Discover and read the best of Twitter Threads about #TurkStream
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🔴 #RussiaUkraineWar Effectivement, les guerres ruinent certains pays et rendent immensément riches d’autres.
Au début de 2021, l'Union européenne 🇪🇺 importait chaque mois seulement 650 millions de mètres cubes de gaz GNL en provenance des #USA , avec un pic en avril à 3,2 🔽
Au début de 2021, l'Union européenne 🇪🇺 importait chaque mois seulement 650 millions de mètres cubes de gaz GNL en provenance des #USA , avec un pic en avril à 3,2 🔽
2.
milliards de mètres cubes. Ensuite, en janvier 2022, ils nous ont envoyé 4,3 milliards de
mètres cubes, avec un pic également en avril - 5,8 milliards. Avec une moyenne mensuelle de 4,7 milliards en 2022, cela signifie que pendant l'année en cours, les navires chargés aux 🔽
milliards de mètres cubes. Ensuite, en janvier 2022, ils nous ont envoyé 4,3 milliards de
mètres cubes, avec un pic également en avril - 5,8 milliards. Avec une moyenne mensuelle de 4,7 milliards en 2022, cela signifie que pendant l'année en cours, les navires chargés aux 🔽
3.
États-Unis ont apporté au moins 56 milliards de mètres cubes de gaz en Europe.
C’est beaucoup. Il s'agit d'un véritable record, à des prix 4 à 5 fois supérieurs à ceux du gaz russe. En comparaison, le gazoduc Soyuz, qui traverse l'Ukraine, ne transporte que 26 milliards de 🔽
États-Unis ont apporté au moins 56 milliards de mètres cubes de gaz en Europe.
C’est beaucoup. Il s'agit d'un véritable record, à des prix 4 à 5 fois supérieurs à ceux du gaz russe. En comparaison, le gazoduc Soyuz, qui traverse l'Ukraine, ne transporte que 26 milliards de 🔽
#NordStream simile a #CrimeanBridge. In entrambe :
- danno parziale
- Washington non ha accusato Mosca
- là polacchi qui ucraini si sono vantati, ma in modo un poco equivoco
Analiticamente è una fortuna. Perché un episodio contribuirà ad interpretare l’altro
- danno parziale
- Washington non ha accusato Mosca
- là polacchi qui ucraini si sono vantati, ma in modo un poco equivoco
Analiticamente è una fortuna. Perché un episodio contribuirà ad interpretare l’altro
Cosa aggiungere❓
Putin : "We are not building anything for no reason. We have received and perfected the necessary technology. We will turn on Nord Stream 2 if necessary"
tass.com/economy/1504103
tass.com/economy/1504103
1/ Dear all, before everyone freaks out complete re the #supply #disruption of #natural #gas to #poland and #bulgaria which was initiated by #gazprom yesterday, i thought i'd make a little explanatory thread.
2/ first, consider poland. it exports about 10 bn m3 annually from russia. 
3/ however, natural gas is not so important for its primary energy supply. poland still heavily depends on #coal, in particular for its electrical energy production.
چرا #روسیه به #اوکراین حمله کرد؟
فردا خیلی دیر بود.
۲۰۰ هزار نظامی روس در تهاجم روسیه به اوکراین شرکت دارن. تقریبا به اندازه کل ارتش اوکراین و یا نیروهای آمریکا در حمله سال ۲۰۰۳ به عراق. /۱
فردا خیلی دیر بود.
۲۰۰ هزار نظامی روس در تهاجم روسیه به اوکراین شرکت دارن. تقریبا به اندازه کل ارتش اوکراین و یا نیروهای آمریکا در حمله سال ۲۰۰۳ به عراق. /۱
اونچه روسیه میخواد خیلی پیچیده و ریشه در اتفاقاتی داره که ۳ دهه قبل رخ داد. پیش از اون و برای چندین قرن روسیه و بلاروس و اوکراین یک کشور و یک مردم بودن. همه اینها در آخر سال ۱۹۹۱ تغییر کرد. شوروی فروپاشید و ۱۵ کشور مستقل از دل اون بیرون اومدن. /۲
در زمان جنگ سرد دو پیمان نظامی با هم رقابت میکردن. #ناتو در غرب و #ورشو در شرق. کشورهای پیمان ورشو در ظاهر مستقل اما در واقعیت دولت‌های تحت نفوذ شوروی بودن. از نظر شوروی این کشورها یه سد بزرگ در مقابل هرگونه تهاجم احتمالی غرب بشمار میومدن. /۳
Rusia también intentó mandar gas por el sur a través de Bulgaria (South Stream). La UE, con la colaboración de EEUU, no le dejó y Putin canceló en 2014 el proyecto para volver a intentarlo a través de Turquía (Turk Stream). Viene de lejos la cosa. @LorenzoRamirez_
Diciembre de 2014. Putin cancela el proyecto South Stream ante las reticencias de la UE a que Rusia mande gas a Europa a través del mar Negro y Bulgaria sputniknews.com/20141201/10153… Curiosamente unos meses antes se ha liado en Ucrania y EEUU ha presionado a la UE y Bulgaria.
