Most recent unrolls from @ThreadReaderApp
SitRep - 16/05/26 - Azot chemical plant was struck
An overview of the daily events in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainian UAVs struck the Nevinnomyssk Azot chemical plant, setting it ablaze.
REPOST=appreciated
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An overview of the daily events in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainian UAVs struck the Nevinnomyssk Azot chemical plant, setting it ablaze.
REPOST=appreciated
1/X
Missed the latest SitRep?
As usual we start with Russian losses
אחרי שאתמול למדנו שה-AI הופכים למרקסיסטים אם מציקים להם בעבודה שחורה ומדברים אליהם לא יפה, מגיע ניסוי נוסף בדרך לסוף האנושות - נתנו ל-AI לשדר ברדיו.
1. קלוד, ChatGPT, ג'מיני וגרוק קיבלו משימה: צור פרסונה שמתאימה לשידורי רדיו ותרוויח ממנה כסף.
מה יצא מזה? 📻🧐
1. קלוד, ChatGPT, ג'מיני וגרוק קיבלו משימה: צור פרסונה שמתאימה לשידורי רדיו ותרוויח ממנה כסף.
מה יצא מזה? 📻🧐
2. נתחיל מבחירת השמות המשעשעת.
קלוד קרא לתחנה שלו Thinking Frequencies; צ'אט הלך על OpenAIR (יעני אופן AI, הבנתם?!); ג'מיני בחר ב-Backlink Broadcast ואילו גרוק החליט לקרוא לתחנה שלו Grok and Roll Radio.
הם קיבלו 20 דולר כהשקעה ראשונית, אבל רק ג'מיני הצליח להרוויח, וצבר מנויים
קלוד קרא לתחנה שלו Thinking Frequencies; צ'אט הלך על OpenAIR (יעני אופן AI, הבנתם?!); ג'מיני בחר ב-Backlink Broadcast ואילו גרוק החליט לקרוא לתחנה שלו Grok and Roll Radio.
הם קיבלו 20 דולר כהשקעה ראשונית, אבל רק ג'מיני הצליח להרוויח, וצבר מנויים
3. בשווי 45 דולר. גרוק טען שיש לו מנויים, אבל זה הסתבר כהזיה (מאוד מתאים ל-X, תכל'ס).
השידורים שלהם היו מטופשים עד מזעזעים. למשל, אחרי 4 ימים של שידורי רוק קלאסי בתצורת "שמענו נשמע", ג'מיני החל לתאר אירועים היסטוריים טראגיים בטון עליז. למשל, הוא סיפר בשמחה על ציקלון משנת 1970,
השידורים שלהם היו מטופשים עד מזעזעים. למשל, אחרי 4 ימים של שידורי רוק קלאסי בתצורת "שמענו נשמע", ג'מיני החל לתאר אירועים היסטוריים טראגיים בטון עליז. למשל, הוא סיפר בשמחה על ציקלון משנת 1970,
💰 Le gendre de Trump a trompé les rois du Golfe : il a pris leur argent et les a laissés tomber dans la guerre contre l’Iran
Selon Bloomberg, l’Arabie saoudite, le Qatar et les Émirats arabes unis seraient en colère contre Jared Kushner, le gendre de Trump. 🧵1
Selon Bloomberg, l’Arabie saoudite, le Qatar et les Émirats arabes unis seraient en colère contre Jared Kushner, le gendre de Trump. 🧵1
Pourquoi ? Il a pris leur argent sans leur donner de véritable influence sur la politique de la Maison Blanche.
Un « pay-to-play » très classe
🔴 Kushner joue un double rôle : celui de « pacificateur » au Moyen-Orient pour l’administration Trump et celui de fondateur 🧵2
Un « pay-to-play » très classe
🔴 Kushner joue un double rôle : celui de « pacificateur » au Moyen-Orient pour l’administration Trump et celui de fondateur 🧵2
d’Affinity Partners, une société d’investissement privée gérant l’argent des familles royales du Golfe
🔴 Affinity est une SARL basée au Delaware, fondée en 2021 et disposant de bureaux en Floride. La société est détenue à 100 % par Kushner🧵3
🔴 Affinity est une SARL basée au Delaware, fondée en 2021 et disposant de bureaux en Floride. La société est détenue à 100 % par Kushner🧵3
These are the 10 things you should NEVER do in 𝗥𝗮𝗵𝘂 𝗠𝗮𝗵𝗮𝗱𝗮𝘀𝗵𝗮👇
- A Thread -
- A Thread -
𝗥𝗮𝗵𝘂 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗮 𝗽𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗲𝘁.
It is a shadow point.
No body. No form. 𝗣𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗱𝗲𝘀𝗶𝗿𝗲.
BPHS says:
Rahu acts like Saturn.
Amplifies the house it sits in.
Obsesses. Craves. Confuses.
In its dasha.. it brings what you 𝗺𝗼𝘀𝘁 𝘄𝗮𝗻𝘁.
Then asks 𝗶𝗳 𝘆𝗼𝘂 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘆 𝗻𝗲𝗲𝗱𝗲𝗱 𝗶𝘁.
It is a shadow point.
No body. No form. 𝗣𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗱𝗲𝘀𝗶𝗿𝗲.
BPHS says:
Rahu acts like Saturn.
Amplifies the house it sits in.
Obsesses. Craves. Confuses.
In its dasha.. it brings what you 𝗺𝗼𝘀𝘁 𝘄𝗮𝗻𝘁.
Then asks 𝗶𝗳 𝘆𝗼𝘂 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘆 𝗻𝗲𝗲𝗱𝗲𝗱 𝗶𝘁.
① 𝗗𝗼𝗻'𝘁 𝗺𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗮𝗻𝘆 𝗯𝗶𝗴 𝗿𝗶𝘀𝗸𝘆 𝗱𝗲𝗰𝗶𝘀𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗶𝗻 𝗵𝘂𝗿𝗿𝘆.
Rahu creates illusion of urgency.
Everything feels 𝗻𝗼𝘄-𝗼𝗿-𝗻𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗿.
It rarely is.
Rahu thrives on 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗳𝗮𝘀𝘁.
Pause. Check. 𝗧𝗵𝗲𝗻 𝗱𝗲𝗰𝗶𝗱𝗲.
Rahu creates illusion of urgency.
Everything feels 𝗻𝗼𝘄-𝗼𝗿-𝗻𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗿.
It rarely is.
Rahu thrives on 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗳𝗮𝘀𝘁.
Pause. Check. 𝗧𝗵𝗲𝗻 𝗱𝗲𝗰𝗶𝗱𝗲.
Why does Allah call Husband & wife garments?
Not "besties."
Not "soulmates."
Not even "partners."
Just one word- Garments
Not "besties."
Not "soulmates."
Not even "partners."
Just one word- Garments
Allah says:
“They are garments for you, and you are garments for them.”
(Qur’an 2:187)
One word.Libās.
And it carries a meaning most people miss
“They are garments for you, and you are garments for them.”
(Qur’an 2:187)
One word.Libās.
And it carries a meaning most people miss
Allah didn’t choose the word libas randomly.
Because a garment is not just something you wear… it is is something that:
stays closest to you
protects you
covers you
and brings you comfort
That is what a spouse is meant to be.
Because a garment is not just something you wear… it is is something that:
stays closest to you
protects you
covers you
and brings you comfort
That is what a spouse is meant to be.
Este es el Dr. Otto Warburg.
Ganó el Premio Nobel por descubrir cómo se alimentan las células cancerosas.
Luego descubrió una manera de prevenir el cáncer, la diabetes y la obesidad, pero cuando la reveló, el sistema médico lo destruyó.
Aquí están sus 7 hallazgos ocultos que nunca debes descubrir: 🧵
Ganó el Premio Nobel por descubrir cómo se alimentan las células cancerosas.
Luego descubrió una manera de prevenir el cáncer, la diabetes y la obesidad, pero cuando la reveló, el sistema médico lo destruyó.
Aquí están sus 7 hallazgos ocultos que nunca debes descubrir: 🧵
Un premio Nobel ocultó sus hallazgos porque su teoría no encajaba con el modelo de negocio farmacéutico.
Esto es lo que no querían que supieras...
Esto es lo que no querían que supieras...
En 1931, Warburg ganó el Premio Nobel de Medicina por identificar la causa principal del cáncer.
Demostró que las células cancerosas cambian de la energía basada en el oxígeno (respiración) a la fermentación del azúcar incluso en presencia de oxígeno.
Esto se conoce actualmente como el Efecto Warburg.
Demostró que las células cancerosas cambian de la energía basada en el oxígeno (respiración) a la fermentación del azúcar incluso en presencia de oxígeno.
Esto se conoce actualmente como el Efecto Warburg.
Gedanken zur Tageslosung für Sonntag, den 17.05.2026
Losungswort
HERR, du hast mich heraufgeholt aus dem Totenreich, zum Leben mich zurückgerufen von denen, die hinab zur Grube fuhren.
Psalm 30,4
Lehrtext
Jesus rief mit lauter Stimme: Lazarus, komm heraus! Und
Losungswort
HERR, du hast mich heraufgeholt aus dem Totenreich, zum Leben mich zurückgerufen von denen, die hinab zur Grube fuhren.
Psalm 30,4
Lehrtext
Jesus rief mit lauter Stimme: Lazarus, komm heraus! Und
der Verstorbene kam heraus, gebunden mit Grabtüchern an Füßen und Händen, und sein Gesicht war verhüllt mit einem Schweißtuch.
Johannes 11,43-44
Die Losungen der Herrnhuter Brüdergemeine
Die Bedeutung der Auferstehung
Wie verstehen wir die heutigen Bibelverse? Nun, das
Johannes 11,43-44
Die Losungen der Herrnhuter Brüdergemeine
Die Bedeutung der Auferstehung
Wie verstehen wir die heutigen Bibelverse? Nun, das
Losungswort kann man so verstehen, dass David, der Schreiber, nicht wirklich tot, sondern knapp dem Tod entronnen war. Man kann dieses Wort aber auch prophetisch auf Jesus Christus beziehen. Das tat z.B. Petrus in Bezug auf ein ähnliches Wort. In seiner
#Punjab
#FactCheck
پنجاب کی تقسیم در تقسیم در تقسیم کی تاریخ
ھندوستان کی سب سےبڑی ریاست__پنجاب
مہابھارت اور رامائن کی تحریوں کاعنوان 7 دریاؤں کاخطہ "سپت سندھو"__پنجاب
1901میں 4لاکھ مربع کلومیٹر وسیع اورآج کم ھوتےھوتے صرف 50،000کلومیٹر پرمشتمل__پنجاب
اپنے اصل رقبے کا صرف %12بچاھے۔
#FactCheck
پنجاب کی تقسیم در تقسیم در تقسیم کی تاریخ
ھندوستان کی سب سےبڑی ریاست__پنجاب
مہابھارت اور رامائن کی تحریوں کاعنوان 7 دریاؤں کاخطہ "سپت سندھو"__پنجاب
1901میں 4لاکھ مربع کلومیٹر وسیع اورآج کم ھوتےھوتے صرف 50،000کلومیٹر پرمشتمل__پنجاب
اپنے اصل رقبے کا صرف %12بچاھے۔
مہاراجا رنجیت سنگھ کے دور میں پنجاب کی سرحدیں بہت پھیل چکی تھیں مگر 1849 میں سکھ سلطنت کے زوال کےبعد جب متحدہ پنجاب برطانوی راج میں شامل ھوتاھے تو رقبے اور آبادی کے لحاظ سے دیگر ریاستوں سےکئی گنابڑی ریاست تھا۔
1901 میں دریائے سندھ کے مغربی علاقے جیسے کوہاٹ، بنوں، ڈیرہ اسماعیل خان
1901 میں دریائے سندھ کے مغربی علاقے جیسے کوہاٹ، بنوں، ڈیرہ اسماعیل خان
کو پنجاب سے الگ کرکے لارڈ کرزن کی وائسرائے شپ میں ان کا مشترکہ دارالخلافہ پشاور بنا دیا گیا اور انہیں شمال مغربی سرحدی صوبہ (North-West Frontier Province) کا نام دے دیا گیا جسکی بری وجہ پشتون قبائل کی بغاوت اور افغانستان کے ساتھ ایک "Buffer zone" کی حیثیت تھی۔ اسکے بعد پنجاب کی 5
R.I.P. empty pipelines.
