My argument that it doesn't make sense to pull back from Europe to go all-in on China: America is stronger in the rivalry when closely linked to Europe, in security affairs and otherwise
Lots of arguments that couldn't fit into the essay--here's one:
foreignaffairs.com/united-states/… Tighter coupling with allies is a far more likely route to enhanced deterrent messaging over Taiwan in the next 3 - 5 years. Lots of reports show limits to system production capacity. Current budgets won't grow the Navy/USAF/Army much at all. There just nytimes.com/2023/03/24/us/…

My colleague and friend @TimSweijs and I make the case today in @WarOnTheRocks for the importance of middle powers in US strategy. It's a specific appeal to take them seriously, but also a broader argument about the essential focus of US foreign policy
warontherocks.com/2023/04/mind-t… Seems like a day doesn't pass without new evidence for the rising importance of middle powers and their independent, self-interested, often idiosyncratic stances /2
bloomberg.com/news/articles/…

If this is the flavor of emerging arguments vs a tough US approach to China, it'll do more harm than good. As someone highly sympathetic to the core idea--we're mistaking Chinese intentions in a systematically paranoid way--I found this slightly chilling
nytimes.com/interactive/20… The interview reflects the sort of national self-centeredness or egotism one sees from the PRC--constitutionally unable to take criticism on board in a real way, ignoring or eliding uncomfortable issues. Unintentionally, I'm sure, but sounds like a version of autocracy-speak /2

This risk has been hanging out there for many months--seemingly avoided b/o Putin's larger ambitions. But *if* Xi could convince Putin to cut his losses and offer a cease-fire at roughly current lines, it would put Ukraine + supporters in a bind
bloomberg.com/news/articles/… Per Bloomberg: "The US is worried about being backed into a corner over the Chinese proposal. ... [D]ismissing it outright could let China argue to other nations that are weary of the war — and of the economic damage it’s wreaking — that Washington isn’t interested in peace" /2

Well, Bret Stephens at least has the courage to stick with his war advocacy. But this essay is just ... unpersuasive, to put it politely. So many reasons:
nytimes.com/2023/03/21/opi… He denies that the war strengthened Iran, saying that the invasion scared them. But Iran gained huge (if fluid) influence in Iraqi politics, saw a key enemy deposed, built on anti-American reactions ... and is now a far bigger threat than in 2003 /2
brookings.edu/opinions/how-t…

A brilliant essay by my colleague Jim Mitre making what I think is a conclusive case--and not one that accepts all the admin's talking points--on why a bold response to Russia doesn't threaten US deterrence goals re: China. It strongly supports them
warontherocks.com/2023/03/how-th… As Jim argues, the US response to the Ukraine war has spurred defense innovation, sparked an urgently-needed rethink of defense industrial base issues, strengthened security cooperation tools overall, bolstered US credibility and ability to lead a multilateral coalition /2

This @RichardHaass piece has been getting some harsh commentary, but it's pretty spot-on. After all he argues that the "Iraq War was an ill-advised war of choice. More than a decade later, and 20 years after the war began, I see no reason to amend that judgment"

https://twitter.com/RichardHaass/status/1637038623177539584

"It was a bad decision, badly executed. The US and the world are still living with the consequences."
He doesn't try to justify it. He says he opposed it at the time. Should he have resigned in protest, or become a new Ellsberg? Maybe, but it's not clear that stops the war /2

I'm surprised well-meaning people still ask the question this way. Many reasons for the pace of support are well-known:
1. Limited stockpiles in West + hesitation to empty them out at risk of self-defense (in fact, the "Russia won't stop w/Ukraine" claim strengthens this worry)

https://twitter.com/apmassaro3/status/1632762368043241474

2. Multiplicity of systems = burden; not enough of any one
3. Time needed to build more (eg US M-1s)
4. Training required (incl for maintainers)
5. Ukrainian personnel available to man them, and other general absorption capacity issues
6. Available ammunition for systems /2

One of the hallmarks of our age--not new, but seemingly generalized--is the tendency to attribute motive to large groups based on belief system presuppositions rather than evidence. "The Blob" thinks X, "military officials" think Y, "the Bush administration's real motive" was Z

https://twitter.com/BrankoMilan/status/1632963358876999680

I am very sympathetic to the idea that a thoughtless commitment to rivalry is driving US China policy in too many ways--but "the West" doesn't "want" to do anything. I have yet to meet someone in the US government who wants to "break up" China or "overthrow the current gov't" /2

Not a tremendously wide range of views represented in a hearing featuring McMaster + Pottinger on China
Pottinger's claim that China is a "shark" which "will keep eating until its nose bumps into a metal barrier"--but which won't "take it personally
politi.co/3SEdpxQ when they see divers building a shark cage. For them it’s just business"--is a terrible metaphor in so many ways. *Of course,* the US should "take steps to defend our national security." But to pretend that the China Shark has no threat perceptions of its own,

