Discover and read the best of Twitter Threads about #SOF
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Today, the #Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs published an evaluation report of its contribution to the Resolute Support mission in #Afghanistan that *pulls no punches.*
I'll string together its primary findings in this THREAD. 1/n
I'll string together its primary findings in this THREAD. 1/n
(You can find the full report and an executive summary here: english.iob-evaluatie.nl/results/public…) 2/N
Before the findings, a quick comment: the Dutch MFA produced this report b/c "Dutch contributions to missions under Article 100 of the Dutch Constitution are subject to an obligation to evaluate the deployment after it's been completed"
Wish the US had a similar requirement. 3/n
Wish the US had a similar requirement. 3/n
Wątek na podstawie wywiadu z operatorem Jednostki Specjalnej OMEGA, wchodzącej w skład 🇺🇦 Gwardii Narodowej.
- CZĘŚĆ 2 -
O Jednostkach Specjalnych; o błędach obu stron; o profesjonalizmie w walce; o sprzęcie i bliskiej walce.
1/n
#Ukraine #Ukraina #OMEGA #UkraineRussiaWar️
- CZĘŚĆ 2 -
O Jednostkach Specjalnych; o błędach obu stron; o profesjonalizmie w walce; o sprzęcie i bliskiej walce.
1/n
#Ukraine #Ukraina #OMEGA #UkraineRussiaWar️
1. Na północ od Kijowa walczyły następujące 🇺🇦 jednostki specjalne:
- SSO (140 Centrum Operacji Specjalnych)
- Alfa SBU
- KORD
- Omega
2/n
#SOF #SSO #SpecialForces
- SSO (140 Centrum Operacji Specjalnych)
- Alfa SBU
- KORD
- Omega
2/n
#SOF #SSO #SpecialForces
2. Ukrainiec potwierdza, że były rosyjskie Grupy Dywersyjne, ale mówi że nie na taką skalę i nie w takich ilościach jak je opisano. Sugeruje, że celowo rozprzestrzeniano takie informacje, żeby narobić paniki.
„Strach rodzi strach”
3/n
„Strach rodzi strach”
3/n
"Charakterystyka wroga na kierunku Izium."
Na podstawie opublikowanego na 🇷🇺 Telegramie wywiadu z żołnierzem jednej z jednostek sił specjalnych, wybraliśmy dla Was co ciekawsze informacje i fragmenty.
Krótki wątek 👇
#Ukraina #Ukraine #Rosja #Russia #SOF #UkraineRussiaWar️
Na podstawie opublikowanego na 🇷🇺 Telegramie wywiadu z żołnierzem jednej z jednostek sił specjalnych, wybraliśmy dla Was co ciekawsze informacje i fragmenty.
Krótki wątek 👇
#Ukraina #Ukraine #Rosja #Russia #SOF #UkraineRussiaWar️
Kto walczył z 🇷🇺 na kierunku Izium:
1. 81 Samodzielna Brygada Aeromobilna
2. 95 Samodzielna Brygada Desantowe-Szturmowa
3. Obrona Terytorialna
4. Siły Operacji Specjalnych
5. Legion
🇷🇺 nie spotkał się osobiście w boju z 🇺🇦 SSO, ale przytacza doświadczenia swoich kolegów.
1. 81 Samodzielna Brygada Aeromobilna
2. 95 Samodzielna Brygada Desantowe-Szturmowa
3. Obrona Terytorialna
4. Siły Operacji Specjalnych
5. Legion
🇷🇺 nie spotkał się osobiście w boju z 🇺🇦 SSO, ale przytacza doświadczenia swoich kolegów.
W maju i czerwcu standardowa grupa 🇺🇦 SSO miała liczyć 12 ludzi, podzielonych na 3 podgrupy, każda po 4 operatorów. Jedna podgrupa złożona była z doświadczonych operatorów, a pozostałe 2 podgrupy z niedoświadczonych.
Allegedly many #UAarmy #SOF crossing the river couple hours ago to go on mission to punish some Ru advance defensive position along the shores...
#Ukraine
#Ukraine
2/ few things does not seems to ads up here, seems more like the sea and sunset is not where we would expect...
if someone has more info. this comes from friend but seems "odd" now
if someone has more info. this comes from friend but seems "odd" now
3/ yep no... that is possible indeed.
thank to Fred and others
this could fit here... indeed
thank to Fred and others
this could fit here... indeed
Hard to describe emotions today.