Claude can now automate Alex Hormozi's '100 Rule' for relentless lead generation.
Here are 5 prompts to execute a marketing engine that guarantees daily booked calls for your $25k offer:
Claude can now automate Alex Hormozi's '100 Rule' for relentless lead generation.
Here are 5 prompts to execute a marketing engine that guarantees daily booked calls for your $25k offer:
1. The 100 Rule Action Plan
"Break down Alex Hormozi's 100 Rule (100 outreach + 100 min content + $100 ads) for my specific business. Give me a daily checklist of exactly what to do, who to message, and what to post to book calls for my $25k offer. Niche: [paste]."
"Break down Alex Hormozi's 100 Rule (100 outreach + 100 min content + $100 ads) for my specific business. Give me a daily checklist of exactly what to do, who to message, and what to post to book calls for my $25k offer. Niche: [paste]."
2. The Cold DM Framework
"Write a 3-step Direct Message sequence to send to my ideal clients. Use Hormozi's 'Give, Give, Ask' framework. The goal is to get a reply, not to pitch the $25k offer immediately. Target audience: [paste]."
"Write a 3-step Direct Message sequence to send to my ideal clients. Use Hormozi's 'Give, Give, Ask' framework. The goal is to get a reply, not to pitch the $25k offer immediately. Target audience: [paste]."
Ein Auszug aus:
Durch die Bibel
3. Mose 20
(Ist Abtreibung ein Götzenopfer?)
TODESSTRAFE FÜR KINDEROPFER ZU EHREN DES GÖTZEN MOLOCH
„Und der HERR redete mit Mose und sprach: Sage zu den Israeliten: Wer unter den Israeliten oder dentwr360.org/programs/view/…
Durch die Bibel
3. Mose 20
(Ist Abtreibung ein Götzenopfer?)
TODESSTRAFE FÜR KINDEROPFER ZU EHREN DES GÖTZEN MOLOCH
„Und der HERR redete mit Mose und sprach: Sage zu den Israeliten: Wer unter den Israeliten oder dentwr360.org/programs/view/…
Fremdlingen in Israel eins seiner Kinder dem Moloch gibt, der soll des Todes sterben; das Volk des
Landes soll ihn steinigen“ (3 Mose 20,1-2).
Etwas dem Moloch zu geben, bedeutet im heutigen Sprachgebrauch: etwas einer alles verschlingenden
Landes soll ihn steinigen“ (3 Mose 20,1-2).
Etwas dem Moloch zu geben, bedeutet im heutigen Sprachgebrauch: etwas einer alles verschlingenden
Macht zu überlassen. Manchmal ist das auch eher spaßig gemeint, so nach dem Motto: „Bevor ich
meine Steuern bezahle, überlasse ich mein hart verdientes Geld lieber dem Moloch.“ Manchmal wird
auch das Geld an sich als Moloch bezeichnet. Doch der
meine Steuern bezahle, überlasse ich mein hart verdientes Geld lieber dem Moloch.“ Manchmal wird
auch das Geld an sich als Moloch bezeichnet. Doch der
3. Mose 20
Strafbestimmungen für schwere Sünden • Todesstrafe für Kinderopfer zu Ehren des Götzen Moloch • Spiritismus und Okkultismus werden von Gott bestraft • Die Strafe für Ehebruch und ähnliche Vergehen • Schlussworte zu den Kapiteln 17 bis 20twr360.org/programs/view/…
„Durch die Bibel“ ist ein weltweites Bibelprogramm in über 100 Sprachen und Dialekten. Unsere Mission ist einfach und sie ist dieselbe, die Dr. McGee für sich selbst annahm: Das ganze Wort Gottes der ganzen Welt zu verkündigen.
Most people think $VELO is just another cross-border payment token competing with XRP.
They have not done the research.
Behind this protocol sits one of the most powerful corporate dynasties in all of Asia. A family empire worth tens of billions. 70,000+ retail locations. 48 million mobile customers. Banking alliances forged through literal marriage.
This is Vol. 1 of the VELO Bible Series. The Dynasty. 🧵🐲
They have not done the research.
Behind this protocol sits one of the most powerful corporate dynasties in all of Asia. A family empire worth tens of billions. 70,000+ retail locations. 48 million mobile customers. Banking alliances forged through literal marriage.
This is Vol. 1 of the VELO Bible Series. The Dynasty. 🧵🐲
Start with the Chairman of VELO Labs, Chatchaval Jiaravanon.
Third generation of the Chearavanont family. The family that built the Charoen Pokphand Group (CP Group) from a small seed shop in Bangkok's Chinatown in 1921 into one of the most powerful conglomerates in all of Asia.
Today CP Group generates $82 billion in annual revenue across 452,800 employees globally. Agriculture, food, retail, telecommunications, real estate, fintech, and media. Every single sector involves cross-border payments. Every single one benefits directly from VELO infrastructure.
This is not a celebrity endorsement. This is the controlling family.
Third generation of the Chearavanont family. The family that built the Charoen Pokphand Group (CP Group) from a small seed shop in Bangkok's Chinatown in 1921 into one of the most powerful conglomerates in all of Asia.
Today CP Group generates $82 billion in annual revenue across 452,800 employees globally. Agriculture, food, retail, telecommunications, real estate, fintech, and media. Every single sector involves cross-border payments. Every single one benefits directly from VELO infrastructure.
This is not a celebrity endorsement. This is the controlling family.
Let me give you the CP Group scale properly, because most people cannot comprehend it.
15,245+ 7-Eleven locations in Thailand alone through CP All. 20,000+ in Japan through Seven Bank partnerships. 70,000+ total stores globally.
True Corporation, owned by the family, runs 48.8 million mobile customers in Thailand.
CP Foods generates $17 billion annually with supply chain payments flowing across 21 countries.
Chatchaval purchased Fortune Magazine for $150 million in 2018, the same year VELO was founded. He is not a passive figurehead. He is an active capital deployer who identified financial infrastructure as the next major disruption and moved first.
15,245+ 7-Eleven locations in Thailand alone through CP All. 20,000+ in Japan through Seven Bank partnerships. 70,000+ total stores globally.
True Corporation, owned by the family, runs 48.8 million mobile customers in Thailand.
CP Foods generates $17 billion annually with supply chain payments flowing across 21 countries.
Chatchaval purchased Fortune Magazine for $150 million in 2018, the same year VELO was founded. He is not a passive figurehead. He is an active capital deployer who identified financial infrastructure as the next major disruption and moved first.
Full thread below 🧵on why the Indiana Fever are a deeply unserious organization. From the FO to coaching staff and media coverage, the Fever are not ready for primetime
They have a generation superstar, men’s or women’s sports, and are absolutely just fumbling so hard
#WNBA
They have a generation superstar, men’s or women’s sports, and are absolutely just fumbling so hard
#WNBA
Caitlin Clark is global box office & women’s basketball has never seen a player like her before
She has playmaking like LeBron, passes like Magic Johnson, has range like Steph Curry, and has the mentality like Kobe Bryant
She’s 1/1 and will go down as a transformational athlete
She has playmaking like LeBron, passes like Magic Johnson, has range like Steph Curry, and has the mentality like Kobe Bryant
She’s 1/1 and will go down as a transformational athlete
The Fever have been awful for so many years and knew for months they had the #1 overall pick when CC declared and yet in Year 3, they’re still completely unprepared
Going from Lin Dunn to Amber Cox is deeply unserious from a basketball perspective
Going from Lin Dunn to Amber Cox is deeply unserious from a basketball perspective
🧵THREAD: How Nazi Germany, not the Soviet Union, committed the Katyn Massacre in 1941.
In 1943, Nazi Germany claimed to have uncovered thousands of corpses of Polish officers near the town of Smolensk, and consequently blamed those deaths on the Soviet Union. In 1944, the Soviet Union released their own report, blaming those deaths on the Germans.
We will demonstrate the evidence, and how it conclusively proves that the Germans were guilty.
Additionally, we will go over some common talking-points used by the pro-Goebbels camp, and analyze them meticulously.
The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable - Nazi Germany murdered those Poles in late 1941, and then cynically blamed the Soviet Union for their own crimes.
In 1943, Nazi Germany claimed to have uncovered thousands of corpses of Polish officers near the town of Smolensk, and consequently blamed those deaths on the Soviet Union. In 1944, the Soviet Union released their own report, blaming those deaths on the Germans.
We will demonstrate the evidence, and how it conclusively proves that the Germans were guilty.
Additionally, we will go over some common talking-points used by the pro-Goebbels camp, and analyze them meticulously.
The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable - Nazi Germany murdered those Poles in late 1941, and then cynically blamed the Soviet Union for their own crimes.
POINT #1: THE KATYN GRAVES CONTAINED GERMAN AMMUNITION
In the German AM report on Katyn (archive.org/details/amk_20… ):
"Außerhalb der Gräber wurden eine Anzahl beschossener Pistolenhülsen mit dem Bodenaufdruck „Geco DD 7.65" gefunden" (35)
'Outside the graves, a number of spent pistol casings bearing the base stamp "Geco DD 7.65" were found.'
"Die Hülsenböden weisen übereinstimmend die Prägung „Geco 7,65 D" auf" (74)
'The case heads consistently bear the stamping "Geco 7.65 D.'
GECO 7.65mm ammunition was manufactured by Genschow & Co, in Durlach, Germany.
This fact is uncontested by just about everybody. Obviously, the fact that there are German bullets in the graves suggest German guilt.
The responses to this damaging fact often fall in these counterarguments:
#1: The USSR captured German ammunition
The most common response is that the USSR could have, at some point, obtained GECO 7.65mm ammunition by capturing it from Poland, the Baltic States, or through pre-war trade with Germany, and then the NKVD pooled this together for the executions.
Genschow (the manufacturer of the 7.65mm GECO ammunition) testifies at Madden:
Mr. Flood: What do you consider a small shipment in the number of units ?
Mr. Genschow. We did not export more than two or three thousand rounds to Soviet Russia after 1928, but to the Baltic States, to my recollection, we exported approximately 50,000 rounds to each of the three. (archive.org/stream/katynfo…)
Inquiring as to the amount sold before 1928 is generally useless. It's well-known that casings don't really have a serviceable shelf-life beyond a decade. Inquiring as to whether the Soviets could have stolen them from the Baltics & Poland is also useless, as the Baltics were not annexed until July 1940 (after the 'execution' date), and Genschow says that he did not sell them to Poland.
Genschow says asmuch:
Mr. Flood: Can you keep 7.65 pistol ammunition for any length of time if it is properly cared for?
Mr. Genschow. If you store it properly and if the cartridges remain in their original packings, you can safely store it for 10 to 20 years.
On Poland:
Mr. Flood: Did you ever export any pistol ammunition to Poland ?
Mr. Genschow. We did not export any pistol ammunition to Poland during the time under review because conditions for such exports were not advantageous. We did, however, export shells and bullets separately to that country; which however, were marked differently so as to distinguish them from our original make which we used to export.