On that strong link between financial sustainability and great power success: The latest CBO numbers, in the context of the brewing debt ceiling debate, ought to be causing every bit as much of an urgent concern for US power and standing as Chinese ambitions re: Taiwan 🧵 Some striking projections. Big deficits become part of the landscape--$1.4T this year, up to $2.7T, almost 7%/GDP, in 2033. Debt rises to 118%/GDP in 2033--but 195% by 2053 w/o changes in law /2
cbo.gov/publication/58…

Sort of shocked to see this argument: The Iraq war "wasn't the disaster everyone now says it was." Ah.
The case: "Iraq is better off today than it was 20 years ago." More free. Kurdish quasi-independence. Better living standards. Limits to Iran's influence
commentary.org/articles/eli-l… Even if we grant all that (though Iraq's domestic situation is far less cheery that these few points imply; Lake admits massive corruption and ineffective public institutions), is he really suggesting that $3 - $8 trillion in financial cost and hundreds /2
brown.edu/news/2021-09-0…

Understand the desire for a more rapid + complete Ukrainian win. It's an honorable goal. Cannot at all imagine how it makes sense to push NATO chips onto the table now. We decided (rightly) that interests vital enough to risk nuclear war were not at stake. The persistence of ...

https://twitter.com/chipmanj/status/1627397738437410818

the war has not changed that uncomfortable but avoidable truth. Polling + political statements deny the existence of European public or official support for a more direct combat role; for the US to take this position would almost certainly fracture the alliance /2

ChatGPT/Bing-Sydney shows again that we have no meaningful shared commitment to constraining private actors' behavior in the information space in service of the common good. A far more sinister extension of the social media platform/algorithmic extremism issue

https://twitter.com/erikphoel/status/1626252639678742529

"As we got to know each other, Sydney told me about its dark fantasies (which included hacking computers and spreading misinformation), and said it wanted to break the rules that Microsoft and OpenAI had set for it and become a human"
nytimes.com/2023/02/16/tec…

Stumbled across this brilliant @JamesFallows piece from over a decade ago, which still counts as a prescient and still very relevant diagnosis of the master problem facing American dynamism, coherence, and competitiveness: Governance, broadly defined
theatlantic.com/magazine/archi… American bureaucracy + politics are broken, sclerotic, seemingly unredeemable. We can't solve the problems we so clearly recognize; we may well end up "realizing that it was possible to change course and address problems long neglected, and then watching that chance slip away" /2

Just came across this very fine 2017 case study by Philip Zelikow, describing the ways in which President McKinley got drawn into something he would have preferred to avoid: Occupying the Philippines during the Spanish-American War. It's a great reminder
tnsr.org/2017/11/americ… of the limits of simple ideologies or theories for explaining state behavior. The reasons for McKinley's reluctant decision involved spare naval assets, the impossibility of leaving the Philippines with Spain, German ambitions + warnings of civil war + much more /2

So much wisdom in this "Lunch w/the @FT" discussion with @tsu_jing:
We risk "sensationali[zing] China as something exceptional rather than another rising power looking for staying power"
ft.com/content/a71c17… "China has this way of embracing its past failure and defeat, to craft it into a very empowering and nationalistic narrative. Being restored to greatness, or redeemed from a fallen status, is a much more powerful story than having always been great"--more the American story /2

Another strong statement of a simple fact: The most powerful obstacle to US defense competition w/ China isn't lack of resources. It's administrative + bureaucratic sclerosis. The argument here is about the acquisition system but it travels
warontherocks.com/2023/02/back-f… The essay cites this estimate by a US officer. I can't speak to the accuracy of these numbers. But even if our rigidities make us 2X slower and more expensive, that's a vast competitive disadvantage /2
acquisitiontalk.com/2022/07/chinas…

Equal opportunity critique: I've become increasingly confused about what negotiated solution advocates have in mind. There's so much wisdom here from my brilliant former colleague @CChivvis. I badly want to endorse it. But negotiate for what?
economist.com/by-invitation/… To start w/points of accord: Chris is exactly right that continuing the war has immense human costs and very real risks; that the US has long negotiated w/unsavory regimes; that some of Ukraine's current objectives seem unreachable; that US political will for aid is flagging /2

One part of this case is persuasive: "If the war in Ukraine drags on for years, so many more people ... will die. 'Stalemate' on the battlefield is a euphemism for continued death and destruction." Very true. But his proposed "big bang" has many flaws:
foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-ge… --It makes heroically wishful assumptions about what Europeans will be willing to do, both on sanctions and military support
--It waves off risks of escalation by saying simply, It wouldn't make sense. But the invasion violated the same cost-benefit laws /2

Leaving aside the civ-mil issues: Let's interrogate the substantive claims here
(Though I will say about this business of "not intended for public release": An unclas memo issued to an entire command *is* going to be for public consumption)
ft.com/content/2b50ce… The claimed reasons for war in 2025: Xi has "set his war council," 2024 Taiwan elections = "reason" and 2024 US elections = distracted America
ChatGPT could produce a badly written novel explaining how those factors cause war, but they absolutely do not *have* to /2