Discover and read the best of Twitter Threads about #paxsinica
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🧵 THREAD 🧵
@jensstoltenberg interview in @FT marks a shift in @NATO's approach to China-Russia axis. Waking up to the issue is welcome compared to years of ignorance. Yet conclusions based on flawed analysis that overstates 🇨🇳🇷🇺 rapport may lead to some grave mistakes 1/
@jensstoltenberg interview in @FT marks a shift in @NATO's approach to China-Russia axis. Waking up to the issue is welcome compared to years of ignorance. Yet conclusions based on flawed analysis that overstates 🇨🇳🇷🇺 rapport may lead to some grave mistakes 1/
2/ In his interview to @khalafroula & @HenryJFoy @jensstoltenberg outlines the profound challenge that 🇨🇳 presents to @NATO, and then suggests that the alliance should in fact treat China and Russia as parts of one problem. ft.com/content/0202ed…
3/ @jensstoltenberg to @FT exhibit 1: "This whole idea of in a way distinguishing so much between China, Russia, either Asia-Pacific or Europe, it’s one big security environment and we have to address it all together" ft.com/content/cf8c6d…
THREAD
Joint exercise is a milestone in deepening 🇨🇳🇷🇺 military cooperation. But is it a step towards a Sino-Russian alliance? Hardly. Is it a sign of deepening across-the-board security partnership aimed at the U.S.? Well, it’s complicated. Let me add some nuance below 👇
Joint exercise is a milestone in deepening 🇨🇳🇷🇺 military cooperation. But is it a step towards a Sino-Russian alliance? Hardly. Is it a sign of deepening across-the-board security partnership aimed at the U.S.? Well, it’s complicated. Let me add some nuance below 👇
2/ “Xibu/Interaction-2021” (西部｜联合) is the latest in a string of joint military exercises that are growing in size and complexity since 2005 – the year when full delimitation of 🇷🇺🇨🇳 border was finally in sight. mod.gov.cn/action/2021-08…
3/ 🇷🇺🇨🇳 military activity now includes annual ground forces drills (frequently with SCO ☔️), annual naval drills (since 2015), table-top missile defense exercise, annual air patrols by strategic bombers. A good summary in @FT by @HenryJFoy & @KathrinHille: ft.com/content/8ba51d…
THREAD
How worried should the West be about 🇷🇺🇨🇳cooperation on digital propaganda and disinformation?
We dug into this issue for a new article "Comrades in Tweets?". It's part of @CarnegieEndow' #PaxSinica project. Some key findings below. 1/14.
How worried should the West be about 🇷🇺🇨🇳cooperation on digital propaganda and disinformation?
We dug into this issue for a new article "Comrades in Tweets?". It's part of @CarnegieEndow' #PaxSinica project. Some key findings below. 1/14.
2/ For this paper @LeonidKovachich and I have interviewed officials, journalists, editors and experts in both Russia and China. Here is what we've found. carnegie.ru/2021/06/03/com…
3/ Chinese online behavior is increasingly marked by tactics that were first utilized by Russian actors, as smart colleagues @niubi, @MariaRepnikova and many others have noticed before. Yet this is not the product of 🇨🇳🇷🇺 cooperation in the global information space.
THREAD
As @Huawei releases Harmony OS today, this @washingtonpost story provides important insights on how embattled 🇨🇳 tech giant uses 🇷🇺 talent to diminish impact of 🇺🇸 sanctions. It also highlights some overlooked aspects of Beijing-Moscow ties. 1/ washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pac…
As @Huawei releases Harmony OS today, this @washingtonpost story provides important insights on how embattled 🇨🇳 tech giant uses 🇷🇺 talent to diminish impact of 🇺🇸 sanctions. It also highlights some overlooked aspects of Beijing-Moscow ties. 1/ washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pac…
2/ In this well-researched piece, @evadou, @ikhurshudyan & Pei Lin Wu describe how after 🇺🇸 sanctions @Huawei has beefed up its partnership with 🇷🇺 research institution and went on hiring spree for Russian IT talents, mostly mathematicians and specialists in algorithms.