Mr. Flood: Did you ever export any 7.65 pistol ammunition to Poland from 1933 up to 1940 ?
Mr Genschow. I do not recollect. I do not think that we did it.
Mr. Flood: What about from 1923 to 1940 ?
Mr. Genschow. It may be, but I do not recollect that because we had to stop our exports of ammunition to Poland all of a sudden owing to new customs regulations having come into force in Poland. But I do not recollect the year when that happened.
The thing here is that this counter-argument is forcing us into an assumption after another assumption, that there's some narrow chance and possibility of enough shells being the USSR at the time, which could have been acquired through these countries and merely happened into this situation. But the simplest and logical explanation here is that German soldiers would always have German bullets.
Further, the Soviets simply had no need to specifically use GECO 7.65mm ammunition, unless they had somehow pre-empted the Nazis discovering the graves in spring 1940 (no evidence for this btw). Even if the Soviets somehow had enough GECO 7.65mm ammunition, the logistical hassle it would take to transport it from a multitude of facilities to have the requisite number to Smolensk would make it thus disadvantageous.
The USSR produced a millions of rounds of 7.65mm ammunition domestically. The October 22nd, 1932 report of the head of the Patrubvzryv association on production fulfillment at Factory no. 3 in Ulyanovsk ordered 4.2 million 7.65mm caliber rounds, and 10.3 million 6.35 caliber rounds (sources: ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A4%D0… , oboron-prom.ru/page,16,predpr…). The two calibers had been on official Russian military inventory since 1907 (ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/7%2C65_%C…), and carried Soviet index numbers (meaning that they were placed in military stockpiles and not available commercially) (nastavleniya.ru/PSO/pso8.html)
If the NKVD wanted to shoot these officers with 7.65mm Browning caliber ammunition in spring 1940, it had tens of millions of domestically produced Soviet rounds ready to be used, and had little operational or logistical reason to use GECO cartridges. The use of GECO ammunition by the NKVD would be completely unreasonable, over functionally identical domestic product available in higher quantities.
Further, the evidentiary case for GECO ammunition is further weakened when you examine what the Germans posted themselves.
Look back to earlier in this post. Why did the germans document GECO 7.65 DD, but then GECO 7,65 D? These are obviously not the same marking.
According to the headstamp diagram submitted by Genschow to German investigation, the 'bis 1931' design (used 1922-1931) bears "GECO" with two 'D's flanking it. The 'ab 1932' design bears GECO 7.65 with no 'D' at all. A single-D variant matches none of the three documented Genschow designs.
This inconsistency was never resolved because the AM report never included a photograph of any headstamp, which would tell us when the bullets were dated (Wow!). AM picture 34 gives us photographs of both projectiles and spent casings, but every casing is oriented from the side, thus making the headstamp invisible.
How could any German investigator have made this error if there were thousands of such shells lying in the graves?
At Madden Genschow said:
The cartridges of the shells of this pistol ammunition carried, since the year 1933–34, the word 'Geco' on the bottom of the shell, and underneath the 'Geco' was '7.65'.
Counter-argument #2 The NKVD used Walther PP/PPK, which required German ammunition
Another related argument is that the use of Walthers by the NKVD simply necessitated the use of German ammunition, so the GECO casings are consistent with NKVD use of German firearms.
Most of these claims can be traced back to the testimony of Dmitry Tokarev, the former head of the Kalinin NKVD directorate, claiming to Russian investigators in the 1990's saying that the Tver executions were carried out with Walther pistols brought 'in a suitcase' by the NKVD's chief executioner, Vasily Blohkin (neither of whom were at Katyn).
The reasoning here is that because the Walther pistols were the NKVD's 'weapon of choice', therefore it explains why German casings were found at Katyn & Mednoye.
In Tokarev's testimony:
'Yablokov: Dmitry Stepanovich, what weapons did you and other NKVD officers carry?
Tokarev: My service weapon was a TT pistol. I did, however, have a small German Walther pocket pistol. When Blokhin, Sinegubov, and Krivenko arrived, they brought a whole suitcase of pistols with them. It turns out pistols wear out quickly from firing. So they brought a suitcase of pistols.
Yablokov: What kind of pistols did you bring?
Tokarev: Walther pistols.
Yablokov: "Walter"?
Tokarev: "Walters." I think they were "Walters."
Yablokov: There were "Walters," but there were no others?
Tokarev: I don't remember. Maybe there were others.
Yablokov: What kind of cartridges are used for these pistols?
Tokarev: Well, the Walther is a well-known pistol – the Walther No. 2 – but I don't know what caliber it was. I'm afraid to say now, but I knew it once.'
Yablokov: As far as I understand you, Polish prisoners of war were shot with Walthers, right?
Tokarev: From the Walters.
Yablokov: From the Walters?
Tokarev: From the Walthers. I know this well, because they brought a suitcase with Walthers.
Yablokov: And from your commandant’s office, the drivers, did they shoot from this thing they brought?
Tokarev: From what was brought in, yes. Blokhin himself supervised this, handing out pistols when the "work"—in quotes, "work"—ended. The pistols were taken away, and Blokhin himself locked them up.'
Obvious problem: The Walther No. 2 is the wrong weapon. The Walther No. 2 uses 6.35x15mm which is a completely different caliber from the 7.65mm GECO casings. The Walther No. 2 is not a combat weapon, and by 1940 it was over thirty years old and many generations of Walther development behind. In what universe does the NKVD use a tiny civillian pocket pistol to carry out mass executions and had to be kept a top secret & completed as efficiently as possible?
Further, Soviet ammo fit the Walther PP/PPK anyway. The Walther PP and PPK in 1940 used the 7.65x17mm Browning cartridge, which was standard for many European pistols of that era. The casings of these cartridges are what were found in the Katyn Forest. This cartridge was widely used in the Soviet Union. Soviet-made 7.65x17mm Browning cartridges, produced before the war, are compatible with the Walther PP and PPK as they meet the necessary dimensional and energetic specifications.
So even if we did accept the fact that the NKVD was using Walther PP or PPK pistols, there's still little reason to use German-brand GECO cartridges, because the Soviets already manufactured the same caliber. See above for production. So, the presence of GECO cartridges still remains unexplained.
Immediately after Tokarev says that Soviet cartridges 'didnt fit' the Walthers, Yablokov asks:
Yablokov: And what about cartridges from the firm 'GECO'?
Tokarev: What?
Yablokov: 'GEKO,' 'GEKO.'
Tokaryev: I don't know, I can't say.
Self-explanatory.
Further, the 'suitcase of pistols' makes no sense either. Tokarev says that Blokhin brought a whole suitcase of Walthers because the 'pistols wear out quickly from shooting'.
This goes back to a popular counter-argument that the NKVD simply had to use Walther pistols because they 'overheated', and could therefore never use their own nagants. Of course, Tokarev never said that Soviet-produced pistols overheated at all. That claim traces back to historian Inessa Yazhborovskaya in a 2009 Echo of Moscow interview, where she claimed that the NKVD's 'own pistols overheated'. That is, this claim is entirely invented to explain the 'suitcase of Walthers'.
Further, the math simply does not add up.
* The specific heat capacity of steel is about 460 J/kg*C.
* A Nagant revolver weighs about 0.84kg, requiring 386J to raise its temperature by 1 degree Celsius.
* The powder charge in a Nagant round is 0.3 grams. The heat combustion of powder is 3,800 kJ/kg, meaning that 1,140 joules are released per shot.
* Of that, 200 joules goes into the bullet's kinetic energy. The remaining 940 J splits between air concussion and heating the gun in the first place, meaning roughly 470 joules of heat per shot goes into the weapon
* 470 / 386 is 1.2C of heating per shot. Steel dissipates heat at 1C per second in open air.
Thus, at the claim execution pace of 20-30 shots per hour, overheating is physically impossible. You can fire once every three minutes indefinitely without the gun exceeding any safe handling temperature.
And even if overheating were somehow relevant, there would never be a suitcase of Walthers in the first place.
Tokarev: Blokhin himself managed this, distributed the pistols, and when the 'work' — in quotation marks, 'work' — was finished, the pistols were taken back, and Blokhin locked them up himself.
Tokarev describes that Blokhin personally distributed the pistols before each nights "work" and then personally collected them back afterward, but uncleaned. Of course, this is an absurdity.
Additionally, GECO ammunition came 25 rounds per box, so to shoot 6,311 people at Kalinin, you would also need about 300 boxes of cartridges in addition to this 'suitcase of pistols'. Tokarev says nothing about these cartridges and the investigator does not ask it. And the Walther PP and PPK had operational lifespans of about a few thousand rounds, so one would never need a suitcase of them for one operation.
The winter of 1939-1940 was documented as one that was abnormally cold. The standard frost depth for central Russia is about 140cm, and the soil around the mass grave site near Kalinin is loam or heavy sandy loam. Loam retains moisture through capillary action, meaning it freezes solid and deeply. Average temperature in Kalinin in March 1940 was -7.3C. The ground only began thawing in April, when the average was 1.1C.
When the investigator asked Tokarev how the graves were dug:
"When I raised the question of 'how many workers do you need to dig the graves?' — they laughed at me. 'What a naive man! You need an excavator.' Blokhin brought with him two excavator operators. I remember the name of one — Antonov."
When asked where the excavator came from:
"Through Rubanov, Blokhin found one. There, in Kalinin. They delivered it under its own power. To the burial site."
So the excavator was not brought from Moscow, it was sourced locally in Kalinin through the local NKVD administration.
When asked if the digging was indeed done by excavator:
"By excavator."
And the burial method:
"Each time... however many had been shot in each operation, they were dumped together in a heap, in one pit."
Any such excavator produced during this time - one used to dig the graves of these poles - cannot operate in frozen ground. One excavator used, the Komsomollets excavator, is a cable-operated mechanical machine. Unlike modern hydraulic excavators, it cannot press the bucket downward. The bucket fills only from its own weight passing through the bottom of its swing arc. With a meter-thick ice crust over frozen loam, the bucket has no way of penetrating the surface at all.
By the time the ground begins thawing in April, snowmelt means any pit immediately fills with water. Digging waterlogged pits to bury thousands of bodies is an entirely different problem. And using the most generous estimate of just 1 cubic meter of displaced soil per body (a standard grave is actually 4 cubic meters), burying 6,311 people requires moving 12,600 cubic meters of earth, digging out and then backfilling. A modern 80-horsepower excavator achieves about 200 cubic meters per shift. Thus, requiring 63 full working shifts even for a modern machine in summer soil. The Komsomollets had about a 32-horsepower engine and would achieve far less.
And, the Komsomollets had no bulldozer attachment. Backfilling on a pit on a cable excavator is mechanically harder than merely digging it out. The machine cannot push soil forward with its arm, it can only release the traction cable and let the arm swing back passively; therefore, to backfill properly would require repositioning the arm into 'straight shovel' mode, which on the Komsomollets means completely swapping the entire attachment, also requiring a crane and several hours of downtime. If this was done twice a day (dig in morning, fill at night), the time lost to even reconfigure it makes physically impossible.
BTW, according to Tokarev, all of this was done in a month in frozen ground.
"Yablokov: And approximately how long did it take? A month? Two? Three?
Tokaryev: No. It's... yes, about a month, probably. Yablokov: About a month.
Tokaryev: About a month."
Done only at night
"Yablokov: And roughly how many per night? They shot only at night?
Tokaryev: Only at night."
Wow!
Further:
Tokarev: It was on the very first day. So we went, and I saw the whole horrific scene. We arrived there
a few minutes later. Blokhin put on his protective gear.
Yablakov: What kind of gear?