Aquí un artículo del think tank otanista de febrero de 2020 (cuando éramos inocentes) comentando la jugada del Turk Stream –South Stream 2.0 según ellos– y mostrándose preocupado por que Rusia abra otra ruta gasística sin pasar por Ucrania. atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energyso…
THREAD on #Serbia and #Russia: President of #Serbia #aleksandarvučić is in #Sochi, #Russia to meet #Russia's President #VladimirPutin. The main talking point of the agenda, the price of Russian #gas for Serbia. #Serbia is entirely dependent on the import of Russian gas.
#Russia owns majority shares in NIS, Serbia's national oil and gas company, sold to Moscow below market price in 2008, in return for #Russia's protection in the #UN on #Kosovo and hoping that Moscow would construct now-defunct South Stream pipeline over Serbian territory.
The energy dependency was confirmed with the inauguration of the #TurkStream pipeline in 2021. In light of the ongoing energy crisis in Europe, the Serbian President fears the high gas prices for Serbia. The first reason is more immediate, the start of the heating season.
Heißer Tipp: Wenn es eng wird, rücke man die #NordStream2-Kritiker in die Ecke der Trump-Vasallen. Das zieht immer. Das Argument, "wir" müssten zwischen russischem Erdgas & US-Frackinggas wählen, ist ein löchriger Strohmann. Thread/1
Primäres Ziel von NS2 ist es, die Ukraine aus dem Gastransit zwischen Russland und Westeuropa zu drängen. Die Röhre hat ein Transportvolumen von 55 Mrd cbm/a. Um diese Menge soll laut Vertrag zwischen Gazprom & Naftogaz der Transit durch die Ukraine reduziert werden. /2
Nimmt man #Turkstream hinzu, kommt man exakt auf die 90 Mio cbm, die heute durch die #Ukraine nach Europa transportiert werden. Das führt nicht nur massiven finanziellen Einbußen, sondern gibt Putin freie Hand, den politisch-militärischen Druck auf die Ukraine zu erhöhen. /3
Now, that the fever of #Turkey's gas finding has cooled off (or not?), time for a (long) THREAD on challenges and implications #OOTT #ONGT
➡️ The gas is in ULTRA-deep waters: mark this term, it bears important outcomes
Tuna-1 well is located in 2115 meters water depth 1/
➡️ The gas is in ULTRA-deep waters: mark this term, it bears important outcomes
Tuna-1 well is located in 2115 meters water depth 1/
and the gas reserves were hit 1400 meters further, at nearly 3500 m water depth.
Total depth of drillings is expected to reach 4525 m where two more layers of gas are likely to be found (accord' to Fatih Donmez)
*Currently 500 m is considered the threshold for "deep waters" 2/
Total depth of drillings is expected to reach 4525 m where two more layers of gas are likely to be found (accord' to Fatih Donmez)
*Currently 500 m is considered the threshold for "deep waters" 2/
Depths over 1500 meters are considered "ultradeep waters"
👉Feature 1> in comparison with onshore projects, the offshore ones are considerable more expensive & involve long term deployments
👉Feature 2 > ultradeep projects are even more challenging
Since 1996, the oil & gas 3/
👉Feature 1> in comparison with onshore projects, the offshore ones are considerable more expensive & involve long term deployments
👉Feature 2 > ultradeep projects are even more challenging
Since 1996, the oil & gas 3/
As #NDAA on the House and Senate floors this week (!), the opportunity for a THREAD on #NordStream2 and #Turkstream has arisen
1️⃣ Modification of Guidance for Section 232 of CAATSA to allow sanctioning of NS2 and second line of Turkstream (#Balkanstream) aims 1/
1️⃣ Modification of Guidance for Section 232 of CAATSA to allow sanctioning of NS2 and second line of Turkstream (#Balkanstream) aims 1/
>>to give entities involved in the two projects leeway to wind down their participation before theCongress sanctions (NDAA) would hit on
>>as paradoxically as it may seem, to reduce some of the impact and scope of Congress sanctions 👉potentially, to avoid retroactive 2/
>>as paradoxically as it may seem, to reduce some of the impact and scope of Congress sanctions 👉potentially, to avoid retroactive 2/
application of sanctions. Regarding the scope, should wait until we see what sanctions, exactly, would be included in NDAA, and what other entities-from those providing underwriting or insurance to pipe-laying vessels, to those facilitating shop retrofitting-would be targeted 3/
Many comments that the Kurds in Syria were mistaken to accept support from imperialists, are "separatists" or "US proxies", that they should have listened to those warning them about this or that they were useful dupes who only have themselves to blame. THREAD 🧵
After gaining a degree of autonomy and self-governance in the midst of the Syrian Civil War, the Kurdish forces in NE Syria (Rojava) found themselves at the mercy of ISIS encroaching along the Syrian-Turkish border, with hostile Turkey the other side providing sustenance to ISIS
The YPG and its political manifestation the PYD ended up in various alliances with various forces. It had a deal with the Syrian regime to defend the territorial integrity of Rojava sine SAA forces fled in 2012, in exchange for political and military autonomy. This allowed PYD
