Thread by @CarnegieRussia

Think Russia’s relations with Europe are bad? Ukraine, Belarus, Navalnyy are part of a long, unhappy legacy shaped by Russian strategic culture, argue .@eugene_rumer and Richard Sokolsky in a recent Carnegie paper. 1/12

carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/08/etc…

Geography, history, and elite consensus are the principal components of Russian strategic culture that explain Russia’s preoccupation and uneasy relationship with Europe. 2/12

Russia is European by its culture, its history, and its geography and demographics. Its Asian lands have always been its backwater, key events in its history—wars, diplomatic triumphs and setbacks—have taken place in Europe. 3/12

Russian elites have embraced the narrative of Soviet victory in WWII as the basis for its claim to a special place and role in European affairs. They resent Europe’s rejection of that claim. 4/12

Shaped by these enduring factors, many Soviet Cold War-era threat perceptions endure. Chief among them is the need for strategic depth, whose loss since the end of the Cold War has been a key concern for Russian leaders. 5/12

Ironically, Russian policy intended to counter the loss of depth and NATO expansion has only increased Russia’s insecurity. 6/12

Without the CFE and the INF Treaties, and with NATO’s 1997 assurances hollowed out by Russian actions, NATO has few restrictions to act to counter Russia. 7/12

For assurances see: 1997-2001.state.gov/regions/eur/fs…

However, far more consequential than the loss of arms control treaties, possibly including even the New START, which should be renewed, is the emergence of new conventional, cyber, space, and other technologies that will redefine the concept of strategic stability. 8/12

The capabilities of these weapons makes them exceedingly difficult to regulate, verification is virtually impossible, and legally binding treaties are likely to be impossible to negotiate. 9/12

When viewed in the context of Russian strategic culture, the Gorbachev-era foreign policy was not the norm, but the departure from it. A policy shaped by the country’s history, geography, and elite worldview is far more likely to endure. 10/12

This means that the best the United States and Europe can hope for is to manage the relationship with Russia—rather than try for a grand bargain or magical breakthrough understanding. 11/12

Managing this relationship will entail a combination of resolve, realism, and restraint, informal arrangements rather than formal treaties, and constant attention to the task rather than a fire-and-forget one-time fix. END.