Thread by @DmitryOpines

1/ An element that makes the Irish Border issue so frustrating for both sides is the absence of potential metrics and arbiters.

Who decides if:
a) Alternatives arrangements are in place;
b) They are working as promised;
c) They sufficiently respect the GFA.

2/ It's often presented as a legal matter of "What's in the GFA?" but that seems simplistic.

If a new border restarts The Troubles Start, I don't want to be the guy flown to Belfast to explain to the IRA 2.0 or whomever that it's not TECHNICALLY against the letter of the GFA.

3/ The GFA represents the legal manifestation of a compromise allowing Northern Ireland to simultaneously feel a part of the United Kingdom and the rest of Ireland.

The sad truth is, it's difficult to imagine a version of Brexit that doesn't degrade that at least a little.

4/ After Brexit, differences in trade regimes will mean doing the "right thing" when it comes to trading with neighbors on the island will require a lot more fees and paperwork...

... the costs of that mean there will need to be enforcement to curb the "wrong thing."

5/ That clearly represents a step backward from current arrangement, but is that a betrayal of the GFA principles and is it sufficient to unpick the delicate peace so painfully forged?

I have no idea, and I suspect opinions would vary wildly.

6/ There is no single authority I'm aware of both sides would trust to look at arrangements on the island two years from now and say,

"Yes, what you've built is in the spirit of the GFA."

or

"This doesn't respect the GFA, you can't do this."

7/ The UK are therefore concerned the RoI and Brussels will set the impossibly high standard of maintaining the status quo, while the RoI and Brussels are concerned the UK will throw together a buggy trusted trader web-portal and declare "Mission Accomplished."

8/ What makes the issue more complex is that in some ways the de facto arbiters of any solution's efficacy are going to be violent extremists.

No country wants its policy evaluated on whether it gets custom's booths blown up, but that's kind of what's up.

9/ I'm often fairly critical of the UK Parliament for not accepting the backstop, but that's largely because they ignored the reasons above to focus on silly paranoia.

The EU doesn't want to trap the UK eternally in the CU. That's not how grown up countries operate. I promise.

10/ However, the lack of clarity of what a GFA compliant post-Brexit border looks like, and who gets to make that determination, is a genuine problem both for any Backstop, but more seriously for the UK and EU more broadly.

There aren't a lot of easy answers here, sadly. /end