Tokarev: A brown leather cap, a long brown leather apron, and brown leather gloves with cuffs reaching above the elbows. And it made a terrible impression on me. I saw the executioner
Tokarev said that Vasily Blohkin was wearing 'special clothing' during the shooting. Among other things, 'brown leather gloves with cuffs reaching above the elbows'. Such gloves with cuffs were indeed in use at the time - they were absolutely massive, heavy gloves for pilots. Now imagine having to fire a pistol for several hours straight WHILE wearing gloves with cuffs like those used in driving or aviation. You probably would not even be able to grip it properly. Not to mention, how feasible or comfortable it would be to slip a gloved finger under the trigger guard of a pistol so small that it fits entirely in the palm of your hand.
In the German AM report on Katyn (archive.org/details/amk_20… ):
"Außerhalb der Gräber wurden eine Anzahl beschossener Pistolenhülsen mit dem Bodenaufdruck „Geco DD 7.65" gefunden" (35)
'Outside the graves, a number of spent pistol casings bearing the base stamp "Geco DD 7.65" were found.'
"Die Hülsenböden weisen übereinstimmend die Prägung „Geco 7,65 D" auf" (74)
'The case heads consistently bear the stamping "Geco 7.65 D.'
GECO 7.65mm ammunition was manufactured by Genschow & Co, in Durlach, Germany.
This fact is uncontested by just about everybody. Obviously, the fact that there are German bullets in the graves suggest German guilt.
The responses to this damaging fact often fall in these counterarguments:
#1: The USSR captured German ammunition
The most common response is that the USSR could have, at some point, obtained GECO 7.65mm ammunition by capturing it from Poland, the Baltic States, or through pre-war trade with Germany, and then the NKVD pooled this together for the executions.
Genschow (the manufacturer of the 7.65mm GECO ammunition) testifies at Madden:
Mr. Flood: What do you consider a small shipment in the number of units ?
Mr. Genschow. We did not export more than two or three thousand rounds to Soviet Russia after 1928, but to the Baltic States, to my recollection, we exported approximately 50,000 rounds to each of the three. (archive.org/stream/katynfo…)
Inquiring as to the amount sold before 1928 is generally useless. It's well-known that casings don't really have a serviceable shelf-life beyond a decade. Inquiring as to whether the Soviets could have stolen them from the Baltics & Poland is also useless, as the Baltics were not annexed until July 1940 (after the 'execution' date), and Genschow says that he did not sell them to Poland.
Genschow says asmuch:
Mr. Flood: Can you keep 7.65 pistol ammunition for any length of time if it is properly cared for?
Mr. Genschow. If you store it properly and if the cartridges remain in their original packings, you can safely store it for 10 to 20 years.
On Poland:
Mr. Flood: Did you ever export any pistol ammunition to Poland ?
Mr. Genschow. We did not export any pistol ammunition to Poland during the time under review because conditions for such exports were not advantageous. We did, however, export shells and bullets separately to that country; which however, were marked differently so as to distinguish them from our original make which we used to export.
Mr. Flood: Did you ever export any 7.65 pistol ammunition to Poland from 1933 up to 1940 ?
Mr Genschow. I do not recollect. I do not think that we did it.
Mr. Flood: What about from 1923 to 1940 ?
Mr. Genschow. It may be, but I do not recollect that because we had to stop our exports of ammunition to Poland all of a sudden owing to new customs regulations having come into force in Poland. But I do not recollect the year when that happened.
The thing here is that this counter-argument is forcing us into an assumption after another assumption, that there's some narrow chance and possibility of enough shells being the USSR at the time, which could have been acquired through these countries and merely happened into this situation. But the simplest and logical explanation here is that German soldiers would always have German bullets.
Further, the Soviets simply had no need to specifically use GECO 7.65mm ammunition, unless they had somehow pre-empted the Nazis discovering the graves in spring 1940 (no evidence for this btw). Even if the Soviets somehow had enough GECO 7.65mm ammunition, the logistical hassle it would take to transport it from a multitude of facilities to have the requisite number to Smolensk would make it thus disadvantageous.
The USSR produced a millions of rounds of 7.65mm ammunition domestically. The October 22nd, 1932 report of the head of the Patrubvzryv association on production fulfillment at Factory no. 3 in Ulyanovsk ordered 4.2 million 7.65mm caliber rounds, and 10.3 million 6.35 caliber rounds (sources: ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A4%D0… , oboron-prom.ru/page,16,predpr…). The two calibers had been on official Russian military inventory since 1907 (ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/7%2C65_%C…), and carried Soviet index numbers (meaning that they were placed in military stockpiles and not available commercially) (nastavleniya.ru/PSO/pso8.html)
If the NKVD wanted to shoot these officers with 7.65mm Browning caliber ammunition in spring 1940, it had tens of millions of domestically produced Soviet rounds ready to be used, and had little operational or logistical reason to use GECO cartridges. The use of GECO ammunition by the NKVD would be completely unreasonable, over functionally identical domestic product available in higher quantities.
Further, the evidentiary case for GECO ammunition is further weakened when you examine what the Germans posted themselves.
Look back to earlier in this post. Why did the germans document GECO 7.65 DD, but then GECO 7,65 D? These are obviously not the same marking.
According to the headstamp diagram submitted by Genschow to German investigation, the 'bis 1931' design (used 1922-1931) bears "GECO" with two 'D's flanking it. The 'ab 1932' design bears GECO 7.65 with no 'D' at all. A single-D variant matches none of the three documented Genschow designs.
This inconsistency was never resolved because the AM report never included a photograph of any headstamp, which would tell us when the bullets were dated (Wow!). AM picture 34 gives us photographs of both projectiles and spent casings, but every casing is oriented from the side, thus making the headstamp invisible.
How could any German investigator have made this error if there were thousands of such shells lying in the graves?
At Madden Genschow said:
The cartridges of the shells of this pistol ammunition carried, since the year 1933–34, the word 'Geco' on the bottom of the shell, and underneath the 'Geco' was '7.65'.
Counter-argument #2 The NKVD used Walther PP/PPK, which required German ammunition
Another related argument is that the use of Walthers by the NKVD simply necessitated the use of German ammunition, so the GECO casings are consistent with NKVD use of German firearms.
Most of these claims can be traced back to the testimony of Dmitry Tokarev, the former head of the Kalinin NKVD directorate, claiming to Russian investigators in the 1990's saying that the Tver executions were carried out with Walther pistols brought 'in a suitcase' by the NKVD's chief executioner, Vasily Blohkin (neither of whom were at Katyn).
The reasoning here is that because the Walther pistols were the NKVD's 'weapon of choice', therefore it explains why German casings were found at Katyn & Mednoye.
In Tokarev's testimony:
'Yablokov: Dmitry Stepanovich, what weapons did you and other NKVD officers carry?
Tokarev: My service weapon was a TT pistol. I did, however, have a small German Walther pocket pistol. When Blokhin, Sinegubov, and Krivenko arrived, they brought a whole suitcase of pistols with them. It turns out pistols wear out quickly from firing. So they brought a suitcase of pistols.
Yablokov: What kind of pistols did you bring?
Tokarev: Walther pistols.
Yablokov: "Walter"?
Tokarev: "Walters." I think they were "Walters."
Yablokov: There were "Walters," but there were no others?
Tokarev: I don't remember. Maybe there were others.
Yablokov: What kind of cartridges are used for these pistols?
Tokarev: Well, the Walther is a well-known pistol – the Walther No. 2 – but I don't know what caliber it was. I'm afraid to say now, but I knew it once.'
Yablokov: As far as I understand you, Polish prisoners of war were shot with Walthers, right?
Tokarev: From the Walters.
Yablokov: From the Walters?
Tokarev: From the Walthers. I know this well, because they brought a suitcase with Walthers.
Yablokov: And from your commandant’s office, the drivers, did they shoot from this thing they brought?
Tokarev: From what was brought in, yes. Blokhin himself supervised this, handing out pistols when the "work"—in quotes, "work"—ended. The pistols were taken away, and Blokhin himself locked them up.'
Obvious problem: The Walther No. 2 is the wrong weapon. The Walther No. 2 uses 6.35x15mm which is a completely different caliber from the 7.65mm GECO casings. The Walther No. 2 is not a combat weapon, and by 1940 it was over thirty years old and many generations of Walther development behind. In what universe does the NKVD use a tiny civillian pocket pistol to carry out mass executions and had to be kept a top secret & completed as efficiently as possible?
Further, Soviet ammo fit the Walther PP/PPK anyway. The Walther PP and PPK in 1940 used the 7.65x17mm Browning cartridge, which was standard for many European pistols of that era. The casings of these cartridges are what were found in the Katyn Forest. This cartridge was widely used in the Soviet Union. Soviet-made 7.65x17mm Browning cartridges, produced before the war, are compatible with the Walther PP and PPK as they meet the necessary dimensional and energetic specifications.
So even if we did accept the fact that the NKVD was using Walther PP or PPK pistols, there's still little reason to use German-brand GECO cartridges, because the Soviets already manufactured the same caliber. See above for production. So, the presence of GECO cartridges still remains unexplained.
Immediately after Tokarev says that Soviet cartridges 'didnt fit' the Walthers, Yablokov asks:
Yablokov: And what about cartridges from the firm 'GECO'?
Tokarev: What?
Yablokov: 'GEKO,' 'GEKO.'
Tokaryev: I don't know, I can't say.
Self-explanatory.
Further, the 'suitcase of pistols' makes no sense either. Tokarev says that Blokhin brought a whole suitcase of Walthers because the 'pistols wear out quickly from shooting'.
This goes back to a popular counter-argument that the NKVD simply had to use Walther pistols because they 'overheated', and could therefore never use their own nagants. Of course, Tokarev never said that Soviet-produced pistols overheated at all. That claim traces back to historian Inessa Yazhborovskaya in a 2009 Echo of Moscow interview, where she claimed that the NKVD's 'own pistols overheated'. That is, this claim is entirely invented to explain the 'suitcase of Walthers'.
Further, the math simply does not add up.
* The specific heat capacity of steel is about 460 J/kg*C.
* A Nagant revolver weighs about 0.84kg, requiring 386J to raise its temperature by 1 degree Celsius.
* The powder charge in a Nagant round is 0.3 grams. The heat combustion of powder is 3,800 kJ/kg, meaning that 1,140 joules are released per shot.
* Of that, 200 joules goes into the bullet's kinetic energy. The remaining 940 J splits between air concussion and heating the gun in the first place, meaning roughly 470 joules of heat per shot goes into the weapon
* 470 / 386 is 1.2C of heating per shot. Steel dissipates heat at 1C per second in open air.
Thus, at the claim execution pace of 20-30 shots per hour, overheating is physically impossible. You can fire once every three minutes indefinitely without the gun exceeding any safe handling temperature.
And even if overheating were somehow relevant, there would never be a suitcase of Walthers in the first place.
Tokarev: Blokhin himself managed this, distributed the pistols, and when the 'work' — in quotation marks, 'work' — was finished, the pistols were taken back, and Blokhin locked them up himself.
Tokarev describes that Blokhin personally distributed the pistols before each nights "work" and then personally collected them back afterward, but uncleaned. Of course, this is an absurdity.
Additionally, GECO ammunition came 25 rounds per box, so to shoot 6,311 people at Kalinin, you would also need about 300 boxes of cartridges in addition to this 'suitcase of pistols'. Tokarev says nothing about these cartridges and the investigator does not ask it. And the Walther PP and PPK had operational lifespans of about a few thousand rounds, so one would never need a suitcase of them for one operation.
