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Why has Ukraine been so successful at information warfare/propaganda vs the supposed Russian masters of it?
A thread 🧵 of 10 persuasion messaging themes working for them:
A thread 🧵 of 10 persuasion messaging themes working for them:
1) Pre-Bunking
In the past, Russia was essentially pushing against an open door.
This time, a network style coalition got ahead of it and preempted and pre-bunked the Russian goal of justifying a long planned invasion as an emergency response.
In the past, Russia was essentially pushing against an open door.
This time, a network style coalition got ahead of it and preempted and pre-bunked the Russian goal of justifying a long planned invasion as an emergency response.
Elements ranged from UKR govt to Biden administration and US intelligence agencies to key NATO states (Baltics especially) to online democracy activists to OSINT trackers.
Some thoughts on yet another right wing online/media mob going after military service member:
1) Always important to identify the players and their history. Today's episode is brought Breitbart's Pentagon reporter, elevating the fellow who helped bring you Pizzagate and multiple other conspiracy theories, as well as has repeatedly elevated Russian info ops
2) We covered this sad player and the tactics in #LikeWar book.
Frankly, it is boring to me to see people still playing this game, as if we don't see through it now. What worked in 2016 doesn't now. Sorry.
Frankly, it is boring to me to see people still playing this game, as if we don't see through it now. What worked in 2016 doesn't now. Sorry.
"Three Ways to Clean Up the Toxic Minefields of Social Media"
I teamed up with a Human Rights leader and a Silicon Valley executive on 3 approaches, each doable, to make the battle harder for those who push disinfo+hate speech+engineered trends
defenseone.com/ideas/2020/09/…
#likewar
I teamed up with a Human Rights leader and a Silicon Valley executive on 3 approaches, each doable, to make the battle harder for those who push disinfo+hate speech+engineered trends
defenseone.com/ideas/2020/09/…
#likewar
The 3 principles to guide:
1) “If you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it.”
--need for tracking and reporting
2) Informed customers are protected customers.
--flagging automated and other inauthentic info
3) Empowered customers are protected customers.
--filter options
1) “If you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it.”
--need for tracking and reporting
2) Informed customers are protected customers.
--flagging automated and other inauthentic info
3) Empowered customers are protected customers.
--filter options
Different from a lot out there, we don't claim a false "fix" that would solve everything, but would never be possible to be implemented for legal or political or profit reasons.
Rather, they are doable steps that would throw some Clausewitzian "friction" at the bad guys.
Rather, they are doable steps that would throw some Clausewitzian "friction" at the bad guys.
Deepfakes are coming for American democracy. Here’s how we can prepare. washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/…
"Actors who are both sophisticated and malicious are likely to hold their fire until after the election to begin deploying their most potent tools."
"Actors who are both sophisticated and malicious are likely to hold their fire until after the election to begin deploying their most potent tools."
I would add a 4th and 5th to @selectedwisdom recomendations:
4th: We need actual, and vetted for effectiveness, digital literacy programs in US education system. Actors changing tactic means need focus on agency of targets. Foundations need to steer more towards this gap
4th: We need actual, and vetted for effectiveness, digital literacy programs in US education system. Actors changing tactic means need focus on agency of targets. Foundations need to steer more towards this gap
5th: Firms should implement what I call "the Blade Runner Rule." You can't ban deep fakes for 1st amendment issue. But you can require a watermark, which would allow use in marketing entertainment, but take out their sting in weaponization.
"I just dove to the ground and used my body to shield my daughter who is four."
wsj.com/podcasts/whats…
Just a searing description of Beirut from the incredible (and incredibly brave) @DionNissenbaum
(Imagine doing your job as a journalist after taking your kid to a hospital)
wsj.com/podcasts/whats…
Just a searing description of Beirut from the incredible (and incredibly brave) @DionNissenbaum
(Imagine doing your job as a journalist after taking your kid to a hospital)
The irony: Dion and his family moved to Beirut, in part, because the authoritarian shift in Turkey made it too dangerous for them...
Readers of #LikeWar book will remember Dion from the story of how a single retweet (a retweet!) led him to be jailed.
Readers of #LikeWar book will remember Dion from the story of how a single retweet (a retweet!) led him to be jailed.
So glad to know he and his family made it through it. But also so saddened for those that were lost and angry about the underlying forces of corruption, hate, and exploitation of power, across multiple countries, that set this all in motion.
This tweet illustrates an ongoing problem in how the public finds out (or not) about foreign threats to our election.
A thread:
A thread:
Social media has become not just an essential communication space, but also a new kind of conflict space (eg #likewar). And, despite increased attention, organized disinformation campaigns have proliferated, targeting everything from elections to corporations to public health
Indeed, in the last several months, the combination of the COVID-19 pandemic and civil unrest in America saw a surge in foreign and domestic extremist disinformation campaigns that sought to spread false information, foment distrust, and destabilize the U.S.
