Discover and read the best of Twitter Threads about #Ukraine_Moldova
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#Ukraine_Moldova: Meanwhile, Russia is adding “more gasoline to the fire” by announcing that Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria will hold training starting in March for 3 months (until June). This means only one thing: more uncertainty about the ability of decision makers to⤵️
keep a cool head. My recommendations (to start with) are as follows: 1) creation of an international crisis unit involving Moldova, Ukraine, OSCE, EU, UK and US (2+4 format) to coordinate actions and prevent escalation ; 2) Synchronize strategic communication and downplay⤵️
disinformation involving Russia or its allies in Chisinau and Tiraspol; 3) Permanent assessment of the risk environment and multilateral intelligence exchange (2+4 format)⤵️
#Ukraine_Moldova: Strengthening Ukraine's defense capabilities against threats originating from the Transnistrian region is logical and correct from the point of view of risk management. This doesn’t mean that Kyiv is interested in attacking the breakaway region of Moldova.⤵️
There are costs about which I commented on other occasions: 1) If Ukraine decides to organize an intervention against Transnistria in the absence of a well-founded reason, this could have indirect effects in Moldova (refugees, explosion of the military depot in Transnistria,⤵️
risks to energy supply, etc. ). Transnistrian elites benefit from neutrality and the Moldovan authorities need stability to avoid public disorder and subversive actions by Russia; 2) If Ukraine enters Transnistria to confront Russian and separatist forces without a clear⤵️
#Ukraine_Moldova: Zelensky has officially confirmed that Ukraine does not plan to attack Transnistria because it respects the independence of other countries. Several observations: 1) Once again, Zelensky's statement confirms that Kyiv avoids costly expansion of its military⤵️
capabilities outside of its focus on southeastern Ukraine against the Russian occupation. This is not to mention the serious reputational costs of Ukraine's support in the West (something that highlighted before in my comments and articles); ⤵️
2) Russian attempts to divert attention from Russian aggression in Ukraine to a fabricated story about an alleged “Ukrainian aggression” against Moldova failed. However, such stories become more frequent. The more repetitive they are, the greater the negative impact on public ⤵️
#Ukraine_Moldova: Russia has announced that it will stop gas supplies through Ukraine, except for gas destined for Moldova: 1) Gazprom claims that Ukraine would have withheld up to 52.52 million m3 of gas destined for Moldova. I assume that these are actually⤵️
Moldova's strategic reserves that are stored in the Ukrainian storage. 2) Russia declares that it will stop the 43 million m3 of gas flowing through Ukraine to the EU, excluding the 5.7 million that are committed for daily supply to Moldova for Dec 2022.⤵️👇
Consequently, Gazprom will not deliver 37.3 million m3, in breach of contractual commitments with Ukraine. The flow of gas will stop from November 28. Gazprom conditions the resumption of supplies with the gas for Moldova stored in Ukraine (for which Moldova paid⤵️
#Ukraine_Moldova: Russia has launched 3 rockets against Ukraine that have flown over Moldovan territory. It is the first time that the Russian army has done that. Arrive 10 days before the gas deadline. The fact that the Russian rockets flew over Moldovan territory⤵️
was confirmed by the Ukrainian and Romanian authorities, including the Moldovan state company in charge of monitoring the airspace. In fact, I picked a perfect time to travel to Moldova: orchestrated protests, fuel delivery deadlines, and now Russian missiles that can easily⤵️
reach Moldovan territory. Putin is sending signals to the Moldovan political class and to the EU and the US It is not ruled out that Russia wants to create chaos in Moldova by adding to the uncertainty about gas supplies. The goal could be to escalate the orchestrated protests⤵️
#Ukraine_Moldova: Zelensky has reiterated that one of the country's objectives is to become a guarantor of European energy security. Ukraine is ready to export electricity to the EU, after synchronization with ENTSO-E completed in March this year. Due to the Russian war,⤵️
the EU approved the union of Ukraine and Moldova before the initial schedule. This makes it possible to temporarily provide the two EU candidate states with electricity in the event of an emergency situation, such as gas cuts for power production. At such risk is Moldova,⤵️
which last year signed a contract with Russia, which both the ruling party and Sandu hailed as the best solution that offers cheaper gas (than that available on EU market). Since the gas flow through NS1 is reduced to 20%, the Moldovan side expects negative scenarios for⤵️
#Ukraine_Moldova: Zelenskiy has highlighted two things about the destabilization of the breakaway region of Moldova. He is clearly aware of the might of the Ukrainian military compared to the Russian potential in the breakaway region. That explains why the Transnistria region ⤵️
has so far avoided getting involved in the war and Russia was reluctant to do so either. Another interesting aspect raised by Zelenskiy, which seems problematic to me, is his argument that destabilization occurs now to prevent Moldova from supporting Ukraine. As a matter of⤵️
fact there is no specific support promised by Moldovan authorities. The latter themselves need external assistance and are facing multi-dimensional crises, happening at once. It is not clear what the Ukrainian presidents really meant. Until very recently, ⤵️
#Ukraine_Moldova: Kyiv reports that Russia is considering an airstrike in the Transnistria region to accuse Ukraine afterwards. This scenario will trigger the reaction of the military forces in the region, including the Russian forces (Operational Group of Russian Forces). ⤵️
Ukrainian intelligence argues that the military forces of Transnistria and Russia are already ready to act if necessary, probably in the direction of Ukraine (if the latter is presented as the responsible side). This doesn't rule out that Moldova could be also somehow affected ⤵️
(the population is already scared). On the other hand, we attended a pin-pong between the president of Moldova, Sandu, and the leader of the region, Krasnoselkiy. The latter hinted that Sandu does not have reliable information. She said after the National Security Council that ⤵️
#Ukraine_Moldova: Kyiv insists that Russia can engineer the Transnistria provocation. I have explained to several Western journalists that such a scenario is not plausible. Here are my main arguments that I didn't change since Russia has started the war: ⤵️
1) Russia cannot guarantee military and other supplies by land; Odesa is under the control of the Ukrainian authorities; 2) If something happens by air, the Ukrainian side will get those involved and the Transnistria region at risk of being affected and causing huge damage ⤵️
to critical infrastructure; 3) The local elites of the breakaway region are not interested in being dragged into the war and will do so only if Russia takes control of Odesa. What is also important to note is that ⤵️
#Ukraine_Moldova: The scandal surrounding the kidnapping of former Ukrainian judge Ceaus allegedly by Ukrainian citizens with connections to special services is getting worse. 1) The Moldovan MFA requested the Ukrainian embassy in Chisinau to lift the diplomatic immunity of ⤵️
the military attaché Sergey Smetanyuk. This would allow to initiate the investigation into the alleged participation of him in the committed kidnapping of Ceaus. The Ukrainian embassy apparently declined the request. 2) At the same time, the Ukrainian embassy informed Kyiv ⤵️
that President Sandu made several attempts to contact Zelensky's office, without success. Zelensky apparently doesn't have a plan / reaction. 3) As stated by the MFA of Ukraine, no Ukrainian authority has participated in the kidnapping. This leaves however unexplained the use ⤵️
