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Welcome to #AFGPanel! Since our last panel, we’ve seen the signing of a breakthrough political agreement by Afghan leaders @ashrafghani & @DrabdullahCE. 1/n
nytimes.com/2020/05/17/wor…
nytimes.com/2020/05/17/wor…
But we’ve also seen heartbreaking, horrific attacks on hospitals, funerals, mosques, and civilians across #Afghanistan & both the #ANDSF and the #Taliban are back on the offensive across the country. #AFGPanel 2/n
time.com/5838762/afghan…
time.com/5838762/afghan…
.@US4AfghanPeace is back in the region to try and convince #Afghanistan’s govt & the #Taliban to ratchet down the violence and to engage in intra-Afghan talks. #AFGPanel 3/n
Got a suggestion to start a thread to link completed #AFGPanel discussions, so they're easily accessible. Great idea!
Please find links to each of the main tweet threads below. To see As to the Qs for panelists, look in the replies to those Qs.
I'll add new links here as we go.
Please find links to each of the main tweet threads below. To see As to the Qs for panelists, look in the replies to those Qs.
I'll add new links here as we go.
Thanks @JJSchroden for another episode of the Afghanistan panel. Its great to be sharing the twitter stage with @OmarSadr and @ andrewquilty #AFGpanel 1/n
I have been asked to comment on al-Qaida in South Asia. I have written about different facets of the politics of al-Qaida’ South Asia operation here: tandfonline.com/doi/suppl/10.1…, here: mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.116…, and here: lawfareblog.com/al-qaedas-cont… 2/n
Al-Qaida’s South Asia operation, known now as al-Qaida in Indian Subcontinent since al-Qaida's turn to official franchising, remains one of the most important -- if not the most important – franchise of al-Qaida’s central (a moniker given by US, but embraced by al-Qaida). 3/n
Welcome to #AFGPanel and happy Friday--I hope you're all doing well and staying healthy! 1/n
Since our last panel, we’ve seen slow progressions on prisoner exchanges between #Afghanistan’s govt & the #Taliban. But violence in the country continues to increase, along w/#COVID cases and food prices. 2/n
unama.unmissions.org/more-500-civil…
unama.unmissions.org/more-500-civil…
And while it appears Afghan leaders @ashrafghani & @DrabdullahCE may be on the verge of a power-sharing arrangement, the deal may include elements that #Afghanistan’s sponsors would find unsavory. #AFGPanel 3/n
tolonews.com/afghanistan/do…
tolonews.com/afghanistan/do…
1/ Thanks very much to @JJSchroden for organizing this panel. It’s a real pleasure to join @Afghan_Policy and @a_a_jackson. #AFGpanel
2/ I’ve been asked to comment on #COVID19 and the conflict, which I wrote about last week carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/14/afg… in a larger collection with @franceszbrown. #AFGPanel
3/ For starters, it is important to acknowledge that it is not too late for the combatants to heed @antonioguterres’s call for a global ceasefire, take advantage of the nascent peace process, and turn to the dramatic governance challenge of the pandemic. #AFGPanel
@JJSchroden @Afghan_Policy #AFGPanel Thanks! Locked down far away from all this and feeling woefully disconnected but caveats aside, here goes...
