A cross-chain message should not be trusted just because it arrives. Here is how Canary verifies one before it ever settles, in four steps.
Step one, the source. Canary reads chain data only from certificate-pinned endpoints. If an imposter RPC presents a mismatched certificate, it is rejected before it is ever read. An entire class of man-in-the-middle attacks is shut out at the source.
Step two, the enclave. Verification runs inside a hardware-isolated trusted execution environment, with attestation proving the exact code is running and unmodified. The operator cannot see inside it or change what it does.
Step three, the quorum. The result is never one machine's word. An independent K-of-N set of operators has to agree before anything is approved. No single node can forge a verification or wave a bad message through.
Step four, the signature. Only once every check passes does Canary sign and hand the message to LayerZero to settle. If the math does not hold, it does not sign. That is the difference between watching for attacks and refusing them.
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