3/ Huawei has a history of significant reliance on 🇷🇺 IT talents going back many years, as company's founder Ren Zhengfei confessed back in 2019: guancha.cn/politics/2019_…
An all-star panel on 🇨🇳🇷🇺 by @CarnegieBeijing featuring @paulhaenle, @andrewsweiss, @SpivakV and @PKU1898's Guan Guihai 关贵海. This nuanced discussion is a good starting point to unpack the increasingly important relationship between Moscow and Beijing. carnegieendowment.org/2021/05/12/chi…
2/ In addition to the panel, it's worth checking out some of the recent pieces in growing body of @CarnegieEndow's works on the topic. Here @SpivakV (@CarnegieRussia alumni, ex-@UC_RUSAL, now with @Control_Risks) unpacks what 十四五means for 🇨🇳🇷🇺econ ties carnegie.ru/commentary/841…
3/ Here @eugene_rumer & @dicktfirefly explore whether 🇺🇸 can drive a wedge between 🇷🇺🇨🇳. Spoiler alert: 🙅♂️❌⛔️, but do read their nuanced reasoning. carnegie.ru/commentary/839…
THREAD 🧵
Tectonic shifts in Russia's trade and exposure to global centers of economic gravity are happening quietly, but surely. In 2013, before Crimea and Western sanctions, 🇷🇺🇪🇺trade volume was 5x of 🇷🇺🇨🇳. Just 7 years after, trade with EU is only 2x bigger than with China. 1/
Tectonic shifts in Russia's trade and exposure to global centers of economic gravity are happening quietly, but surely. In 2013, before Crimea and Western sanctions, 🇷🇺🇪🇺trade volume was 5x of 🇷🇺🇨🇳. Just 7 years after, trade with EU is only 2x bigger than with China. 1/
2/🇪🇺share of 🇷🇺 trade:
2013 - 49.4%
2019 - 41.6%
2020 - 38.5%
2013 - 49.4%
2019 - 41.6%
2020 - 38.5%
3/ 🇨🇳 share of 🇷🇺 trade:
2013 - 10.5%
2019 - 16.7%
2020 - 18.3%
2013 - 10.5%
2019 - 16.7%
2020 - 18.3%
China’s strategy vis-à-vis Central Asia’s elites is undergoing an under-appreciated change. Beijing is shifting from working exclusively w/ the region’s incumbent leaders to support for pro🇨🇳 politicians & even making efforts to bring them to power.
THREAD
carnegie.ru/commentary/837…
THREAD
carnegie.ru/commentary/837…
1/18: In October 2020, Kyrgyz President Sooronbay Jeenbekov was ousted and replaced by Sadyr Japarov, who managed to seize power, schedule elections & become the 6th president of Kyrgyzstan this month. carnegie.ru/commentary/830…
2/ This eyebrow-raising quick jump to the presidency incited many questions from the public. Read @joannalillis piece to learn why he's popular:
economist.com/asia/2021/01/1…
But how did a former convicted criminal muster enough resources to get elected? One of the factors could be 🇨🇳
economist.com/asia/2021/01/1…
But how did a former convicted criminal muster enough resources to get elected? One of the factors could be 🇨🇳
ICYMI. Dear colleagues from across the global @CarnegieEndow family have come up with a digital magazine that looks at post-pandemic global shifts. It's like a festive meal for a curious mind: diverse, rich in flavor (and surprisingly digestible too!).
Yours truly has contributed with a short video on U.S.-China-Russia 🇺🇸🇨🇳🇷🇺, and risks for Moscow to be deeply embedded into Beijing-centered #PaxSinica as a result of self-inflicted breakdown of ties with the West carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/09/asi…
(This clip also makes a perfect explainer of orthodontic treatment's impact on public speaking ability.)
THREAD. Chinese customs data is out. It shows that 🇨🇳🇷🇺 trade is gradually going back to pre-COVID levels. Key driver for Sino-Russian economic relationship in the near&mid-term will be politics rather than markets: fallout of @navalny's poisoning, crisis over #Belarus, US-China.