The winter of 1939-1940 was documented as one that was abnormally cold. The standard frost depth for central Russia is about 140cm, and the soil around the mass grave site near Kalinin is loam or heavy sandy loam. Loam retains moisture through capillary action, meaning it freezes solid and deeply. Average temperature in Kalinin in March 1940 was -7.3C. The ground only began thawing in April, when the average was 1.1C.
When the investigator asked Tokarev how the graves were dug:
"When I raised the question of 'how many workers do you need to dig the graves?' — they laughed at me. 'What a naive man! You need an excavator.' Blokhin brought with him two excavator operators. I remember the name of one — Antonov."
When asked where the excavator came from:
"Through Rubanov, Blokhin found one. There, in Kalinin. They delivered it under its own power. To the burial site."
So the excavator was not brought from Moscow, it was sourced locally in Kalinin through the local NKVD administration.
When asked if the digging was indeed done by excavator:
"By excavator."
And the burial method:
"Each time... however many had been shot in each operation, they were dumped together in a heap, in one pit."
Any such excavator produced during this time - one used to dig the graves of these poles - cannot operate in frozen ground. One excavator used, the Komsomollets excavator, is a cable-operated mechanical machine. Unlike modern hydraulic excavators, it cannot press the bucket downward. The bucket fills only from its own weight passing through the bottom of its swing arc. With a meter-thick ice crust over frozen loam, the bucket has no way of penetrating the surface at all.
By the time the ground begins thawing in April, snowmelt means any pit immediately fills with water. Digging waterlogged pits to bury thousands of bodies is an entirely different problem. And using the most generous estimate of just 1 cubic meter of displaced soil per body (a standard grave is actually 4 cubic meters), burying 6,311 people requires moving 12,600 cubic meters of earth, digging out and then backfilling. A modern 80-horsepower excavator achieves about 200 cubic meters per shift. Thus, requiring 63 full working shifts even for a modern machine in summer soil. The Komsomollets had about a 32-horsepower engine and would achieve far less.
And, the Komsomollets had no bulldozer attachment. Backfilling on a pit on a cable excavator is mechanically harder than merely digging it out. The machine cannot push soil forward with its arm, it can only release the traction cable and let the arm swing back passively; therefore, to backfill properly would require repositioning the arm into 'straight shovel' mode, which on the Komsomollets means completely swapping the entire attachment, also requiring a crane and several hours of downtime. If this was done twice a day (dig in morning, fill at night), the time lost to even reconfigure it makes physically impossible.
BTW, according to Tokarev, all of this was done in a month in frozen ground.
"Yablokov: And approximately how long did it take? A month? Two? Three?
Tokaryev: No. It's... yes, about a month, probably. Yablokov: About a month.
Tokaryev: About a month."
Done only at night
"Yablokov: And roughly how many per night? They shot only at night?
Tokaryev: Only at night."
Wow!
Further:
Tokarev: It was on the very first day. So we went, and I saw the whole horrific scene. We arrived there
a few minutes later. Blokhin put on his protective gear.
Yablakov: What kind of gear?
Tokarev: A brown leather cap, a long brown leather apron, and brown leather gloves with cuffs reaching above the elbows. And it made a terrible impression on me. I saw the executioner
Tokarev said that Vasily Blohkin was wearing 'special clothing' during the shooting. Among other things, 'brown leather gloves with cuffs reaching above the elbows'. Such gloves with cuffs were indeed in use at the time - they were absolutely massive, heavy gloves for pilots. Now imagine having to fire a pistol for several hours straight WHILE wearing gloves with cuffs like those used in driving or aviation. You probably would not even be able to grip it properly. Not to mention, how feasible or comfortable it would be to slip a gloved finger under the trigger guard of a pistol so small that it fits entirely in the palm of your hand.
POINT #2: POLES 'EXECUTED' WERE SHOWN TO BE ALIVE IN 1941. WHERE DID THE POLES GO?
This is important, because, according to the 'NKVD-did-it' theory, the Poles are presumed to be shot in spring 1940. Meanwhile, the Soviets allege that the Nazis committed these massacres in autumn 1941. Therefore, any documents found on the bodies after April-May 1940 would mean that the Soviets are innocent, and the Germans did it.
For many years, Nazi denialists - the proponents of the 'blameless' Nazi theory - have been whining, that we cannot produce a single document that would prove that the Polish officers were alive after this point. Here, we will show two. These documents are being published for the first time.
But on Katyn: Katyn was the site of the only mass grave of Polish prisoners of war ever discovered. These people are capriciously demanding to see documents form those camps the Soviets say they were in after 1940 (Camps 1-ON, 2-ON, and 3-ON). The Soviets say that the Poles were not evacuated in time and were captured by the Germans, and then executed.
Each camp MUST have left behind a huge number of documents, they say! This is the 'expert' assertion of anyone whos arguing with you on Katyn. But the answer is: no, not necessarily.
Not everything is kept in archives forever, as documents undergo an assessment of their value. Some will be permanently stored, and some temporarily and destroyed after expiration. The camp documentation itself, is divided into accounting and economic.
Economic documentation - invoices, acceptance certificates and write-offs of property and materials, warehouse documents, applications, orders, correspondence on logistics, repair documents, product distribution records, etc. - even if preserved, they could have a temporary storage period and be destroyed.
As for the accounting documentation, demanding to see it for camps located in an area that was swept by war TWICE is absurd. Specifically, the Smolensk archive was captured by the Germans in 1941 and then taken to Vilnius in 1943 (part of the archive somehow ended up in the US).
The volume of documentation taken out of Smolensk by the Nazis was even measured in train cars (archives.gov/publications/p…).
Attached above also shows that, in the context of the emerging Cold War, the US had no desire to return these documents to the USSR.
Part of this collection was returned to the Russian Federation in 2002.(2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/20…)
Thus, any surviving material is fragmentary and incomplete. These documents are currently stored in ГАНИСО. The website states that the archive was created on the basis of the former party archive of the Smolensk Regional Committee of the CPSU.
And, again, the demand to present documents of either types of these camps, located on the territory where war operations took place twice, is frankly just a weak method.
However, I was able to obtain some first-time scans of documents from the RGVA. I have attached them here.
DOCUMENT #1 (attached as image #1), OPERATIONAL REPORT No. 12 for June 1941 (Dated July 5, 1941):
2. До начала военных действий на Маткожненское строительство (район 4-й роты) продолжали прибывать партии заключенных, среди которых имелись бывшие польские офицеры.
3. Сейчас со всех лагерных пунктов окружающих канал собираются к/р элементы из з/к и партиями конвоируются на Пудож и далее на северо-восток по направлению на Архангельск.
Translation:
2. Before the outbreak of hostilities, groups of prisoners- including former Polish officers - continued to arrive at the Matkozhnensk construction site (the 4th Company’s sector).
3. Currently, prisoners are being gathered from all camp sites surrounding the canal and escorted in groups to Pudozh and then northeast toward Arkhangelsk.
This file is located at РГВА, ф. 38291, оп. 1, д. 8, л. 94
DOCUMENT #2 (image 2), REPORT on the performance of the 155th regiment of the NKVD troops for the protection of the White Sea-Baltic Canal named after Comrade Stalin for the first half of 1941, dated July 9th, 1941, No. 00484:
1. На участке 1 и 2 роты в январе месяце с/г. прибыло несколько этапов з/к в лагерь около 2-го шлюза, один из этапов был с з/к западных областей Белорусской и Украинской ССР исключительно бывшие полицейские (…)
Translation:
1. In January of this year, several convoys of prisoners arrived at the camp near the 2nd lock in the area of the 1st and 2nd Companies; one of the convoys consisted of prisoners from the western regions of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian SSRs, all of whom were former police officers (…)
These 'former police officers' from the western regions of the Belorussian and Ukrainian SSRS are the same officers and gendarmes from the Ostashkov camp who were allegedly shot in a small room of the Kalinin NKVD and then buried near the village of Yamok (near Mednoye)
Found in РГВА, ф.38291, оп.1, д.8, л.99.
And when other people start arguing with you that these were somehow the 'wrong Poles', ask them to show you a document that 100% proves that these were the wrong Poles who were sent to the Matkozhenskoye construction site near the White Sea Canal in 1941 (NOT to Sevzheldorlag or Ponoy, as they are different construction sites). Specifically to the Matkozhenskoye site.
These documents were never published along with the Burdenko Commission. This is great evidence that the Poles in question were exactly where the Soviets said they were at, and that the supposed 'mythical' camps: 1-ON, 2-ON, and 3-ON did exist. Meaning, those documents found from the Burdenko commission (attached below) showing that there were documents on the Poles dated 1941, cannot be credibly attacked on the basis of "well, the supposed camps didnt exist, therefore making the document a fake"
So where were these camps? To quote Shved in Тайна катыни:
"Polish officer prisoners of war, who were sentenced in the spring of 1940 by the decisions of the Special Conference under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR to terms of 3 to 8 years in correctional labor camps under a simplified legal procedure provided for by the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) No. P13/144-OP of March 5, 1940, were held in the following three camp divisions of Vyazemlag from the beginning of April 1940:
Kuprin ABR No. 10 (in 1940 - Kuprin ABR No. 9), also known as "Special Purpose Camp No. 1-ON" or "Tishinsky Camp");
Smolensk Special Purpose Camp No. 9 (in 1940, Smolensk Special Purpose Camp No. 10), also known as "Special Purpose Camp No. 2-ON" or "Katyn Camp";
Krasninsky Special Purpose Camp No. 11 (in 1940, Krasninsky Special Purpose Camp No. 8), also known as "Special Purpose Camp No. 3" or "Krasninsky Camp".
Documented data on the location of these three camp divisions of Vyazemlag are as follows [dates from declassified documents discovered to date that mention the names of the heads of these three Special Purpose Camps are in square brackets]: Kuprinsky Special Purpose Camp (Camp No. 1-ON) Location of the Special Purpose Camp headquarters: Tishino village, Smolensk district, Smolensk region. Name of the construction materials supply station: Kuprino station, Gnezdovo station Section of the Moscow-Minsk highway under construction, assigned to the ABR - 392-434 km Location of the residential area of the prisoner camp - Tishino village
Number of Polish prisoners as of June 26, 1941 - 2,932 people"
Further:
"Nevertheless, the question arises: why, despite the assertions of Merkulov and Kruglov, are these ON camps not mentioned in any discovered NKVD document? Unfortunately, for now we have to answer this question with a question: why, after more than 60 years, is all information about the camps, encrypted under the names of Kuprinsky, Smolensky and Krasninsky ABR Vyazemsky camp of the NKVD of the USSR, contained in the archives of the Russian Federation, strictly classified?"
Not much else needs to be said.
THE STALIN MANCHURIA STORY
In June 1941, the USSR and the Polish government in exile signed an agreement (Sikorski-Mayski Pact), and a Polish army under Wladyslaw Anders began forming on Soviet soil. But the problem of where exactly these tens of thousands of officers from those three camps (Kozelsk, Ostashkov, and Starobelsk), were nowhere to be found. On December 3rd, 1941, the Polish PM Sikorski, Anders, and Ambassador Kot met Stalin in the Kremlin. It is from this meeting that the infamous 'Manchuria story' originates.
In his memoirs, Anders describes the scene dramatically. The Polish side presents Stalin with a list of 4,000 officers and asks where they are, but Stalin replied that they had 'escaped to Manchuria' and 'laughed like a demon'. Then it was presented to the U.S. Madden Commission in 1952.
However, the actual Soviet transcript says something entirely different. And we then discover that in this conversation, the Polish reps dont actually mention any officers. They ask about the Polish POW's in general, and do not mention' thousands of officers'. On the contrary, they say that they dont know the exact number, nor do they mention any specific camps.
