A few thoughts on the observations from @julianku last week on @opiniojuris about the #Guyana/#Venezuela dispute and its referral to the #ICJ by the UN Secretary-General. opiniojuris.org/2018/02/12/doe…
(1) It’s an unusual situation, but it’s difficult for me to follow the suggestion that a decision by the ICJ would not necessarily be legally binding in this case (because of the terms of Article IV(2) of the 1966 Geneva Convention).
(2) Article 33 of the UN Charter lists 'judicial settlement' as a possible means of peaceful dispute resolution. One might suppose that 'judicial settlement' (by the ICJ or another court) is, by its very nature, legally binding.
(3) The best interpretation of Article IV(2) may be that it contemplates the use of the various means of non-binding dispute settlement in Article 33 (as chosen by Sec-Gen) until arbitration or adjudication of the dispute is selected, thus leading to a binding award or judgment.
(4) I concede that this interpretation precludes a situation involving referral of the dispute both to arbitration *and* to a court, a possibility that a literal reading of the last sentence of Article IV(2) seems to contemplate.
(5) How the Secretary-General's referral of the dispute to the #ICJ can be operationalized (ie, how it can actually lead to the seisin of the Court) is another puzzle. I would suggest that at this point Article IV(2) functions as the equivalent of a compromissory clause.
(6) This would mean that both #Guyana & #Venezuela have the option to unilaterally seize the Court by submitting an application to commence proceedings. It would be for the party that does so (presumably Guyana) to prove that the 'preconditions' of Article IV(2) have been met.
(7) Ultimately, both parties appear to have consented in 1966 to the possibility of #ICJ jurisdiction over the dispute (under Article 36(1) of the Statute) by agreeing to the broad dispute settlement scheme set forth in Article IV(2). *end*
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