Too much pain for sure. Joy of liberation and realization of horrors ppl had to endure to reach this moment
#Kherson, early March 2022
Too much pain for sure. Joy of liberation and realization of horrors ppl had to endure to reach this moment
#Kherson, early March 2022
#Kherson late March 2022
#Kherson late March 2022, russians attack Ukrainian rally
Sehr spannendes Video aus der Anfangsphase des #RussianUkrainianWar vom Häuserkampf rund um #Irpin. Da zuletzt ja wieder sehr viel Aufmerksamkeit auf mechanisierte/motorisierte Kriegsführung lag, wieder etwas #Infanterie/#SOF-content:
Wen sehen wir hier: Bravo Team, eine Gruppe internationaler Freiwilliger, viele mit einem Hintergrund aus Spezial- oder spezialisierten Verwendungen. Angeführt von Lt Ken Rhee, einem ROK Seal, der auch von Youtuber und Insta bekannz ist.
Was sehen wir hier: verschiedene Ausschnitte aus den Kämpfen um Irprin - und verschiedene infanteristischer Aufträge in diesem Umfeld: Hunter-Killer-Teams (Form von Jagdkampf) gegen russ. Artilleriebeobachter und Einsatz als Panzervernichtungstrupp (auch abgesetzt als JagdKdo)
On 29 July, the German newspaper #SZ published an interview with LTC “Tobias”, commanding officer of the German #KSK-team that took part in the #Kabul evacuation in Aug 2021. Rare insights, given the notoriously taciturn #KSK press policy: 👉some key takeaways. 1/8 #miltwitter
It needed the fall of Mazār-i-Sharīf (14 Aug), to convince the govt to “flip the switch” and decide to evacuate. Priority was on German citizens. At this point, there was no known scheme for Afghan local staff and families. 2/8
#UkraineRussia
Local media reports that the UAF troops from the territory of Ukraine launched a rocket at #Belgorod, which is a Russian city near the border with Ukr. It was reportedly shot down
Local media reports that the UAF troops from the territory of Ukraine launched a rocket at #Belgorod, which is a Russian city near the border with Ukr. It was reportedly shot down
#UkraineRussia
The Rus Army captured a large UAF field camp in the #Kherson region with large quantities of supplies and equipment
The Rus Army captured a large UAF field camp in the #Kherson region with large quantities of supplies and equipment
JUST OUT! My team @CNA_org just completed a quick-look project – led by Alex Powell – looking at lessons from historical examples of #maritime #sabotage for #StrategicCompetition. I’ll summarize some key findings & implications in this THREAD. 1/n
@CNA_org The impetus for this study was discussions w/various #SOF entities as well as the call for work in this area by the Joint Special Operations University in its 2021 “Special Operations Research Topics” guide: jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content… 3/n
Tonight begins my new course @ElliottSchoolGW: “Understanding U.S. Special Operations”
In it, we’ll learn what special ops/#SOF are & how these differ from conventional ops/forces; how US SOF came to be; how they’ve been used over time; & what major issues they face today. 1/n
In it, we’ll learn what special ops/#SOF are & how these differ from conventional ops/forces; how US SOF came to be; how they’ve been used over time; & what major issues they face today. 1/n
If you want to follow along at home, I’ll be posting key topics & readings in this THREAD.
Week 1 is course overview & class intros, so while you wait for substance, you can buy our main text (Oppose Any Foe by @MarkMoyar) & watch this cool #SOF vid😎 2/n
Week 1 is course overview & class intros, so while you wait for substance, you can buy our main text (Oppose Any Foe by @MarkMoyar) & watch this cool #SOF vid😎 2/n
Given recent events in #Afghanistan & my focus on that country since 2008, I’ve been engaging in a lot of professional reflection of late. I'm going to share some results of that in this (long) THREAD. 1/n
To do this, I went back and re-read everything I’ve written publicly on #Afghanistan over the past two years, as well as a few pertinent older pieces. I’ll post links to these articles as I go. 2/n
I’ll start w/this article I wrote in @WarOnTheRocks in 2016. In it, I described how the #Taliban were steadily encroaching on key rural areas of #Afghanistan & how the #ANDSF were struggling to stop them. 3/n
warontherocks.com/2016/12/afghan…
warontherocks.com/2016/12/afghan…
#Military_Photos
General Mil Photos thread with pics (& some videos) covering recent & historical events.
