 – CSG as stress test
The Czech defence group CSG has reportedly approached the German owner families with an offer for a KNDS stake. CSG is not the main point. The main point is that the German block is now in play.
15/21 – investment screening: The under-discussed lever
Germany has a below-the-radar legal lever: investment screening. Foreign acquisitions in defence-relevant companies can be reviewed, conditioned or, in extreme cases, prohibited.
16/21 – Shield, not strategy
Investment screening can prevent loss of control. It does not create German control. If Berlin wants to limit an external buyer, it also needs its own target structure.
17/21 – Not only 30 or 40
The debate is not simply 30% versus 40%. It is about ownership plus the quality of legal rights: board rules, veto rights, shareholder agreements and IPO governance.
18/21 – Why 30% is fragile
30% plus special rights may work in theory. But special rights can be contested, narrowed or weakened over time. The more rights diverge from ownership, the more fragile the construction becomes.
19/21 – Why 40% matters
40% is not just a number. It is a second line of defence if legal arrangements are challenged. It reduces dependence on fragile special rights.
20/21 – Necessary math
At a €20bn valuation for KNDS as a whole, 40% equals about €8bn. 30% equals about €6bn. The difference is roughly €2bn.
21/21 – No negotiation magic
If France holds 40% and Germany holds 30%, why should Germany automatically receive equal rights? Paris negotiates with actors whose consent it needs. Germany should become more French: not against France, but on equal terms.

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More from @Ce_Moll

May 12
Op Ed

Warum der mögliche KNDS-Börsengang einen neuralgischen Punkt betrifft

table.media/security/table…Image
1/19 – Industrieller Pfeiler der Landstreitkräfte

Beim möglichen Börsengang von KNDS geht es nicht darum, dass der Staat besser Panzer baut. Es geht um Kontrolle über den industriellen Pfeiler der Landstreitkräfte – und damit über ein zentrales Element europäischer Abschreckung.
2/19 – Kanzlerversprechen

Der politische Maßstab ist das Kanzlerversprechen: Die Bundeswehr soll konventionell zur stärksten Armee Europas werden. Das gelingt nicht allein mit Geld, sondern nur mit Produktion, Instandsetzung, Ersatzteilen, Modernisierung und Weiterentwicklung.
Read 20 tweets
May 2
US-threat to German stationing

1/17 — Capabilities, not numbers
The possible US drawdown from Germany is not mainly a 5,000-troop story. The key issue is the capability that may not arrive: land-based US Long-Range Fires as a bridge for Europe’s Deep Precision Strike gap. Image
2/17 — Visible is not decisive
The Brigade Combat Team is politically loud. The harder military problem is the Long-Range Fires battalion. Europe can compensate a BCT more easily. It cannot quickly replace this range, mobility and integration.
3/17 — MDTF: Not a mass capability
The US Army plans only five Multi-Domain Task Forces. This is not routine force posture. If a Long-Range Fires element drops out of Europe, it hits a scarce strategic resource — not just another battalion.
Read 17 tweets
Apr 22
First German Military Strategy

1/14

Germany presents its first Military Strategy today. Not a strategic big bang, but an important step: Germany is formally stating what it wants to be able to do militarily — nationally, in NATO, and for Europe. Image
2/14
The 5 points to watch:
Europe from national strength

industry as the key gap
limited public prioritisation
Russia as military focal point
deep strike as the most interesting capability signal.
3/14
The biggest step forward is this: Germany frames European defence more clearly from national strength. Not: cooperation compensates for missing capabilities. Rather: national capabilities make cooperation credible.
Read 14 tweets
Apr 22
Deutschlands erste Militärstrategie
Thread ( 14 )

Heute wird Deutschlands erste Militärstrategie vorgestellt. Kein strategischer Urknall, aber ein wichtiger Schritt: Deutschland formuliert erstmals formell, was es militärisch national leisten und in NATO/Europa einbringen will. Image
2

Die 5 Punkte:

Europa aus nationaler Stärke
Industrie als zentrale Leerstelle
Prioritäten bleiben öffentlich begrenzt sichtbar
Russland ist militärischer Fixpunkt
Deep Strike ist das interessanteste Fähigkeitssignal.
3
Der größte Schritt nach vorne: Deutschland denkt europäische Verteidigung stärker aus nationaler Stärke heraus. Nicht: Kooperation ersetzt fehlende Fähigkeiten. Sondern: nationale Fähigkeiten machen Kooperation erst belastbar.
Read 14 tweets
Mar 2, 2025
1/11
Managing Transatlantic Defence Transition:

Key Priorities

by @_schuetzt and @Ce_Moll Image
2/11
Europe may soon handle key defense tasks—deterrence, defense, and Ukraine support—largely without the US. A less willing US administration or a crisis elsewhere (e.g. Taiwan) could draw American forces away.
3/11
Can’t Buy Leadership:
Some EU leaders think money & matériel alone can replace the US. But who sets priorities, decides what to buy, and authorizes use? US political and military leadership has been crucial. Without that direction, more weapons won’t suffice. #NATO
Read 13 tweets
Feb 18, 2025
1/ next stop: February 24, 2025

– a symbolic day: The anniversary of Russia’s attack on Ukraine coincides with the day after the German federal election. A potential turning point for Germany and Europe. 🧵 Image
2/ There is no better moment for Germany’s democratic parties to make a joint statement: “We will do whatever it takes to restore our security!”
3/ I hope this is already being coordinated behind the scenes, beyond election campaign tactics. Security must not become a bargaining chip.
Read 7 tweets

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