Miad Maleki Profile picture
Jun 22 3 tweets 2 min read Read on X
The U.S. Treasury just issued a new license, "General License X," that reopens Iran's oil (including petrochemicals) business to the world. Here's what it lets Iran do, and why each piece matters.

1/3 It lets Iran produce, ship, and sell its oil — not just unload what's already at sea, but keep the whole operation running. The previous license was much more narrow in scope and only covered tankers already loaded during a certain period.

The biggest piece: the money flows back to Tehran. The license explicitly allows buyers to pay Iran — including the Iranian government and blacklisted Iranian entities — directly for the oil. This isn't just permission to sell. It's permission to get paid.

And the payments can be made in U.S. dollars. The dollar is the backbone of global finance, and Iran has been largely locked out of it for years. Handing the regime dollar revenue restores access that sanctions were specifically designed to deny.
2/3 It also covers petrochemicals, the products refined from oil and gas that are one of Iran's largest sources of hard currency. Many of these come from facilities tied to the IRGC. The license waves them through.

It even protects the vessels, including ships that were previously blacklisted for smuggling Iranian oil. Insurance, flagging, docking, salvage: all the services that keep a tanker fleet moving are now authorized.
3/3 But here is an important caveat, the license runs through August 21, 2026. This is not enough time for buyers, banks, and shippers to build durable channels back into Iranian oil.

The picture is clear though: production, sales, dollar payments, petrochemicals, and protected shipping — all switched on at once. Each piece on its own loosens the pressure. Together, they amount to a sustained reopening of Iran's most important revenue stream.

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More from @miadmaleki

Jun 13
"Oil sanctions waiver" for Iran in the MOU is most likely the same General License that @USTreasury issued on March 20, 2026, a narrow authorization covering crude already loaded on vessels.

Here are some details:

1/4 Don't expect this authorization to open a new market for Iranian oil. Iran's buyers aren't switching. China accounts for roughly 90% of Iran's oil exports, with independent "teapot" refineries in Shandong province absorbing the majority of that trade. These refiners already accept the sanctions risk. If anything, a temporary license gives them marginal cover — but once it lapses, they'll keep buying anyway. New Western buyers aren't coming, new Asian buyers highly unlikely.
2/4 The most critical part of the Iran sanctions architecture isn't the oil purchase ban, it's the financial sanctions that prevent Tehran from actually getting paid. Iran's Central Bank (CBI) and NIOC remain sanctioned under U.S. counterterrorism authorities; foreign banks face loss of U.S. correspondent accounts for facilitating significant transactions with CBI under NDAA §1245 (FY2012).

The license doesn't touch any of that. Iran gets paid in yuan through small sanctioned Chinese banks like Bank of Kunlun, trapped in a "closed loop" where the majority of the funds can only be spent inside China. A GLU-style authorization doesn't unblock CBI, doesn't restore SWIFT access, and doesn't allow dollar-clearing. Iran's revenue problem persists.
3/4 Here's the operational problem that gets little attention: after a general license expires or is revoked, enforcement becomes genuinely murky. GL U authorized oil loaded on or before March 20, 2026, for transactions through April 19, 2026. Once it expires, investigators face a months-long forensic puzzle — which shipments were loaded before the cutoff? Which cargoes were sold within the authorized window? Evasion networks exploit exactly this ambiguity. Revoking a general license doesn't flip a clean switch.
Read 4 tweets
Jun 7
1/1 The idea of using Iran’s restricted funds in Qatar, Oman, and Iraq for internet access to Iranians sounds appealing. But there’s a fundamental legal problem most people miss: those funds aren’t really under U.S. control to begin with.

@USTreasury blocking means assets in the U.S. or held by U.S. persons are frozen. The accounts in Qatar and Iraq are restricted, not formally blocked. The U.S. can’t just redirect them. Its leverage is secondary sanctions, not possession and that’s a huge difference.
2/2 So what would actually have to happen to redirect those funds?