#A_7E (72nd Sq) Iraq 1991
General Mil Photos thread with pics (& some videos) covering recent & historical events.
#A_7E (72nd Sq) Iraq 1991
I attended #SOFIC today, at which GEN Rich Clarke, the commander of @USSOCOM spoke. My notes from his speech (paraphrases, not quotes unless specified) are in this THREAD. 1/n
- #COVID19 has impacted @USSOCOM's operating culture—caused #SOF to look at where they need to be, how they interact, etc
- The withdrawal from #Afghanistan will bring changes. SOF were first ones in, will be the last ones out. Will spark a new era of opportunity for SOF. 2/n
- The withdrawal from #Afghanistan will bring changes. SOF were first ones in, will be the last ones out. Will spark a new era of opportunity for SOF. 2/n
- #SOF today are almost unrecognizable from SOF that invaded #Afghanistan in 2001. 20 years of the necessity of combat has been the mother of all inventions. SOF have had urgent warfighting needs for 20 years, and will continue to have these going forward. 3/n
Today, the House Armed Services Committee held a full hearing for "An Update on #Afghanistan."
Witnesses were ASD David Helvey (OSD) & BGen Matt Trollinger (Joint Staff). It was a *long* hearing. I'll post a summary in this THREAD. 1/n
Witnesses were ASD David Helvey (OSD) & BGen Matt Trollinger (Joint Staff). It was a *long* hearing. I'll post a summary in this THREAD. 1/n
(If you'd like to watch the whole thing, here's the link: armedservices.house.gov/2021/5/full-co…. Note that what follows aren't quotes, but my paraphrases of their comments). 2/n
Chairman Smith opening remarks: This hearing will focus on key questions, such as: What is the process for US withdrawal from #Afghanistan & what’s our strategy going forward? Also, what our lessons learned from the past 20 years? 3/n
Yesterday, I had the great honor of publishing a net assessment of #Afghanistan's security forces & the #Taliban's fighting forces in @CTCWP's Sentinel. In this THREAD, I'll summarize my analysis. 1/n
ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/upl…
ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/upl…
The article was inspired by this paper by @SethGJones. In it, Jones asserts that "w/o a peace deal, the further withdrawal of US forces…will likely shift the balance of power in favor of the #Taliban...who would eventually overthrow the Afghan gov't" 2/n
ctc.usma.edu/afghanistans-f…
ctc.usma.edu/afghanistans-f…
This is a critically important judgment for the future of US
policy on #Afghanistan, but a formal, public assessment of how AFG's security forces (the #ANDSF) compare to the #Taliban’s fighting forces in the context of US troop withdrawals doesn't exist. 3/n
policy on #Afghanistan, but a formal, public assessment of how AFG's security forces (the #ANDSF) compare to the #Taliban’s fighting forces in the context of US troop withdrawals doesn't exist. 3/n
With the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act having been passed (& now sitting on President Trump's desk for signature or veto), thought I'd put together a THREAD on what it says about #SOF. 1/n
govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BI…
govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BI…
SEC. 163. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR THE ARMED OVERWATCH PROGRAM.
No armed overwatch aircraft for @USSOCOM in FY21 or @usairforce FY21-23. Seriously disappointing for @AFSpecOpsCmd, which has been pushing hard for this. 2/n
No armed overwatch aircraft for @USSOCOM in FY21 or @usairforce FY21-23. Seriously disappointing for @AFSpecOpsCmd, which has been pushing hard for this. 2/n
Was mir beim Lesen aufgefallen ist: Eine toxische #WarriorCulture wird mehrfach erwähnt, als ein treibender Faktor hinter den Kriegsverbrechen gesehen. Allerdings wird weder definiert noch darauf eingegangen, wie diese #Krieger-Kultur im Dienst- oder Einsatzalltag ausgesehen hat.
