Profile picture
, 17 tweets, 4 min read Read on Twitter
1- This is true. The State is not what it was. Not even close. But why? When the uprising began, Assad wasn't prepared (judging by his interview with Jay Solomon of the WSJ in Jan/2011). Having not expected what started in Tunisia to reach his shores, there was early confusion
2-The early confusion & hesitancy convinced many that Assad's fate will be that of Ben Ali, Mubarak or Ghaddafi. In other words, he was either going to hand the key & leave or get toppled/killed. While Syrians & observers expected the above, never once did this cross Assad's mind
3-Why was Syria's case different than Tunisia, Egypt or Libya? Answer: The country's sectarian mix and history/legacy of the early 1980's. Tunisia/Egypt/Libya was ruled by one person/family with no sectarian cocktail mix and an ugly recent history (Moslem Brothers - Hama)
4-While many have repeatedly called for Assad's departure over the past 7 years, few have discussed or contemplated the "settling-of-scores" that will most likely dominate the Syrian landscape should the system/regime/state/ disappear or be forcefully toppled
5-Make no mistake about it : Should Assad have been forcefully toppled, Syria would have experienced an extraordinaryily violent & bloody period of "settling of scores" where everyone & anyone that was associated with the "system" was going to pay a price for Hama- with his life
6-Think of the whole Baath party membership. Think of every Alawi village. Think of anyone who was going to be called an Assad "sympathizer". Who was going to be the judge? Who was going to be in charge of this inevitable "settling of scores"?
7-During summer/2015, I met a senior official in charge of Syria. While he discussed transition etc, I asked if his organization or anyone else has put in place a plan to protect minorities, villages, cities from this likely "settling of scores". I received a blank stare
8-Back to the early days of the crisis: Again, Assad NEVER ONCE contemplated leaving. He tried all he can to contain the crisis. please see this for more on these early days including Assad's first speech…
9-Since Assad never contemplated leaving, he was either going to tame the uprising or fight till the very end. Losing was not an option as losing, to the leaderships's mind, would have led to a situation that would make scenes from Hutus/Tutsis war look like a walk in the park
10-If leaving or losing were not an option, Assad had two other steps left. He first went to the opposition in early 2012 asking/pleading with them to calm the situation down before he is forced to cross the line and call his "big foreign allies". There were no takers
11-Regrettably, left with no option but losing and going through with what the leadership saw as the inevitable country-wide bloodbath that was to follow, Assad made his final decision-He will call on his allies to come to his defense and, to his mind, save the country & state
12-Did Assad call on his allies for help reluctantly? Did he fear the loss of independence or sovereignty that many now accuse him of? To answer this, think of the list of countries & actors that had already teamed up to help see him toppled with zero regards to what comes after
13-Assad & the Syrian State have their share of enemies who want to see them gone. Those enemies (including many Syria observers) however, hardly ever thought or cared about what happens after the abrupt forceful removal of Assad & State. Many non-Syrians have no skin in the game
14-As for the Syrians who wanted Assad & his state gone, it is of course understandable to demand & ask for democracy and change. Nearly 350 million Arabs and hundreds of millions elsewhere in the world would like the same
15-The Assads & the Baath did not come to power through a Jeffersonian democracy. They did so by working inside the System & through an internal military coup. And yes, they monopolized power since. But, this doesn't mean one goes to any length to force a change in the status quo
16-Being fed up with Assad/Baath monopoly on power does not give one the license to carry arms, invite global jihadists and beg foreign occupiers to come for help, all while blaming Assad for not handing the key and leaving -Something only a fool ought to have expected
17-Many observers remind us of Assad's reliance on his allies. Every regional country relies on its allies. What about Jordan? Saudi? Qatar? Bahrain? Turkey (NATO)? Israel? What about all the foreign bases in those countries? What about their "sovereignty"?
Missing some Tweet in this thread?
You can try to force a refresh.

Like this thread? Get email updates or save it to PDF!

Subscribe to EHSANI2
Profile picture

Get real-time email alerts when new unrolls are available from this author!

This content may be removed anytime!

Twitter may remove this content at anytime, convert it as a PDF, save and print for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video

1) Follow Thread Reader App on Twitter so you can easily mention us!

2) Go to a Twitter thread (series of Tweets by the same owner) and mention us with a keyword "unroll" @threadreaderapp unroll

You can practice here first or read more on our help page!

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!

This site is made by just three indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member and get exclusive features!

Premium member ($3.00/month or $30.00/year)

Too expensive? Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal Become our Patreon

Thank you for your support!