🇺🇦Ukraine counterattacks in the south... again
Once more, only weeks after the attacks of the late winter, Ukrainian forces are conducting localized offensive actions in Dnipropetrovsk oblast.
The 🇺🇦79th, 80th and 95th Air Assault Brigades began operations around mid-May under strict OPSEC measures.
While Russian Telegram channels have been circulating rumors about this area since then, our team only managed to confirm the operation and the units involved at the beginning of this week.
On Friday May 29th, the Ukrainian side openly acknowledged the ongoing offensive movements, mainly executed by units of the Air Assault Forces (DShV) - just as in February and March.
The sector involved is approximately 20 kilometers wide, with the villages of Zelenyi Hai and Vorone as the northern and southern boundaries respectively.
Keep reading ⬇️ to find out why the south-eastern sector might represent a growing vulnerability for 🇷🇺Russian forces of the “Vostok” Grouping
Once more, only weeks after the attacks of the late winter, Ukrainian forces are conducting localized offensive actions in Dnipropetrovsk oblast.
The 🇺🇦79th, 80th and 95th Air Assault Brigades began operations around mid-May under strict OPSEC measures.
While Russian Telegram channels have been circulating rumors about this area since then, our team only managed to confirm the operation and the units involved at the beginning of this week.
On Friday May 29th, the Ukrainian side openly acknowledged the ongoing offensive movements, mainly executed by units of the Air Assault Forces (DShV) - just as in February and March.
The sector involved is approximately 20 kilometers wide, with the villages of Zelenyi Hai and Vorone as the northern and southern boundaries respectively.
Keep reading ⬇️ to find out why the south-eastern sector might represent a growing vulnerability for 🇷🇺Russian forces of the “Vostok” Grouping
Is the 🇷🇺“Vostok” grouping struggling?
The westward gains achieved by the Vostok grouping throughout 2025 and early 2026 forced them to stretch the Areas of Operations (AO) of some of their Combined Arms Armies (CAA) - specifically the 🇷🇺36th and 29th CAAs in the Pokrovske-Ivanivka direction - in an attempt to maintain numerical superiority in the main axis of attack, north and west of Hulyaipole, where the 🇷🇺5th and 35th CAAs are expected to continue advancing.
In early spring, the Vostok grouping was significantly reinforced with the 🇷🇺68th Army Corps, 40th Naval Infantry Brigade and with the 🇷🇺55th and 120th Naval Infantry Divisions, likely in an attempt to sustain offensive tempo.
At the same time, Ukrainian counterattacks conducted by the 🇺🇦82nd and 95th Brigades (supported by the 92nd Brigade and elements of 425th Regiment) forced Russian command to deploy the 🇷🇺68th Corps and parts of the 🇷🇺120th Division on the Ternuvate-Velykomykhailivka axis.
🇺🇦Ukrainian forces have now shifted their pressure northward, with the commitment of two additional brigades (the 🇺🇦82nd has likely been withdrawn for recovery) - the aim is to exploit the 🇷🇺29th CAA’s weak lines between Sichneve and Ivanivka, where only two lightly motorized regiments (the 🇷🇺656th and 430th) are holding the line.
Furthermore, we estimate that the sector between Andriivka-Klevtsove and Ivanivka is the boundary between the 🇷🇺Vostok and Centr groupings - a possible point of vulnerability where the 🇷🇺90th Guards Tank Division has been attempting to capture Ivanivka and Novopavlivka for approximately 8 months, without success.
There are indications that parts of the 🇷🇺90th Division may have been transferred towards Pokrovsk, potentially further weakening the overall Russian posture in this area.
The westward gains achieved by the Vostok grouping throughout 2025 and early 2026 forced them to stretch the Areas of Operations (AO) of some of their Combined Arms Armies (CAA) - specifically the 🇷🇺36th and 29th CAAs in the Pokrovske-Ivanivka direction - in an attempt to maintain numerical superiority in the main axis of attack, north and west of Hulyaipole, where the 🇷🇺5th and 35th CAAs are expected to continue advancing.
In early spring, the Vostok grouping was significantly reinforced with the 🇷🇺68th Army Corps, 40th Naval Infantry Brigade and with the 🇷🇺55th and 120th Naval Infantry Divisions, likely in an attempt to sustain offensive tempo.
At the same time, Ukrainian counterattacks conducted by the 🇺🇦82nd and 95th Brigades (supported by the 92nd Brigade and elements of 425th Regiment) forced Russian command to deploy the 🇷🇺68th Corps and parts of the 🇷🇺120th Division on the Ternuvate-Velykomykhailivka axis.
🇺🇦Ukrainian forces have now shifted their pressure northward, with the commitment of two additional brigades (the 🇺🇦82nd has likely been withdrawn for recovery) - the aim is to exploit the 🇷🇺29th CAA’s weak lines between Sichneve and Ivanivka, where only two lightly motorized regiments (the 🇷🇺656th and 430th) are holding the line.
Furthermore, we estimate that the sector between Andriivka-Klevtsove and Ivanivka is the boundary between the 🇷🇺Vostok and Centr groupings - a possible point of vulnerability where the 🇷🇺90th Guards Tank Division has been attempting to capture Ivanivka and Novopavlivka for approximately 8 months, without success.
There are indications that parts of the 🇷🇺90th Division may have been transferred towards Pokrovsk, potentially further weakening the overall Russian posture in this area.
Conclusions
After a relatively successful 2025 campaign that saw the 🇷🇺Vostok grouping advance west of Velyka Novosilka, it seems Russian momentum in this area is diminishing.
A partial stabilization of the 🇺🇦Ukrainian manpower deficit, along with the continuing corps reform, is allowing Gen. Syrskyi and the General Staff to expand the envelope of “assault units” available and prepared for tactical counterattacks.
In this example, the 🇺🇦80th Air Assault Brigade was offensively redeployed after spending a year on defense in Sumy oblast.
While critical systemic issues persist in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as frequently reported by @Militarylandnet, the balance of resources (manpower, material, etc.) in several sectors of the frontline has equalized compared to 2024 and 2025.
Two crucial areas in the next several months will be the Kostyantynivka and Slovyansk axes, where Russia continues to maintain overall superiority in 2026.
After a relatively successful 2025 campaign that saw the 🇷🇺Vostok grouping advance west of Velyka Novosilka, it seems Russian momentum in this area is diminishing.
A partial stabilization of the 🇺🇦Ukrainian manpower deficit, along with the continuing corps reform, is allowing Gen. Syrskyi and the General Staff to expand the envelope of “assault units” available and prepared for tactical counterattacks.
In this example, the 🇺🇦80th Air Assault Brigade was offensively redeployed after spending a year on defense in Sumy oblast.
While critical systemic issues persist in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as frequently reported by @Militarylandnet, the balance of resources (manpower, material, etc.) in several sectors of the frontline has equalized compared to 2024 and 2025.
Two crucial areas in the next several months will be the Kostyantynivka and Slovyansk axes, where Russia continues to maintain overall superiority in 2026.
Source on the 90th Guards Tank Division's possible redeployment to Pokrovsk (and other Russian unit movements):
@kriegsforscherD / @RALee85
twomarines.substack.com/p/battlefield-…
Persistent systemic command issues within ZSU:
militaryland.net/article/skille…
@kriegsforscherD / @RALee85
twomarines.substack.com/p/battlefield-…
Persistent systemic command issues within ZSU:
militaryland.net/article/skille…
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