Stalin says that *perhaps* SOME fled 'somewhere' before liberation, for example, to Manchuria - in other words, Stalin is only talking about a few Poles and not thousands.
The transcript can be found here: docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/20376…
Before meeting with Sikorski, Lavrentiy Beria prepared a report for Stalin, dated November 30 1941, No. 2939/b, 'О настроениях в польской армии на территории СССР' (On the mood within the Polish Army on Soviet territory), stating:
"Андерс также проявляет недовольство тем, что, по сведениям поляков, большое количество польских офицеров, среди которых есть лично известные Андерсу, не освобождены из мест заключения. Поляки провели списочный учет офицеров, которые содержались в лагерях и тюрьмах, и Андерс представил нам список на 239 человек."
Translation:
"Anders also expresses dissatisfaction with the fact that, according to Polish sources, a large number of Polish officers - some of whom Anders knows personally - have not been released from detention. The Poles compiled a list of officers held in camps and prisons, and Anders provided us with a list of 239 people."
Thousands?
Source: docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/20376…
Anders could not have physically recorded this meeting anyway. The transcript of the conversation reads:
The conversation was conducted in Polish, General Anders translated, and Podtserob wrote it down.
(docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/20376…)
Podtserob was a Soviet diplomat at the time. He was also Molotov's assistant, and it is his name that appears at the bottom of the transcript. The Polish version of the conversation appears from Anders's memoirs. Here is what he wrote:
"The conversation with Stalin took place on December 3, 1941. Present were General Sikorski, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Stalin, Polish Ambassador Kot, Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces in the USSR General Anders, and Molotov's secretary, who acted as translator. In reality, I acted as translator, taking down the minutes of the conversation along with Ambassador Kot. I am presenting the content of the conversation according to the minutes we compiled and reviewed by General Sikorski, as, despite our efforts, we did not receive the minutes compiled by the Soviet side."
Of course, this statement doesnt stand up to scrutiny. Acting as a simultaneous interpreter, translating a conversation involving several people, and at the same time taking a transcript is literally impossible. And if you compare the transcript of the conversation with what Anders wrote in his memoirs, you'll discover that his transcript is ridden with details simply not found in the transcript.
He was simultaneously interpreting the conversation of several people, and also recording it, and in greater detail than Podtserob, who transcribed it but didn't participate in the conversation and didn't translate anything. His job was simply to record, but Anders did a better job. Wow. A true hero.
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS CONFIRM POLES ALIVE IN 1941
Sergey Strygin, author of the site Правда о Катыни, found a translation of a statement by Polish citizen Waclaw Pych (Pykh), dated 1953, in the Russian foreign policy archives, and was addressed to the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party. This person is a soldier who crossed into Soviet territory after the German attack and defeat of the Polish army. In a labor camp, he was promoted for his good work, and then the NKVD officers recruited him for propaganda work among the Poles.
It is located here: web.archive.org/web/2014080208…
Quote:
"Я организовывал лагеря на основе самоуправления, полностью обеспечивая их необходимыми пунктами обслуживания такими как магазины, мастерские, госпитали, читальни и т.д. Я организовывал концерты, самодеятельность, спортивные игры и т.д. Серьезная работа проводилась в лагере в Скнилове, строившим военный аэродром, где моя административная и политическая работа требовала большой бдительности и выдержки для того, чтобы из потока взаимных обвинений и доносов выявить действительных врагов коммунизма и вовремя их устранить с важных работ."
Translation:
"I organized self-governing camps, fully equipping them with essential facilities such as stores, workshops, infirmaries, reading rooms, and so on. I organized concerts, amateur performances, sports games, and so on. Serious work was carried out at the camp in Sknilov, which was a military airfield construction site, where my administrative and political duties required great vigilance and composure in order to identify the true enemies of communism from the flood of mutual accusations and denunciations and remove them from important tasks in a timely manner."
Then, as we all know, Germany attacked the USSR, and it was time to evacuate the camp. Pykh writes,
"23/VI-1941 г. наши лагери в составе 4.000 человек направились в глубь СССP. Я был назначен начальником по хозяйству по поручению НКВД. Требовалось сверхчеловеческое усилие и железная воля, чтобы обеспечить продовольствием 4 тысячи людей, не имея ни собственных магазинов, ни транспорта."
Translation:
"On June 23, 1941, our camps, comprising 4,000 people, set out for the interior of the USSR. I was appointed supply officer by order of the NKVD. It took superhuman effort and iron will to provide food for 4,000 people without access to our own stores or transportation."
And so he arrives at one of these camps, where preparations for evacuation are in full swing. However, not everyone plans to participate. Pykh writes:
"Until late at night, arguments, discord and swearing continued among the prisoners, especially among the senior officers. In the morning, I was awakened by the excited shouts of officers, and I saw people pushing their way to the exit. Following them out, I saw that the camp was surrounded by German guards."
Here is concrete evidence, one of many, that the Poles were alive at the time of the German invasion.
He goes on to describe how they were checked against name lists, how they were offered work building bomb shelters and that the best workers were sent home, etc. He also names various Polish surnames, recounts the content of conversations, and reports that they were allowed to write letters and were told to indicate "Headquarters of Labor Battalion No. 537" as the return address. This name was given by the new commandant during the reading of the camp regulations.
Then, he writes, they began to be taken away in groups toward Smolensk, and upon arriving in the Katyn forest, near the "villa," as he called the NKVD dacha, he saw an officer he called Arnes or Arne (in reference to Friedrich Ahrens, who we will get to later.)
He describes being interrogated in a room, and remembers seeing a sofa and a cabinet with bottles of liquor. Writing:
"Нас провели от виллы каких-нибудь 600-800 метров по направлению к вновь выкопанным убежищам, которые находились на расстоянии около 200-220 метров от шоссе. Подойдя к яме, я почувствовал сильный удар в затылок и потерял сознание."
Translation:
"They led us about 600 to 800 meters from the villa toward the newly dug shelters, which were located about 200 to 220 meters from the highway. As I approached the pit, I felt a sharp blow to the back of my head and lost consciousness."
At night, he was wounded, but not fatally. He came to his senses, climbed out of the still unfilled pit with corpses, and then left.
Of course, many Nazi denialists have problems with Pykh and believe his statements lend no merit. Let us examine them:
1) Pych, while in the camp, was an NKVD agent, which he stated directly.
This is particularly strange. First, if Pykh had written this statement at the request or under duress of the authorities, and the fact of his collaboration was somehow criminal, discrediting the statement, then this fact simply wouldn't have appeared in it. If we consider the fact of collaboration with the NKVD to be something incriminating, then this only adds weight to Pykh's statement.
Also, if we cast doubt on any information related to Soviet authorities in this way, then by this logic, Beria's note from Closed packet no. 1 proposing to shoot the Poles is simply a dud, since it was written by the head of that very NKVD.
The fact that Pykh openly writes about his work for the NKVD says absolutely nothing about the authenticity. There's no point in discussing further
2) Pych messed up the dating
Another argument is that Pych's testimony implies that at the end of July, at the latest, all of the prisoners of war in the camp had been executed, and therefore contradicts his testimony given before the Burdenko Commission report, saying the executions happened in September.
But this, too, is strange. Who is saying that all the Poles had already been shot? What? There's no way that this can be inferred from Pych's testimony. He writes there that he was the LAST one taken from the barracks, and he was the last one taken because he simply wasnt on the lists mentioned. He had literally just arrived.
So one can conclude that his barracks neighbors were shot before him, and not necessarily all of them. But there's no evidence to say that all of the Poles were shot. And he was in ONE of the three camps mentioned in the BU report. Surely, not all three at once.
Also, Pych mentions an agreement signed on July 30th between the USSR and the Polish government in exile regarding the invalidation of the Soviet-German treaties signed in 1939 and on the restoration of diplomatic relations (this one: docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/27005…)
July is already over, and all the Poles were still alive. Let us extrapolate further, that they learned about the agreement a day later in August, after which Pych tells how, for some time, they still worked on building bomb shelters, and then were evacuated from camp.
Pych does not mention HOW long they worked on the construction site, or HOW long it took them to be transported, neither does he mention how many executed Poles were in that pit, or whether he understood how many there were, the beginnings of a mass execution, Pych doesnt mention it at all.
So where are these 'July shootings' in Pych's account?
3) The pronunciation error of Friedrich Ahren's surname made it into Pych's statement, proving it was from the BU.
This is just straight tweaker activity. For those that do not know, Nazi denialists are trying to convince me and you that the USSR prosecution suffered some crushing defeat at Nuremberg and that the judges found zero guilt in part of the Germans for Katyn (a lie, btw). The Soviet prosecution alleged that Friedrich Ahrens was the commander of the unit responsible for the killings at Katyn. The Soviet prosecution also messed up his name at Nuremberg. Because they both messed up the names, it is a fabrication. Lol
And all of this is notwithstanding the multitude of testimonies given to the Burdenko Commission, which is freely available. Some of them can be found at these links:
web.archive.org/web/2023062312…
istmat.org/files/uploads/…
istmat.org/files/uploads/…
istmat.org/files/uploads/…
istmat.org/files/uploads/…
istmat.org/files/uploads/…
This is important, because, according to the 'NKVD-did-it' theory, the Poles are presumed to be shot in spring 1940. Meanwhile, the Soviets allege that the Nazis committed these massacres in autumn 1941. Therefore, any documents found on the bodies after April-May 1940 would mean that the Soviets are innocent, and the Germans did it.
For many years, Nazi denialists - the proponents of the 'blameless' Nazi theory - have been whining, that we cannot produce a single document that would prove that the Polish officers were alive after this point. Here, we will show two. These documents are being published for the first time.
But on Katyn: Katyn was the site of the only mass grave of Polish prisoners of war ever discovered. These people are capriciously demanding to see documents form those camps the Soviets say they were in after 1940 (Camps 1-ON, 2-ON, and 3-ON). The Soviets say that the Poles were not evacuated in time and were captured by the Germans, and then executed.
Each camp MUST have left behind a huge number of documents, they say! This is the 'expert' assertion of anyone whos arguing with you on Katyn. But the answer is: no, not necessarily.
Not everything is kept in archives forever, as documents undergo an assessment of their value. Some will be permanently stored, and some temporarily and destroyed after expiration. The camp documentation itself, is divided into accounting and economic.
Economic documentation - invoices, acceptance certificates and write-offs of property and materials, warehouse documents, applications, orders, correspondence on logistics, repair documents, product distribution records, etc. - even if preserved, they could have a temporary storage period and be destroyed.
As for the accounting documentation, demanding to see it for camps located in an area that was swept by war TWICE is absurd. Specifically, the Smolensk archive was captured by the Germans in 1941 and then taken to Vilnius in 1943 (part of the archive somehow ended up in the US).
The volume of documentation taken out of Smolensk by the Nazis was even measured in train cars (archives.gov/publications/p…).
Attached above also shows that, in the context of the emerging Cold War, the US had no desire to return these documents to the USSR.
Part of this collection was returned to the Russian Federation in 2002.(2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/20…)
Thus, any surviving material is fragmentary and incomplete. These documents are currently stored in ГАНИСО. The website states that the archive was created on the basis of the former party archive of the Smolensk Regional Committee of the CPSU.
And, again, the demand to present documents of either types of these camps, located on the territory where war operations took place twice, is frankly just a weak method.
However, I was able to obtain some first-time scans of documents from the RGVA. I have attached them here.
DOCUMENT #1 (attached as image #1), OPERATIONAL REPORT No. 12 for June 1941 (Dated July 5, 1941):
2. До начала военных действий на Маткожненское строительство (район 4-й роты) продолжали прибывать партии заключенных, среди которых имелись бывшие польские офицеры.