2/ China's Customs has released its August data. 🇨🇳🇷🇺trade in Jan-Aug was $68.63b, -3.2% compared to 2019. Decline in trade is slowing down (in Jan-Jul it was -4.5%), and trade volumes are growing for a second month in a row: +4.2% in Jul, +4.1% in Aug. customs.gov.cn/customs/302249…
3/ Key factor of growth is rise in 🇷🇺 imports from 🇨🇳 for the fifth month in a row. In Aug alone it added 17.8% ($5.23b). This is a reflection of a far better state of 🇷🇺 economy than many have feared in spring, as @AndrianovaAnna explains in @business bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
THREAD Failure to address Moscow's growing dependency on @Huawei will help Beijing embed Russia in a China-centred technological order, a digital #PaxSinica with worrying, global ramifications, I argue in my new piece for @FT. Here is why 👇 1/ ft.com/content/f36a55…
2/ As US-led pressure campaign against @Huawei starts to bear fruit, and now @10DowningStreet even contemplates an alliance of democracies to provide developing countries with alternatives to Huawei in 5G, this effort overlooks one key battleground: Russia thetimes.co.uk/article/downin…
3/ If @Huawei succeeds in establishing control over 🇷🇺 5G buildout, that will strengthen 🇨🇳 position in the battle for other EMs. Influence of example is key. If proud and technologically sophisticated Russia believes that Huawei is safe, why should Brazil or South Africa resist?
Great @WSJ deep dive story on 🇨🇳🇷🇺 by @yarotrof & @tggrove. @DmitriTrenin nails it: “There is an increasing realization in Russia that getting too close to the Chinese giant can lead to undesirable dependence on Beijing.” Couple of additional thoughts 👇 wsj.com/articles/weary…
2/ Moscow indeed becomes increasingly alerted to and concerned about its growing dependency on China, as is evident in recent conversations with 🇷🇺 senior government officials and business executives from both private sector & SOEs.
3/ It's not really about the mutual distrust exposed by early stages of COVID management, and not about spying including the most recent case since great powers spy on each other, even closest allies (Angela Merkel can tell you all about it)...
A notable phone conversation between Xi and Tajikistan's President Rahmon. Dependency of Dushanbe on its giant neighbor is accelerated by COVID, as Tajikistan is becoming Cambodia of Central Asia in terms of 🇨🇳 influence. Some details that caught my eye👇 xinhuanet.com/english/2020-0…
2/ According to @XHNews, Rahmon told Xi that Dushanbe wants to "further align Tajikistan's national development strategy for the period up to 2030 with the joint construction of the Belt and Road."
3/ Rahmon: "Tajikistan is willing to expand cooperation with China in such areas as economy and trade, health, science and technology"
Yet another big win for @Huawei in Russia. The government working group on digital economy (includes regulators & telecom companies) has blocked a proposal to use only 🇷🇺-made hardware in rollout of national 5G network, according to @kommersant. 1/ kommersant.ru/doc/4380525?fr…
2/ The requirement to use Russian-made equipment for 5G was pushed by Ministry of digital development and telecommunication (@minsvyaz_news), but has met strong resistance from the companies, as local hardware will not be produced before 2024 and thus will delay 5G rollout
3/ It looks like the 🇷🇺 government is doubling down on plans for swift rollout of 5G, as a direct result of growing demand for speed&network capacity driven by COVID & work-from-home. Another factor is tech-obsessed Mikhail Mishustin as new PM of @GovernmentRF.
"The tension between elites’ priorities and those of ordinary Central Asians will persist. It doesn't help that the unspoken rule in dealings with China is never to acknowledge problems." Great article in @TheEconomist, summed up by a quote from @TUmarov
economist.com/asia/2020/06/0…
economist.com/asia/2020/06/0…
Here is @TUmarov's report on China's relations with Central Asia, part of @CarnegieEndow's new research project #PaxSinica carnegie.ru/commentary/814…
And if you aren't following @TUmarov on all things China in Central Asia, you definitely should!
THREAD Fresh 🇷🇺&🇨🇳 data is out, and it shows that #COVIDー19 exacerbates Russia's dependency on its giant neighbor. Beyond transient effects, there are longer-term implications that bring China one step closer to #PaxSinica, a Beijing-centered regional order. Some details 1/
2/ According to 🇷🇺 customs data, China's share in Russian trade continues to grow. In Q1-20 it's 17.3%, while in Q1-19 it was 16%. Growth of 🇨🇳 share in 🇷🇺 export is the main driver: 14.6% in Q1-20 compared to 12.5% a year ago customs.ru/folder/511?fbc…
3/ No surprise, the primary driver was growth in oil exports. According to @SPGlobalPlatts calculations (by @oceana_zhou) based on 🇨🇳 customs statistics, in Q1-20🇷🇺 has exported 21.07 million tons to China, +16.7% to Q1-19 (18.06 million tons)
THREAD: The rift between Russia and the West is deepening, and China is exploiting it to expand its influence in Eurasia.