Step one: the U.S. would need to recognize an Iranian exile government as the legitimate Government of Iran, stripping the Islamic Republic of its legal claim to those assets. That’ll take a presidential determination.

Step two: @USTreasury and @StateDept would need to redefine “Government of Iran” and adapt a similar approach to the Syria case after Assad fell. This is not that straightforward.
3/3 Step three: secondary sanctions would need to be muted or waived, maybe with a definition of the Government of Iran (recognizing the exile government would potentially do that). Gulf banks won’t touch these transfers without protection. Iran’s secondary sanctions regime is far more expansive than Syria’s Caesar Act.

Step four, and this is the one people always forget: Qatar, Oman, Iraq, and the banks holding these accounts would have to voluntarily cooperate. They have their own relationships with the regime in Iran. No U.S. law compels them to transfer sovereign funds to an exile body with no territory. Remember post JCPOA, Obama admin had to throw cash on pallets because no bank would move Iranian funds even if asked by the US government.
Read 4 tweets
Apr 29
The Iran oil story we are missing: this isn’t just about sanctions and the blockade cutting exports and shut in oil wells.

1/ The regime spent over $100 billion directly on a nuclear program that generates 2% of Iran’s electricity. That money was drained from National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), the same company whose workers earn ~$80–140/month against Iran’s own official poverty line of ~$227/month. The people responsible for maintaining the most critical infrastructure in the country can’t afford to live on their salaries. The infrastructure reflects it.
2/9 Bushehr nuclear plant cost $10–11 billion to build, five to ten times over its original budget. It generates 1,000 megawatts. Iran’s current electricity shortfall alone is 25,000 megawatts, meaning you’d need 25 more Bushehrs just to close the gap that already exists. Beyond Bushehr, the broader nuclear program has cost Iran $2–3 trillion in lost economic opportunity through sanctions and isolation. For context: Iran’s own Oil Ministry says it needs $170–180 billion to restore oil production capacity. The money existed.
3/9 Now the oil sector. Start with South Pars. It produces ~70–80% of all Iranian gas. That same gas gets reinjected into aging oil fields to maintain reservoir pressure and keep them producing. In March 2026, strikes damaged five South Pars phases, cutting condensate output by 100,000–120,000 b/d for at least six months. One field hit but leading to two cascading failures simultaneously.
Read 9 tweets
Apr 27
Everyone's focused on Iran's crude oil export/extraction disruptions. But there is another real domestic crisis: gasoline. Pre war, Iran was burning through 126 million liters of fuel per day while producing only ~110 million liters domestically. That 15-20M liter/day gap was being covered by imports costing ~$6 billion a year.

1/6 On March 7, strikes hit oil storage depots in Tehran and Alborz Province. ~30 tanks hit in southern Tehran alone. The immediate response: per-fill limits in Tehran cut from 30 liters to 20 liters overnight. Stations reported running dry. Citizens described it as "سهمیه‌بندی خاموش" or "silent rationing."
2/6 Here's what most people missed: Iran's largest gasoline producer is Persian Gulf Star refinery in Bandar Abbas, ~40M liters/day, roughly 35% of national output. It runs on condensate from South Pars, not crude oil. When Israel struck South Pars in March, it didn't just hit gas exports. It cut the feedstock to the refinery Iran depends on most for gasoline.

Then there's Lavan. Iran's Lavan Island refinery, a 55,000 b/d condensate processing facility, was struck on April 7, hours after the ceasefire announcement. The National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company's chief visited the island and said they could recover 70-80% of capacity in "one to two months." I don't buy it. Lavan, South Pars, Rey depot, Iran's refinery system took compounding hits, not one-off damage.
3/6 Normally Iran papers over its domestic production shortfall with imports, sanctioned, shadow-fleet, intermediary-financed. But then the regime closed the Strait of Hormuz, which immediately severed Iran's own import lifeline.

