Thread by @MJ_Busta

Last week, U.S. officials called Cuba's recent economic reform package, its most dramatic in 60 years (at least on paper), "superficial smoke signals."

Today's SDN listings may have already been in works, but timing amounts to an additional snub.

state.gov/releases/offic…

I and others have asked many Qs about the reforms:

How will they be sequenced?
Will there be follow through or are they meant to buy time?
Can they work w/o political opening or accomodation w DC?
Will they just empower new elite but impoverish majority?

elpais.com/us/2026-06-13/…

But rather than saying "Ok - there are some things that look like progress in right direction on paper (private sector expansion etc), but we need to see follow through on X, clarity on Y, and more on the political front," Washington is basically saying "Ask me if I care."

This is odd from an administration that weeks ago was telegraphing the message that progress in the bilateral relationship could at least start on economic issues.

Impact of today's additional SDN designations will become clearer in time, but is likely to be significant:

Almaneces Universales involved in import ops for foreign investors AND private sector.

BFI is commercial bank that investors & Cuba's int'l partners deal with.

As I told AP, if foreign investors don't have local commercial bank they can operate through, game over.

Bad news too for Cuba's service exports (eg for medical services) that generate hard currency to BFI or its corresponding accounts abroad.

apnews.com/article/us-san…

Hotel companies still hanging on (under Ministry of Tourism partnerships) could have to further pull out.

I worry about food imports being impacted, given already dire shortages.

I want Cuba's economy out from GAESA's thumb as much as the next person.

But if DC is unwilling (so far) to engage in any back and forth in response to moves from Havana—I struggle to see envisioned end game here, except:

1. Immiseration to provoke social explosion
2. Military op
2. Devaluing Cuban state assets to such a point that Havana agrees to break up GAESA and sells off parts for small change to US bidders—ironically, something that the new reforms announced last week might facilitate.

If the status quo is untenable, neither scenario above guarantees a hopeful political future, let alone one in which Cubans are primary owners of their economic future vs. the country becoming a new dependency.

And that's reason to worry.