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Tamer Badawi تامر بدوي (@tbdwi.bsky.social) Profile picture
Tamer Badawi تامر بدوي (@tbdwi.bsky.social)
@TamerBadawi1
PhDc & TA @UniKentPolitics @UniKent. Mainly qualitative research on conflict & governance in Iraq. Views are mine, not my employer. چا أسمي تامر مو ثامر
May 20, 2022 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
'The interior minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) secretly visited Iran this week and signed several security agreements with Tehran officials, a source close to Iraq's ruling elites told The New Arab.'
english.alaraby.co.uk/news/iraqi-kur… 'Rebar Ahmed, the candidate of the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) for Iraq's presidency, spoke with Iranian officials on key security and border issues affecting Tehran, including the presence of a US airbase near Erbil, Iraqi-Kurdistan.'
May 17, 2022 • 17 tweets • 5 min read
Please read my latest for @SadaJournal: I argue that a major armed clash between the Sadrist movement and Iran-allied paramilitary groups risks further aggravating tribal violence in southern Iraq and vice versa.
carnegieendowment.org/sada/87147 Data compiled from @ACLEDINFO shows that Iraq's three southern governorates Basra, Thi Qar, and Maysan are seeing historical high levels of incidents of tribal violence, particularly in Maysan where they have been skyrocketing. Image
Feb 2, 2022 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Two things to look at: 1) UAE's engagement w Israel has a cost in Iran, and for Iran to make itself relevant in the run-up to the 5th talks w Saudi in Iraq, such a strike could be useful. 2) Frustration felt by resistance groups in Iraq from politics need to be channeled somehow. But what if political frustration was replaced by content thanks to electoral gain? That would have put the resistance on a path of greater access 2 resources (let's see the upcoming gov.) and empowerment. So what's the difference? There are differences. This is food for thought.
Jan 28, 2022 • 8 tweets • 3 min read
Thread 🧵

Abu Ali al-Askari, security spox of KH makes a statement:

1) Congratulates the Yemeni Ansar/Houthis for targeting the UAE & KSA and attributes "victories" to the resistance axis as a whole. Asks resistance to be on stand by in case adversaries capitulate. Image 2) Accuses those who "rigged elections" of targeting BGD's airport. Askari calls upon those who are faithful in the ISF as well as PMF security directorate to investigate.
Dec 22, 2021 • 10 tweets • 6 min read
Two key winners from Iraq's elections are Muqtada Sadr & Akram Kabi. Two Sadrists leading v. different paramilitaries. There could be short-term fragile convergence btw. them, yet their parallel rise brings risks, I argue in my latest for @MiddleEastEye
middleeasteye.net/opinion/iraq-e… Sadr & Kabi took radically different decisions towards elections. Sadr v. heavily invested in it and Kabi kept his group's hands-off policy. Kabi's group, Nujaba, was careful in media over how it sided w/ its allies in the elections dispute. @MiddleEastEye
middleeasteye.net/opinion/iraq-e…
Nov 8, 2021 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Keep an eye on this very interesting rumor: PM #Kadhimi, AAH SG Khazali, and KH SG Hamidawi allegedly in one room to sort out the drone attack crisis. Awaiting more confirmation, the rumor seems to be partially correct; President Salih, the PM, and the Shia Coordination Framework leaders met (at least this means AAH's Khazali was present).
Nov 8, 2021 • 7 tweets • 3 min read
The Tansiqiya (IRCC), a semi-anonymized joint #Iraq-i paramilitary front, condemned in a statement (Nov. 7) the drone attack on the house of Iraqi PM #Kadhimi.

Which resistance axis faction implicitly backed the statement? Who ignored it?

Thread 🧵 Translation (brief): "We condemn the targeting of the outgoing PM's house which we consider an act of targeting the Iraqi state that we have built with our blood and this position [the premiership] is exclusively among the most important state institutions....
Nov 7, 2021 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Multiple projectiles reportedly targeted a Turkish military post in Zlekan, Ninewa. This could be the 4th attack targeting Turkish military posts this year in Iraq. One attack was preempted by Iraqi security forces in Sep. this year.
shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%8… On Nov. 4, Ass. Sec. General & the Spox of Harakat al-Nujaba questioned in a tweet if the Iraqi gov. is unaware whether the TR military has been building building a post in Metin, Duhok (the KRI) since the 1st of Nov this year. However, no direct threat was made by Shammari.
Oct 23, 2021 • 15 tweets • 5 min read
How Iraqi resistance axis media brought back Kata'ib al-Imam Ali (KIA) into KH/AAH line?

Thread:

KIA's SG, Shibl Zaidi, tweeted on Oct. 20 that "the next gov. is inevitably a national unity one because political blocs need one another & they are forced to accept the other... Image ...this is a reality produced by a distorted electoral process & political sharing process since 16 yrs. accompanied by deep and accumulated failure. Those who posses vetos & preconditions will only be a delaying factor to national consensus...
Oct 11, 2021 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
A few hours prior to the Iraqi resistance axis' backlash against elections' results (e.g. see KH Askari's escalatory statement), Iraq-focused former Iranian diplomat Amir Mousawi congratulated cleric Muqtada al-Sadr on the gains he realized in elections. Mousawi "hopes" that Sadr allies with the SoL/Fatah (whom he refers to as "the believing powers") to create the biggest bloc. Can Mousawi's conciliatory tone vs resistance brinkmanship indicate some sort of disconnection btw. Iranian policymakers and the resistance at this stage?
Jul 28, 2021 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
Spot on. The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Commission's wording in its latest statement issued today on US "combat troops" withdrawal was carefully ambiguously worded to provide the groups the leeway to (de-) escalate vs. US without rhetorical commitment to either tactic. The IRCC commits to "readiness" to escalate against the US and this is different from commiting to "escalation" as an ultimate strategy and end to itself.
Jun 28, 2021 • 9 tweets • 4 min read
Who speaks 1st on behalf of the PMF/Iraqi resistance casualties after US airstrike(s)?

The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Commission was probably the 1st to condemn US airstrikes, promising revenge (5:19 AM Baghdad). Aim: reflect an early semblance of Iraqi paramilitary unity. Image The IRCC recently established a Telegram channel (Sabereen News shared it) and created a logo: a 16 vector-Islamic design may have been chosen to signal the multiplicity of actors involved. The channel and logo come many months after the IRCC 1st appeared in Oct. 2020. ImageImage