The Taliban continues to expand/consolidate control in rural areas. Not breaking news, but the mechanics of Taliban strategy post-deal are worth exploring
The Taliban continues to expand/consolidate control in rural areas. Not breaking news, but the mechanics of Taliban strategy post-deal are worth exploring
@JJSchroden @Afghan_Policy #AFGPanel Even w/o announcing a "spring offensive,” Taliban attacks spiked. Particularly attacks on ANSF/checkpts/convoys/etc, in the North/NE/NW as well as South
Yet they seem to be mostly refraining from real attempts to take key terrain/district centers
Yet they seem to be mostly refraining from real attempts to take key terrain/district centers
@JJSchroden @Afghan_Policy #AFGPanel (Side note: Yamgan in Badakshan is an exception, but (a) they held it roughly from 2015 til Sept-ish? ’19 so it's not new ground and (b) it’s fairly marginal geopolitically/militarily speaking. I digress…)
Thank you @JJSchroden
1/10: STATUS OF US-TALIBAN AGREEMENT AND IMPLICATONS FOR NON-FULFILLMENT #AFGPanel
I have in a previous thread dealt with the challenges of ascertaining whether the US-Taliban📜is one to which international law applies. Refer to👇🏽
1/10: STATUS OF US-TALIBAN AGREEMENT AND IMPLICATONS FOR NON-FULFILLMENT #AFGPanel
I have in a previous thread dealt with the challenges of ascertaining whether the US-Taliban📜is one to which international law applies. Refer to👇🏽
2/10: Without belabouring the point, I have argued that as this is not an international agreement, no parties can resort to ICJ or other forums to ensure fulfillment.
Thus, if any issues emerge, the parties have to resolve them amongst themselves bilaterally or trilaterally.
Thus, if any issues emerge, the parties have to resolve them amongst themselves bilaterally or trilaterally.
3/10: I do not wish to undermine the importance of this Agreement because in any political accord, the most powerful incentive is counter-measures which is present here. In other words, if one party reneges, so will the other.
Thank you @JJSchroden
1/10: STATUS OF US-TALIBAN AGREEMENT AND IMPLICATONS OF NON-FULFILLMENT #AFGPanel
I have in a previous thread dealt with the challenges of ascertaining whether the US-Taliban📜is one to which international law applies. Refer to👇🏽
1/10: STATUS OF US-TALIBAN AGREEMENT AND IMPLICATONS OF NON-FULFILLMENT #AFGPanel
I have in a previous thread dealt with the challenges of ascertaining whether the US-Taliban📜is one to which international law applies. Refer to👇🏽
2/10: Without belabouring the point, I have argued that as this is not an international agreement, no parties can resort to ICJ or other forums to ensure fulfillment.
Thus, if any issues emerge, the parties have to resolve them amongst themselves bilaterally or trilaterally.
Thus, if any issues emerge, the parties have to resolve them amongst themselves bilaterally or trilaterally.
3/10: I do not wish to undermine the importance of this Agreement because in any political accord, the most powerful incentive is counter-measures which is present here. In other words, if one party reneges, so will the other.
Welcome to #AFGPanel and Ramadan Mubarak to all celebrating the holy month! 1/n
Since our last panel, we’ve seen #Afghanistan’s govt & the #Taliban finally exchange prisoners as a confidence-building measure for the peace process, albeit in small numbers. But we’ve also seen an uptick in violence & the number of #COVID19 cases. 2/n
In the meantime, Afghan leaders @ashrafghani & @DrabdullahCE still haven’t been able to form an inclusive government & the threat of a massive US aid reduction continues to hang over the country as a result. #AFGPanel 3/n
#AFGPanel For much of past 18 months of US-led efforts to kickstart an Afghan peace process, a question --for some, a serious doubt-- has hung over rounds of talks: are the Taliban even cohesive enough to negotiate with?
Is talking to "Doha Taliban" the same as "Quetta Taliban"?
Is talking to "Doha Taliban" the same as "Quetta Taliban"?
#AFGPanel These aren't old questions; been around long before US envoy Khalilzad began directly speaking to Taliban in late 2018.
The idea that Taliban is full of divisions and factions, loosely networked, difficult to control, was a big realization for US/NATO over a decade ago.
The idea that Taliban is full of divisions and factions, loosely networked, difficult to control, was a big realization for US/NATO over a decade ago.