Der Begriff #Warrior wurde zuletzt - u.a. auch #miltwitter - immer wieder problematisiert und immer wieder mit Artikeln wie diesem⬇️ unterlegt. wavellroom.com/2020/04/28/on-…
"A warrior is a professional fighter trained since childhood whose class or caste holds power. Warriors feel they own the exclusive right to apply violence or bear arms." - Mit dieser Definition hatte der Artikel mich verloren.
I’m seeing lots of stratospheric-level discussion on US drawdown to 2500 troops in #Afghanistan & what it might mean, but let’s get operational for a moment in this THREAD. 1/n
The US is conducting 2 missions in #Afghanistan: counterterrorism (CT) & train/advise/assist (TAA) of the #ANDSF. It does so from a half-dozen major bases around the country. The TAA mission it does w/@NATO ally forces. CT it does unilaterally & partnered w/Afghan #SOF. 2/n
For the past few years, TAA has been at the level of the MOD & MOI (in Kabul) & the Afghan Army Corps HQs & Afghan Air Force at regional bases. That posture—which was sustainable even at 4500 troops—is heavily enabled by contractors. 3/n
Interesting article here by former DASD for security cooperation Tommy Ross, though he whiffs on his analysis of the Senate language pertaining to ASD-SOLIC
justsecurity.org/72098/house-an…
justsecurity.org/72098/house-an…
Specifically, he seems to think the bill "elevates" the ASD somehow, when all it does is clarify aspects of Section 922 from the 2017 NDAA (which put SOLIC in @USSOCOM's admin chain of command). 1/2
Either way, the ASD/Spec Ops Secretariat wouldn't have oversight of 127(e) progs, since they aren't in the Secretariat's portfolio of "spec ops-peculiar admin & support of SOCOM, incl the readiness & org of #SOF, resources & equipment, & civ personnel" as stated in the bill. 2/2
Interesting proposal by @DavidMaxwell161 for a Dept of Special Ops. Though if #SOF were to be their own service, it’d make more sense to consolidate the Service components under the new Dept as well (Dave proposes leaving them as is). 1/n militarytimes.com/opinion/commen…
If the underlying problem to be solved is lack of effective oversight, creation of a whole new Dept/Service for #SOF doesn’t solve that if a bifurcated chain of command remains. 2/n
Plus, if #SOF are to be their own service, they can’t have their cake & eat it too—they’d likely have to forego the vast majority of the “Service common” support they currently get from the Services (MFP-2) & pay for that stuff themselves (MFP-11). 3/n
“To date, DOD has no corroborating evidence to validate the recent allegations found in open-source reports” that #Russia paid bounties to militants in #Afghanistan to kill coalition troops. defense.gov/Newsroom/Relea…
Statement is oddly worded amid reports that the initial source of the intelligence was interrogations conducted by US #SOF (ie, it’s not “open source reports” that need to be corroborated).
Also, the #DOD euphemism “malign activity”—typically used to describe adversary non-lethal/influence operations—is out of place in the context of bounties for US troops’ heads. Smacks of deliberate soft-peddling.
In which @USArmy Chief of Staff GEN McConville describes how SFABs are different than Special Forces in a way that will certainly rankle most Green Berets 1/n #SOF
armytimes.com/news/your-army…
armytimes.com/news/your-army…
"SF is very good at training tactical units; They’re very good at accompanying tactical units. But SFABs build a professional mil force, which is different. How do you do logistics. How do you maintain vehicles. How do you build a professional mil that will provide security.” 2/n
An SF "captain has never been a battalion commander, never a brigade commander, and maybe never even a company commander. They know how to do tactics & sergeants certainly know how to do skillsets...but they’ve never run a battalion." 3/n
It’s a little appreciated fact (in part because it’s counterintuitive) that the more virulent a terrorist group is, the closer US troops need to be to it IOT be effective. Why? Because the US model of CT is one of network targeting. 1/n
This means trying to remove nodes of the network faster than the network can reconstitute itself. If you can consistently do that long enough, you can eventually dismantle a terrorist group (here “consistently” & “long enough” are group-dependent). 2/n
If a group is not particularly resilient (eg disorganized, inexperienced), ops to dismantle the group can be “slower” than ops against a more resilient group (ie, the rate at which you need to remove nodes can be less). Consequently, you can be further away. 3/n