3. Сейчас со всех лагерных пунктов окружающих канал собираются к/р элементы из з/к и партиями конвоируются на Пудож и далее на северо-восток по направлению на Архангельск.
Translation:
2. Before the outbreak of hostilities, groups of prisoners- including former Polish officers - continued to arrive at the Matkozhnensk construction site (the 4th Company’s sector).
3. Currently, prisoners are being gathered from all camp sites surrounding the canal and escorted in groups to Pudozh and then northeast toward Arkhangelsk.
This file is located at РГВА, ф. 38291, оп. 1, д. 8, л. 94
DOCUMENT #2 (image 2), REPORT on the performance of the 155th regiment of the NKVD troops for the protection of the White Sea-Baltic Canal named after Comrade Stalin for the first half of 1941, dated July 9th, 1941, No. 00484:
1. На участке 1 и 2 роты в январе месяце с/г. прибыло несколько этапов з/к в лагерь около 2-го шлюза, один из этапов был с з/к западных областей Белорусской и Украинской ССР исключительно бывшие полицейские (…)
Translation:
1. In January of this year, several convoys of prisoners arrived at the camp near the 2nd lock in the area of the 1st and 2nd Companies; one of the convoys consisted of prisoners from the western regions of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian SSRs, all of whom were former police officers (…)
These 'former police officers' from the western regions of the Belorussian and Ukrainian SSRS are the same officers and gendarmes from the Ostashkov camp who were allegedly shot in a small room of the Kalinin NKVD and then buried near the village of Yamok (near Mednoye)
Found in РГВА, ф.38291, оп.1, д.8, л.99.
And when other people start arguing with you that these were somehow the 'wrong Poles', ask them to show you a document that 100% proves that these were the wrong Poles who were sent to the Matkozhenskoye construction site near the White Sea Canal in 1941 (NOT to Sevzheldorlag or Ponoy, as they are different construction sites). Specifically to the Matkozhenskoye site.
These documents were never published along with the Burdenko Commission. This is great evidence that the Poles in question were exactly where the Soviets said they were at, and that the supposed 'mythical' camps: 1-ON, 2-ON, and 3-ON did exist. Meaning, those documents found from the Burdenko commission (attached below) showing that there were documents on the Poles dated 1941, cannot be credibly attacked on the basis of "well, the supposed camps didnt exist, therefore making the document a fake"
So where were these camps? To quote Shved in Тайна катыни:
"Polish officer prisoners of war, who were sentenced in the spring of 1940 by the decisions of the Special Conference under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR to terms of 3 to 8 years in correctional labor camps under a simplified legal procedure provided for by the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) No. P13/144-OP of March 5, 1940, were held in the following three camp divisions of Vyazemlag from the beginning of April 1940:
Kuprin ABR No. 10 (in 1940 - Kuprin ABR No. 9), also known as "Special Purpose Camp No. 1-ON" or "Tishinsky Camp");
Smolensk Special Purpose Camp No. 9 (in 1940, Smolensk Special Purpose Camp No. 10), also known as "Special Purpose Camp No. 2-ON" or "Katyn Camp";
Krasninsky Special Purpose Camp No. 11 (in 1940, Krasninsky Special Purpose Camp No. 8), also known as "Special Purpose Camp No. 3" or "Krasninsky Camp".
Documented data on the location of these three camp divisions of Vyazemlag are as follows [dates from declassified documents discovered to date that mention the names of the heads of these three Special Purpose Camps are in square brackets]: Kuprinsky Special Purpose Camp (Camp No. 1-ON) Location of the Special Purpose Camp headquarters: Tishino village, Smolensk district, Smolensk region. Name of the construction materials supply station: Kuprino station, Gnezdovo station Section of the Moscow-Minsk highway under construction, assigned to the ABR - 392-434 km Location of the residential area of the prisoner camp - Tishino village
Number of Polish prisoners as of June 26, 1941 - 2,932 people"
Further:
"Nevertheless, the question arises: why, despite the assertions of Merkulov and Kruglov, are these ON camps not mentioned in any discovered NKVD document? Unfortunately, for now we have to answer this question with a question: why, after more than 60 years, is all information about the camps, encrypted under the names of Kuprinsky, Smolensky and Krasninsky ABR Vyazemsky camp of the NKVD of the USSR, contained in the archives of the Russian Federation, strictly classified?"
Not much else needs to be said.
THE STALIN MANCHURIA STORY
In June 1941, the USSR and the Polish government in exile signed an agreement (Sikorski-Mayski Pact), and a Polish army under Wladyslaw Anders began forming on Soviet soil. But the problem of where exactly these tens of thousands of officers from those three camps (Kozelsk, Ostashkov, and Starobelsk), were nowhere to be found. On December 3rd, 1941, the Polish PM Sikorski, Anders, and Ambassador Kot met Stalin in the Kremlin. It is from this meeting that the infamous 'Manchuria story' originates.
In his memoirs, Anders describes the scene dramatically. The Polish side presents Stalin with a list of 4,000 officers and asks where they are, but Stalin replied that they had 'escaped to Manchuria' and 'laughed like a demon'. Then it was presented to the U.S. Madden Commission in 1952.
However, the actual Soviet transcript says something entirely different. And we then discover that in this conversation, the Polish reps dont actually mention any officers. They ask about the Polish POW's in general, and do not mention' thousands of officers'. On the contrary, they say that they dont know the exact number, nor do they mention any specific camps.
Stalin says that *perhaps* SOME fled 'somewhere' before liberation, for example, to Manchuria - in other words, Stalin is only talking about a few Poles and not thousands.
The transcript can be found here: docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/20376…
Before meeting with Sikorski, Lavrentiy Beria prepared a report for Stalin, dated November 30 1941, No. 2939/b, 'О настроениях в польской армии на территории СССР' (On the mood within the Polish Army on Soviet territory), stating:
"Андерс также проявляет недовольство тем, что, по сведениям поляков, большое количество польских офицеров, среди которых есть лично известные Андерсу, не освобождены из мест заключения. Поляки провели списочный учет офицеров, которые содержались в лагерях и тюрьмах, и Андерс представил нам список на 239 человек."
Translation:
"Anders also expresses dissatisfaction with the fact that, according to Polish sources, a large number of Polish officers - some of whom Anders knows personally - have not been released from detention. The Poles compiled a list of officers held in camps and prisons, and Anders provided us with a list of 239 people."
Thousands?
Source: docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/20376…
Anders could not have physically recorded this meeting anyway. The transcript of the conversation reads:
The conversation was conducted in Polish, General Anders translated, and Podtserob wrote it down.
(docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/20376…)
Podtserob was a Soviet diplomat at the time. He was also Molotov's assistant, and it is his name that appears at the bottom of the transcript. The Polish version of the conversation appears from Anders's memoirs. Here is what he wrote:
"The conversation with Stalin took place on December 3, 1941. Present were General Sikorski, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Stalin, Polish Ambassador Kot, Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces in the USSR General Anders, and Molotov's secretary, who acted as translator. In reality, I acted as translator, taking down the minutes of the conversation along with Ambassador Kot. I am presenting the content of the conversation according to the minutes we compiled and reviewed by General Sikorski, as, despite our efforts, we did not receive the minutes compiled by the Soviet side."
Of course, this statement doesnt stand up to scrutiny. Acting as a simultaneous interpreter, translating a conversation involving several people, and at the same time taking a transcript is literally impossible. And if you compare the transcript of the conversation with what Anders wrote in his memoirs, you'll discover that his transcript is ridden with details simply not found in the transcript.
He was simultaneously interpreting the conversation of several people, and also recording it, and in greater detail than Podtserob, who transcribed it but didn't participate in the conversation and didn't translate anything. His job was simply to record, but Anders did a better job. Wow. A true hero.
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS CONFIRM POLES ALIVE IN 1941
Sergey Strygin, author of the site Правда о Катыни, found a translation of a statement by Polish citizen Waclaw Pych (Pykh), dated 1953, in the Russian foreign policy archives, and was addressed to the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party. This person is a soldier who crossed into Soviet territory after the German attack and defeat of the Polish army. In a labor camp, he was promoted for his good work, and then the NKVD officers recruited him for propaganda work among the Poles.
It is located here: web.archive.org/web/2014080208…
Quote:
"Я организовывал лагеря на основе самоуправления, полностью обеспечивая их необходимыми пунктами обслуживания такими как магазины, мастерские, госпитали, читальни и т.д. Я организовывал концерты, самодеятельность, спортивные игры и т.д. Серьезная работа проводилась в лагере в Скнилове, строившим военный аэродром, где моя административная и политическая работа требовала большой бдительности и выдержки для того, чтобы из потока взаимных обвинений и доносов выявить действительных врагов коммунизма и вовремя их устранить с важных работ."
Translation:
"I organized self-governing camps, fully equipping them with essential facilities such as stores, workshops, infirmaries, reading rooms, and so on. I organized concerts, amateur performances, sports games, and so on. Serious work was carried out at the camp in Sknilov, which was a military airfield construction site, where my administrative and political duties required great vigilance and composure in order to identify the true enemies of communism from the flood of mutual accusations and denunciations and remove them from important tasks in a timely manner."
Then, as we all know, Germany attacked the USSR, and it was time to evacuate the camp. Pykh writes,
"23/VI-1941 г. наши лагери в составе 4.000 человек направились в глубь СССP. Я был назначен начальником по хозяйству по поручению НКВД. Требовалось сверхчеловеческое усилие и железная воля, чтобы обеспечить продовольствием 4 тысячи людей, не имея ни собственных магазинов, ни транспорта."
Translation:
"On June 23, 1941, our camps, comprising 4,000 people, set out for the interior of the USSR. I was appointed supply officer by order of the NKVD. It took superhuman effort and iron will to provide food for 4,000 people without access to our own stores or transportation."
And so he arrives at one of these camps, where preparations for evacuation are in full swing. However, not everyone plans to participate. Pykh writes:
"Until late at night, arguments, discord and swearing continued among the prisoners, especially among the senior officers. In the morning, I was awakened by the excited shouts of officers, and I saw people pushing their way to the exit. Following them out, I saw that the camp was surrounded by German guards."
Here is concrete evidence, one of many, that the Poles were alive at the time of the German invasion.
He goes on to describe how they were checked against name lists, how they were offered work building bomb shelters and that the best workers were sent home, etc. He also names various Polish surnames, recounts the content of conversations, and reports that they were allowed to write letters and were told to indicate "Headquarters of Labor Battalion No. 537" as the return address. This name was given by the new commandant during the reading of the camp regulations.
Then, he writes, they began to be taken away in groups toward Smolensk, and upon arriving in the Katyn forest, near the "villa," as he called the NKVD dacha, he saw an officer he called Arnes or Arne (in reference to Friedrich Ahrens, who we will get to later.)
He describes being interrogated in a room, and remembers seeing a sofa and a cabinet with bottles of liquor. Writing:
"Нас провели от виллы каких-нибудь 600-800 метров по направлению к вновь выкопанным убежищам, которые находились на расстоянии около 200-220 метров от шоссе. Подойдя к яме, я почувствовал сильный удар в затылок и потерял сознание."
Translation:
"They led us about 600 to 800 meters from the villa toward the newly dug shelters, which were located about 200 to 220 meters from the highway. As I approached the pit, I felt a sharp blow to the back of my head and lost consciousness."
At night, he was wounded, but not fatally. He came to his senses, climbed out of the still unfilled pit with corpses, and then left.
Of course, many Nazi denialists have problems with Pykh and believe his statements lend no merit. Let us examine them:
1) Pych, while in the camp, was an NKVD agent, which he stated directly.