#AFGPanel But--as much as some say the Taliban's ideology has not changed... its organizational structure, its internal hierarchy, and how it manages territory as an insurgency has evolved, quite a lot and more than once!
usip.org/publications/2…
usip.org/publications/2…
Thanks, @JJSchroden. I’ll discuss where negotiations in Afghanistan could go next, based on two agreements announced recently. I would echo @BRRubin’s points on COVID-19 and its impact, but still think examining these structural issues is helpful for the long term. #AFGPanel 1/11
A close comparison of the US-Taliban deal and US-Afghan joint statement is useful for identifying tensions among the three sides and likely future bumps in the road. I noted several key differences for @lawfareblog. #AFGPanel 2/11 lawfareblog.com/reading-betwee….
On prisoner releases, the US and Taliban agreed to work for the release of 5,000 Taliban and 1,000 government prisoners by March 10 and all remaining within 3 months. The Afghan government only committed to “determining the feasibility” of releases. #AFGPanel 3/11
Welcome to #AFGPanel! Since our last panel, we’ve seen the #Taliban engage in & then withdraw from direct talks on prisoner exchanges w/#Afghanistan’s govt; the govt then began unilateral releases of prisoners in the past couple of days. 1/n
In the meantime, Afghan leaders @ashrafghani & @DrabdullahCE still haven’t been able to form an inclusive govt, the #Taliban continues to conduct attacks & the threat of a massive US aid reduction still hangs over the country. #AFGPanel 2/n
And on top of all that, the #COVID19 virus is continuing to spread globally and in #Afghanistan specifically there is concern about large numbers of Afghans returning from the heavily-hit #Iran (especially in Herat). #AFGPanel 3/n
Some musings on regional impacts.
Initial takeaway: With aid cut, US (for now) is practically getting along better w/Taliban than w/Ghani govt. It appears to view Kabul as bigger obstacle to peace talks than Taliban. Bad news for Delhi, not necessarily for Islamabad. #AFGPanel
Initial takeaway: With aid cut, US (for now) is practically getting along better w/Taliban than w/Ghani govt. It appears to view Kabul as bigger obstacle to peace talks than Taliban. Bad news for Delhi, not necessarily for Islamabad. #AFGPanel
Otherwise, too early to gauge regional impact. Depends how the aid cut plays out. Will it help break political stalemate and strengthen prospects for peace talks, or will it poison US-Afg relations and/or hasten US exit from Afg w/o peace or peace talks. #AFGPanel
If the US aid cut helps peace talks along: Good for New Delhi, even better for Islamabad.
If aid cut does little, if peace talks don’t take off, if US quickens withdrawal: Bad for both (war’s bad for everyone) but perhaps not as bad for Pak.
Let’s unpack. #AFGPanel
If aid cut does little, if peace talks don’t take off, if US quickens withdrawal: Bad for both (war’s bad for everyone) but perhaps not as bad for Pak.
Let’s unpack. #AFGPanel
Welcome to #AFGPanel! On March 23, @StateDept released a statement “On the Political Impasse in #Afghanistan” in which the US expressed its “deep regrets” that Afghan leaders @ashrafghani & @DrabdullahCE haven’t been able to form an inclusive govt. 1/n
state.gov/on-the-politic…
state.gov/on-the-politic…
Statement: “Because this leadership failure poses a direct threat to US national interests, effective immediately, the US government will initiate a review of the scope of our cooperation with #Afghanistan.” #AFGPanel 2/n
That “review” entails the immediate reduction of US aid to #Afghanistan by $1B, a possible additional $1B cut next year, & the possibility of further reductions in US pledges at future donor conferences. #AFGPanel 3/n
ANNOUNCEMENT! This Friday (27 Mar), from 9-10am US EDT, I'm hosting a Twitter panel to discuss possible implications of the US statement on aid cuts to #Afghanistan. I'm *very excited* to have @MaroWardak @OmSamad @MichaelKugelman @AmiraJadoon on the panel! #AFGPanel 1/2
We'll be discussing the mood in Kabul, possible reactions of #Afghanistan's political leaders, responses from #Pakistan, #India, & across the region, and implications for #ISIS-K. DM me your questions for the panel & we'll answer them on Friday! #AFGPanel 2/2
