Discover and read the best of Twitter Threads about #KarenPittel
Most recents (6)
@ben_moll is right to take a little victory lap in a new paper with @MSchularick and @GeorgZachmann. This is based on his his work with @BachmannRudi, @DBaqaee, @christianbaye13, @kuhnmo, @andreasloeschel, @APeichl, #KarenPittel, @MSchularick. Let me explain 1/
This was timely public spirited policy research at its best. It had a big impact. I know, for I follow the polical dynamics in oil and gas well for reasons not relevant for this post. And I don't know how well you recall the environment their paper was written in. 2/
It was written early in the Ukraine-Russia war. The Germans were very reluctant to impose sanctions. The government was being heavily influenced by "research" by lobby groups. The government was dragging its feet in supporting sanctions fearing gigantic economic cost. 3/
Überzeugender Kommentar von Braunberger in der FAZ: Deutschland kann sich ein Energieembargo leisten. Als Bürger erscheint es mir moralisch (angesichts von Mariupol), geostrategisch und auch ökonomisch ein klarer Fall zu sein, dies *jetzt* zu tun. faz.net/aktuell/wirtsc…
Sehr überzeugender Beitrag von @ulrichspeck, der illustriert, wie stark die deutsche Debatte von Partikularinteressen geprägt ist und von einem Missverständnis dessen, was "Wirtschaft" ist.
Persönlich hielte ich ein sofortiges Embargo auch noch bei deutlich höheren gesamtwirtschaftlichen Kosten (als in Studien veranschlagt) für sinnvoll. Als Ökonom interessiert mich dennoch, wie Berechnungen für worst-case-Szenarien aussehen, da ich diese bislang nicht gesehen habe
The What if?… study on the effects of RU energy ban (below) was published on 7 March, 2 weeks after the start of this atrocious war.
A long-ish thread on (a) how incredible that is, and (b) how it’s been under-utilised by the policymakers. 1/20
A long-ish thread on (a) how incredible that is, and (b) how it’s been under-utilised by the policymakers. 1/20
2/20 Just let that sink in: *2 weeks* into this war, German policymakers had on their desks a concise, lucid and detailed study of the economic effects of a policy tool (energy ban) that could actually make a difference in this war.
3/20 A tool that would not only reverse the mistaken policies that brought us to this point but would actually use the leverage we have (yes, EU’s addiction to Russian energy is a double-edged sword – a sword one can use to hit Putin hard).
In our import stop paper we emphasize that it makes a big difference how much people and firms can substitute for Russian energy inputs.
How might such substitution work in concrete terms?
A new supplement to our paper has some more thoughts
benjaminmoll.com/RussianGas_Sub…
Thread:
How might such substitution work in concrete terms?
A new supplement to our paper has some more thoughts
benjaminmoll.com/RussianGas_Sub…
Thread:
First, some real-world examples showing how firms do find ways to substitute & sometimes even to their own surprise.
Particularly relevant: the Chinese embargo of rare earths exports to Japan and how Japanese producers adapted and substituted in response.
1/
Particularly relevant: the Chinese embargo of rare earths exports to Japan and how Japanese producers adapted and substituted in response.
1/
Perhaps even more relevant for the discussion at hand: shutdown of the Druzhba pipeline due to contamination. Response: ship the oil instead.
This is example is borrowed straight from @jakluge's excellent thread
2/
This is example is borrowed straight from @jakluge's excellent thread
2/
We put together a team of macro-, micro- and energy economists to think about the question: what would be the effects on the German economy of a stop of energy imports from Russia?
In short: moderate, especially in combination with the right policy response.
1/
In short: moderate, especially in combination with the right policy response.
1/
Link: econtribute.de/RePEc/ajk/ajkp…
Members of team: @BachmannRudi @DBaqaee @christianbaye13 @kuhnmo @andreasloeschel @APeichl #KarenPittel @MSchularick
See the more @kuhnmo thread for details.
2/
Members of team: @BachmannRudi @DBaqaee @christianbaye13 @kuhnmo @andreasloeschel @APeichl #KarenPittel @MSchularick
See the more @kuhnmo thread for details.
2/
Worth emphasizing: the -3% GNE loss number is an extremely conservative upper bound.
Using the more reasonable @DBaqaee-Farhi model, we obtain numbers that are an order of magnitude lower.
But this is a hard counterfactual to predict so we wanted to be conservative.
3/
Using the more reasonable @DBaqaee-Farhi model, we obtain numbers that are an order of magnitude lower.
But this is a hard counterfactual to predict so we wanted to be conservative.
3/
"What are the macroeconomic & distributional consequences for Germany of a stop of Russian energy imports?" Our @EContribute policy brief provides an answer
@BachmannRudi @DBaqaee @christianbaye13 @kuhnmo @andreasloeschel @ben_moll @APeichl #KarenPittel @MSchularick
@BachmannRudi @DBaqaee @christianbaye13 @kuhnmo @andreasloeschel @ben_moll @APeichl #KarenPittel @MSchularick
Our answer: Consequences are severe but seem manageable. How severe? That depends on how fast and determined policy reacts to reduce and substitute energy. How do we arrive at this conclusion? A short thread 2/n
We combine macro data, household micro data, & state-of-the-art theory to derive at 4 key findings
(1) Stop of Russian energy imports would lead to a GDP decline bw 0.2% and 3%. Range depends on possibilities to adjust gas usage (baseline 0.3%, very conservative estimate 3%) 3/
(1) Stop of Russian energy imports would lead to a GDP decline bw 0.2% and 3%. Range depends on possibilities to adjust gas usage (baseline 0.3%, very conservative estimate 3%) 3/