This is particularly strange. First, if Pykh had written this statement at the request or under duress of the authorities, and the fact of his collaboration was somehow criminal, discrediting the statement, then this fact simply wouldn't have appeared in it. If we consider the fact of collaboration with the NKVD to be something incriminating, then this only adds weight to Pykh's statement.
Also, if we cast doubt on any information related to Soviet authorities in this way, then by this logic, Beria's note from Closed packet no. 1 proposing to shoot the Poles is simply a dud, since it was written by the head of that very NKVD.
The fact that Pykh openly writes about his work for the NKVD says absolutely nothing about the authenticity. There's no point in discussing further
2) Pych messed up the dating
Another argument is that Pych's testimony implies that at the end of July, at the latest, all of the prisoners of war in the camp had been executed, and therefore contradicts his testimony given before the Burdenko Commission report, saying the executions happened in September.
But this, too, is strange. Who is saying that all the Poles had already been shot? What? There's no way that this can be inferred from Pych's testimony. He writes there that he was the LAST one taken from the barracks, and he was the last one taken because he simply wasnt on the lists mentioned. He had literally just arrived.
So one can conclude that his barracks neighbors were shot before him, and not necessarily all of them. But there's no evidence to say that all of the Poles were shot. And he was in ONE of the three camps mentioned in the BU report. Surely, not all three at once.
Also, Pych mentions an agreement signed on July 30th between the USSR and the Polish government in exile regarding the invalidation of the Soviet-German treaties signed in 1939 and on the restoration of diplomatic relations (this one: docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/27005…)
July is already over, and all the Poles were still alive. Let us extrapolate further, that they learned about the agreement a day later in August, after which Pych tells how, for some time, they still worked on building bomb shelters, and then were evacuated from camp.
Pych does not mention HOW long they worked on the construction site, or HOW long it took them to be transported, neither does he mention how many executed Poles were in that pit, or whether he understood how many there were, the beginnings of a mass execution, Pych doesnt mention it at all.
So where are these 'July shootings' in Pych's account?
3) The pronunciation error of Friedrich Ahren's surname made it into Pych's statement, proving it was from the BU.
This is just straight tweaker activity. For those that do not know, Nazi denialists are trying to convince me and you that the USSR prosecution suffered some crushing defeat at Nuremberg and that the judges found zero guilt in part of the Germans for Katyn (a lie, btw). The Soviet prosecution alleged that Friedrich Ahrens was the commander of the unit responsible for the killings at Katyn. The Soviet prosecution also messed up his name at Nuremberg. Because they both messed up the names, it is a fabrication. Lol
And all of this is notwithstanding the multitude of testimonies given to the Burdenko Commission, which is freely available. Some of them can be found at these links:
web.archive.org/web/2023062312…
istmat.org/files/uploads/…
istmat.org/files/uploads/…
istmat.org/files/uploads/…
istmat.org/files/uploads/…
istmat.org/files/uploads/…
@OttokarHochman @KeyTryer The thing is that people who are most consistently pro-AI art are not so for based iconoclastic reasons but because, they, like legitimately enjoy it aesthetically (think Facebook boomers)
@OttokarHochman @KeyTryer Though this itself produces cool second order iconoclastic effect where various artists are forced to squeal and cringe and suffer as their pretences to some high transcendental artistic vision is debased and exposed as mere mechanical product without higher value
@OttokarHochman @KeyTryer Like literally the reason AI art is so widespread is because certain types of people actually appreciate it for its aesthetic quality completely unironically. What it does is just exposes the actual aesthetic preferences of the masses
Percebi um pouco disso na minha ultima sessão, to mastigando culpa desde então mas consciente que sempre estive aberto pra tentar mudar padrões e já tentava fazer isso antes, as vezes infelizmente precisava que fossem esfregados na minha cara, levo isso de lição pra um novo ciclo
Aprendi que meu incômodo é sempre verdadeiro mas não necessariamente vai ser verdade, por isso eu não deveria criar discussões sobre todos os incomodos que sentia mesmo que elas fossem saudáveis
O meu incomodo poderia ser verdadeiro porque era a forma como eu me sentia, a realidade que estava na minha cabeça mas ele não é necessariamente VERDADE, pq tipo dentro de uma relação pode ser só um gatilho interno ativado pelo incomodo e as vezes isso não tem nada a ver com...
Here are some projects US is pushing, working on, or already locked in to counter China.
Idea that this administration is "soft on Xi Jinping" or that "US is in decline" is incredibly misleading
🧵
Idea that this administration is "soft on Xi Jinping" or that "US is in decline" is incredibly misleading
🧵
Middle East / Gulf
1- Stargate UAE (OpenAI, G42, Oracle, Nvidia, SoftBank, Cisco): 1GW Abu Dhabi AI cluster, first 200MW live 2026
Locks G42 into the US AI stack and forecloses Huawei and Alibaba cloud penetration of the Gulf
2- Project Vault (Feb 2): $10B EXIM critical minerals reserve plus 11 bilateral mineral MOUs (Argentina, Cook Islands, Ecuador, Guinea, Morocco, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, UAE, UK, Uzbekistan)
Breaks Beijing’s monopsony on processed rare earths and builds non-Chinese refining capacity
3- Amazon $5B Saudi HUMAIN AI hub; Google Cloud-HUMAIN $10B; Microsoft-G42 $1.5B equity stake
Embeds US hyperscalers as the default compute layer for Saudi industrial policy, displacing Chinese vendors
4- Qatar QIA $500B committed to US data centers, AI, and healthcare; Gulf total $2.5T pledged to US tech
Redirects sovereign wealth flows from Belt and Road and Chinese AI firms into the US
1- Stargate UAE (OpenAI, G42, Oracle, Nvidia, SoftBank, Cisco): 1GW Abu Dhabi AI cluster, first 200MW live 2026
Locks G42 into the US AI stack and forecloses Huawei and Alibaba cloud penetration of the Gulf
2- Project Vault (Feb 2): $10B EXIM critical minerals reserve plus 11 bilateral mineral MOUs (Argentina, Cook Islands, Ecuador, Guinea, Morocco, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, UAE, UK, Uzbekistan)
Breaks Beijing’s monopsony on processed rare earths and builds non-Chinese refining capacity
3- Amazon $5B Saudi HUMAIN AI hub; Google Cloud-HUMAIN $10B; Microsoft-G42 $1.5B equity stake
Embeds US hyperscalers as the default compute layer for Saudi industrial policy, displacing Chinese vendors
4- Qatar QIA $500B committed to US data centers, AI, and healthcare; Gulf total $2.5T pledged to US tech
Redirects sovereign wealth flows from Belt and Road and Chinese AI firms into the US
Central Asia / South Caucasus / India
1- TRIPP Implementation Framework (Jan 13): US holds 74% of TRIPP Development Company for 49 years, corridor through Armenia cuts Iran out of Caucasus transit
Gives the US structural control of a Middle Corridor link that BRI needs to reach Europe overland
2- US-Azerbaijan Charter on Strategic Partnership (Vance Baku visit, first since Cheney 2008)
Anchors Baku as a Trans-Caspian hub for non-Chinese energy and logistics flows
3- US-India trade deal (Feb 6): India eliminates tariffs on US industrial goods, retains ag protections; 2.2M tons LPG long-term LNG deal
Pulls India deeper into US supply chains and replaces Russian and Iranian energy with US LNG
4- FORGE launched (Feb 4): 54-nation critical minerals platform, chaired by South Korea, coordinates pricing floors and supply chain investment
Creates a buyers’ cartel against Chinese price manipulation in lithium, cobalt, and rare earths
1- TRIPP Implementation Framework (Jan 13): US holds 74% of TRIPP Development Company for 49 years, corridor through Armenia cuts Iran out of Caucasus transit
Gives the US structural control of a Middle Corridor link that BRI needs to reach Europe overland
2- US-Azerbaijan Charter on Strategic Partnership (Vance Baku visit, first since Cheney 2008)
Anchors Baku as a Trans-Caspian hub for non-Chinese energy and logistics flows
3- US-India trade deal (Feb 6): India eliminates tariffs on US industrial goods, retains ag protections; 2.2M tons LPG long-term LNG deal
Pulls India deeper into US supply chains and replaces Russian and Iranian energy with US LNG
4- FORGE launched (Feb 4): 54-nation critical minerals platform, chaired by South Korea, coordinates pricing floors and supply chain investment
Creates a buyers’ cartel against Chinese price manipulation in lithium, cobalt, and rare earths
America cannot lead the AI race without building the power and computing infrastructure AI requires. On that I agree completely. But the piece gets the diagnosis wrong — and a wrong diagnosis produces the wrong cure. 🧵
The Gallup poll it cites shows a majority of Americans oppose data centers near their home, including 63% of Republicans. The real enemies of AI are electric utilities that use data centers to jack up rates and GW+ developers that fail to engage communities.
The electricity price comparison also misses the structural problem. Investor owned utilities don’t make money when you use what we have already paid for more efficiently. They only make money when they invest new money even if they don’t need to.
🚨 We recently discovered that an unauthorized party obtained a token with access to the Grafana Labs GitHub environment, enabling the threat actor to download our codebase. (1/6)
Our investigation has determined that no customer data or personal information was accessed during this incident, and we have found no evidence of impact to customer systems or operations. (2/6)
We immediately initiated forensic analysis and we believe we’ve identified the source of the credential leak.
We have since invalidated the compromised credentials and implemented additional security measures to further secure our environment against unauthorized access. (3/6)
We have since invalidated the compromised credentials and implemented additional security measures to further secure our environment against unauthorized access. (3/6)
残念ながら雑誌収益という無尽蔵に近い収入手段が消滅した現在、「小説が売れなくても漫画が売れてくれるからOK」すら成り立たなくなってきて、「どれもこれも売れているものだけが欲しい」にシフトが始まり「商業出版が作家を育てない」方向になっているので、色々大変なのよ #なんか見た
どういうことかというと「そこそこ売れている作家・漫画家」はまとめて「いま大ヒットしてない作家・漫画家＝損益作家」の箱に放り込まれ、斬り捨てる業界になっていくということ。 それでも続けたければ兼業になるか、貯金を切り崩したりしつつ、KDP等でひとり出版社で書き続けるしかなくなるわけで
だって商業で今「電書でしか出しません」といわれた瞬間、印税じゃなくて売上高からの10％~25％になるわけでな。それなら自分で直接KDPなどにオンリー販売したほうが取り分は高くなる。表紙の作成発注・デザイン、宣伝や校閲校正も自分でしなくちゃいけないけど、自分でやるなら無料、と思えるなら。
Everyone is debating whether AI will take jobs.
Wrong question. The right one: where is it showing up first, and how do you tell signal from noise?
Read three pieces this week. The Economist on labour history. Bloomberg on Korea's AI dividend debate. Reuters on India IT.
One signal jumps out.
Wrong question. The right one: where is it showing up first, and how do you tell signal from noise?
Read three pieces this week. The Economist on labour history. Bloomberg on Korea's AI dividend debate. Reuters on India IT.
One signal jumps out.
The Economist's case: no technology in history has produced sustained mass unemployment. Diffusion is slow. Aggregate OECD employment is at record highs. Industrial Revolution wages stagnated because of food prices and the Corn Laws, not because machines stole labour's share.
Solid history. Wrong altitude.
Solid history. Wrong altitude.
OECD aggregate employment is a lagging indicator. By the time that chart breaks, the political response is already drafted.
The action is one layer down. Sector. Firm. Function. That is where the signal lives now.
The action is one layer down. Sector. Firm. Function. That is where the signal lives now.