Oscillating between sessions this morning: now listening to Matteo Mossio and why biological parts are not machines. #ISHPSSB19
Mossio: “a machine is a system that exists because it produces work resulting from the properties of its parts and their interactions.” #ISHPSSB19
Mossio: “machines are purposive systems endowed with internal functional differentiation.” #ISHPSSB19
Mossio uses Kant’s argument to show that organisms have intrinsic purpose and are therefore very much unlike machines. #ISHPSSB19
Mossio interprets Maturana and Varela’s talk about autopoietic *machines* as somewhat frivolous. #ISHPSSB19
Mossio: in most cases, parts of organisms cannot be interpreted as machines either. The conditions of existence of organismic components depend on the activity of the whole in ways machine parts do not. #ISHPSSB19
Mossio: organismic part-whole relationships constantly change over time (ontogenetic differentiation) and depend on the level of organisation. #ISHPSSB19
Mossio: molecular parts are special; they are the best candidates for being interpreted as machine-like components. See recent discussion by Militello & Moreno vs. Nicholson. #ISHPSSB19
Mossio: despite their producing functional work, we should not call molecular parts “machines.” Better use “organisational complexes” or “constraints,” to emphasise organisational differences. #ISHPSSB19
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