Then the regime made it worse. Fujairah, the UAE's key oil hub and the port through which Iran ran much of its shadow condensate trade and refined product flows, was struck by Iranian drones in mid-March. Iran also hit the UAE Shah gas field and suspended operations at the Ruwais refinery complex. The UAE, which had served as Iran's critical intermediary hub for decades, running condensate from Iranian fields through ENOC refineries and routing fuel back, was now a war target. Iran didn't just lose the Strait. It torched the back door too.
Read 6 tweets
Apr 25
"Do you have any estimates on Iran's oil in storage; onshore, floating, and pre-positioned for China?"

1/4 Onshore: Iran's own terminal operator, IOTCO, puts total onshore capacity at ~38–42M bbl system-wide. Kharg Island, the dominant export hub, accounts for ~30–31M bbl of that. At blockade day (Apr 13), Kharg had roughly 13M bbl of spare capacity left.

At a net inflow of ~1.0–1.1M bpd (production minus domestic refinery intake which has apparently lowered following the strikes), that's a ~13-day runway.

The only thing that extends that clock is floating storage, and here are my estimated numbers. 👇
2/4 Floating is a separate bucket, and it's large. Iran pre-positioned ~163–170M bbl at sea on National Iranian Tankers Company (NITC) and dark-fleet tankers before the blockade (best numbers are with Kpler/Vortexa, Jan–Mar 2026). Most of it is heading to Chinese buyers under long-term offtake deals.

This does nothing for onshore pressure at Kharg. It's a supply buffer for China, not a release valve for Iran's terminal saturation problem. The two keep getting conflated. They shouldn't, unless empty tankers evade the blockade and go back to Kharg to load oil.
3/4 The real question is how many empty NITC VLCCs are still inside the Strait that Iran can use as makeshift floating storage at the terminal.

Bloomberg/@TankerTrackers (correct me if I'm wrong): ~ 9 empty supertankers visible in the entire Persian Gulf as of early March — theoretical ceiling of ~18M bbl.
JPMorgan (Apr 22): 4 Iran-linked VLCCs still inside the Strait, roughly 8M bbl.

Iran already reactivated the retired VLCC NASHA as improvised storage at Kharg.
Read 4 tweets
Apr 22
The "$45B oil loss = 10% of GDP, Iran can survive it like Ukraine" sounds compelling but wrong in almost every important way. Let me explain why, or just skip to the last tweet.

1/7 First, let's do the math. Pre-war, Iran earned ~$45.7B from oil annually (debatable number but we can start with this). But oil & gas together account for 65–75% of Iran's total export revenue and roughly 25% of its GDP. Lose oil and the blockade also cuts petrochemicals ($13–17B/yr, 85% of capacity now offline) and all other Gulf-routed exports. We're not talking about a 10% GDP hit alone here but a simultaneous wipeout of the entire hard currency earnings base.
2/7 Ukraine went into its war with functioning banks, a currency backed by $40B+ in Western support, and an inflation rate in the single digits. Iran entered this conflict with: 60% headline inflation, food inflation at 105%, only 9 of 35 banks meeting solvency criteria, 39% industrial capacity utilization, and a rial that had already lost 97%+ of its value.

Ukraine received $200B+ in external financial support from the West. Iran gets secondary-sanctioned. Its revenues from oil sales are trapped in yuan accounts in China it cannot repatriate most majority of it. Its shadow fleet is being designated. The 160M+ barrels it already shipped to international waters before the blockade are now legally toxic.
3/7 The $45B oil framing also misses the structural damage that has nothing to do with the blockade. 70% of steel production capacity destroyed. 85% of petrochemical export capacity offline, representing $30B in cumulative investment at Mahshahr alone, near-total write-off. This isn't a revenue shortfall. It's deindustrialization at a pace not seen since WWII. Total direct damage: $122–208B, or 38–48% of pre-war GDP, in 45 days.
Read 7 tweets

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