Thread by @MMazarr

It's becoming a common refrain among some China watchers: Engagement was always stupid; those now coming around to tougher position on China should have seen it before; China's harsh trajectory was always obvious. Several good sources refute that notion ...

Iain Johnston's superb essay in @TWQgw is the best one-source response: China isn't resolutely against all rules or orders; its behavior toward post-war order has been mixed, not wholly negative; criticisms use straw man versions of engagement
tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…

We forget that the opening to China was a strategic gambit that had big geopolitical return. Phil Gordon's new essay in @WarOnTheRocks puts it brilliantly: "The benefits of not having [China] as an enemy have endured for so long they are now largely taken for granted"

Very nice video cases of US-China dispute resolution by @EvanFeigenbaum add two important points: (1) We will *need* to deal w/ China on big issues, and (2) Stable overall relations + personal ties = key to advancing US interests
Six Crises youtube.com/playlist?list=… via @YouTube

Some might argue we should have hedged more. But *we built all the tools required to deal with current Chinese trajectory* during the period of so-called feckless engagement: Alliances, partnerships , int'l rules, norms, institutions and standards ...

… continued strong defense investments + more. We weren't on the wrong track and what's needed isn't rocket science: Multilateral, norm-based answers to China's belligerence; strengthened tools of influence; key US domestic investments; willingness to work w/China where needed

The basis for such responses was firmly laid over the last 30 years, and our position is *stronger* b/c we engaged China. Mischaracterizing bipartisan policy of engagement as appeasement promotes a dangerous myth that will be used to fuel excessive reactions to the competition