Are Russia and its neighbors becoming a testing ground for a new Beijing-centered regional order? Call it #PaxSinica. @CarnegieEndow takes a deep dive.
Are Russia and its neighbors becoming a testing ground for a new Beijing-centered regional order? Call it #PaxSinica. @CarnegieEndow takes a deep dive.
Is China using trade, investment, infrastructure projects, and security ties to lay the foundation in Eurasia for a new “Pax Sinica”?
Such a Beijing-centered regional order would cover large swaths of the Eurasian landmass.
Such a Beijing-centered regional order would cover large swaths of the Eurasian landmass.
China’s rapid rise is feeding fears in Russia that the bilateral relationship is becoming too asymmetrical. The coronavirus pandemic has also exposed deep reservoirs of mutual suspicion at both the elite and popular level. ceip.org/p-80238
THREAD This is a great story by @technology on Xi's ambitions to turn $1.4 trillion "new infrastructure" program into a Chinese version of the "New Deal." It might also have some sweeping long-term implications for the Russian economy. My quick take 1/ bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/ In this well-research article, @technology team (@Colum_M, @luluyilun, @byzhulin, @GaoYuan86, @pingroma) explain how China plans to make "new infrastructure" program (新型基础设施) into a cornerstone of its recovery effort after #COVID bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
3/ Not only will this program support growth and employment like the 2008-2009 infrastructure-heavy recovery plan did, but will also lay groundwork for China to leapfrog into what @wef calls industrial revolution 4.0 - and secure Beijing's global leadership in tech
THRED @StateDept has published a policy paper by AS Christopher Ford, outlining "T Suite's" view on competitive strategy against China and Russia. If implemented, this approach will further deepen security cooperation between Beijing and Moscow. 1/
2/ Link to Ford's memo, who apart from his role as AS is performing the duties for Under Secretary on Arms Control and International Security, is here 👇. Ford states that this paper builds on @realDonaldTrump's 2017 NSS that lumps China&Russia together state.gov/wp-content/upl…
3/ Ford doesn't go into Sino-Russian security cooperation, but describes "whole-of-system" challenges that Beijing and Moscow separately present to the U.S. He then outlines "make competitors run more slowly" approach that should guide the U.S. in thwarting this threat
THREAD How will #COVID19 affect China’s strategy in Eurasia, and Sino-Russian ties? The pandemic could tighten Beijing’s grip on the former USSR even further, leading to the creation of a China-led regional order in Eurasia: #PaxSinica. Here’s how: 1/
2/ Despite the huge amount of mistrust between Moscow and Beijing that COVID-19 has helped to expose, the virus is likely to strengthen China-Russia ties, as I argue in my recent piece for @ForeignPolicy foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/23/cor…
3/ Russia was one of the first countries to close its border with China. This move reflected Moscow’s suspicion of its neighbor. I’ve witnessed this in meetings with senior Russian officials who questioned Beijing’s data, complained about a lack of transparency etc.
THREAD:
Sitting at home during the #JantaCurfew, decided it would be a good time to revisit some of the arguments @samirsaran and I made in our book #PaxSinica. Many of our hypotheses are on full display during the #COVID19 crisis.
Sitting at home during the #JantaCurfew, decided it would be a good time to revisit some of the arguments @samirsaran and I made in our book #PaxSinica. Many of our hypotheses are on full display during the #COVID19 crisis.
International Institutions:
China has steadily occupied leadership positions in international institutions, advancing its agenda and enforcing its domestic politics. We had cited examples from China's behaviour at the @UN, the @icao, the @WHO, @INTERPOL_HQ & @UNESCO.
China has steadily occupied leadership positions in international institutions, advancing its agenda and enforcing its domestic politics. We had cited examples from China's behaviour at the @UN, the @icao, the @WHO, @INTERPOL_HQ & @UNESCO.
The @WHO's behaviour amidst the #COVID19 outbreak strongly suggests continued deference to China's interests:
theprint.in/opinion/chinas…
theprint.in/opinion/chinas…
