Thread by @ElbridgeColby

Delighted to testify before @HASCRepublicans @HASCDemocrats yesterday on role of allies & partners in US defense. The formal statement is here: docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS…. The hearing itself is here: armedservices.house.gov/2020/9/full-co…. Thread of key points in my testimony/Q&A follows. 1/

Allies&partners ("A/Ps") essential. Lie at heart of #NDS. Not a platitude b/c US is no longer so preeminent. Mostly about China but US also faces challenges from RF to NATO, transnational terrorists, Iran, & NK. US ergo cant do everything. So US needs to focus on whats key. 2/

Key for US is to focus on top challenge: potential for Chinese hegemony in Asia & esp alliance defense there. Otherwise China will be able to use focused & sequential strategy to break apart any anti-hegemonial coalition there. This will be a consuming rqmt for US. 2/

To put it bluntly, we will need help to accomplish this, and will also leave exposed flanks. We will not be able to dedicate the level of resources and effort to the Middle East and Europe that we have in the past. We will therefore need allies and partners to do their part. 4/

#NDS solution is new approach. Truly integrate A/Ps not as totems but rather as active participants who share a much greater part of the burden. How? 1) Add new Ps & much more selectively As. 2) Encourage greater effort by A/Ps. 3) Make our collective efforts more efficient. 5/

On 1) Mismatch b/ where dangers present themselves
& threat perceptions of most established allies. Euro As don’t feel motivated to do much in Asia, ME. Way to rectify is add partners. Key points: We should add Ps liberally, but allies v conservatively b/c implicates our cred.6/

Also, focus on +ing Ps who share threat perceptions. Alliances = commitments to each other’s defense. Best motivator to fight is self-defense. This is true whether or not they are democracies. In this light, we shld focus on adding Ps in SE/South Asia vis a vis China. 7/

In other theaters, seek help offload burdens, esp ME. 8/

On 2) Burden-sharing. Tough problem for which no easy solution. The fact is that most countries will only do so much if they do not feel directly threatened by an adversary. My view is that we should work with this reality rather than vainly try to alter it. 9/

We therefore shld focus on urging countries to increase their efforts where they will be able to generate sufficient political will to make an effective contribution to shared
interests. At some level, this is obvious – but actually this isn’t what we have been doing...10/

Now we shld focus Asian A/Ps largely on defending selves & access. Japan moving in right direction but needs to do more, incl prep to help Taiwan defense. US should therefore not be shy about emphasizing this point. Japan can and should do more, and time is short. 11/

US shld encourage India to focus on own defense and countering PRC in S Asia & adjacent SE Asia, not projecting out of region. Will allow US to focus more on WestPac, where US most needed. 12/

In Europe, US needs to economize given priority of Asia. US mil not large enough for simultaneous wars w PRC&RF. Ergo Europeans need to do more to prepare to defend against RF. Many states like Poland, Finland, & Sweden already adjusting. 13/

Main challenge to model is Germany. FRG role critical b/c of size/wealth. A greater effort by Germany seems more consistent w proclaimed foreign policy of standing up for
multilateralism and honoring its pledges and duties. Let us take Germany at its word. 14/

3) US shld takes steps to make A/P efforts more effective/efficient. Can do by bringing select As into force dev & other planning earlier on, esp Japan, UK, Australia. Given how powerful China will be, we cannot afford to waste money and effort with duplication. 15/

US shld also strengthen A/Ps w arms sales, tech transfers, etc. In this vein, though, must fundamentally move away from using these tools as leverage over
key partners for domestic political reform or secondary geopolitical objectives. Shld strengthen states in the
region...16/

against Chinese power, whether they are model democracies or not. This is especially important in Southeast and South Asia, which will be key theaters of
competition with Beijing, but where there are no model democracies. 17/

In closing, new model will involve hard decisions& friction
w A/Ps. But friction with allies may be necessary if it
means we are facing up to new realities in a way that helps us get to our goal. We're much stronger A/Ps & our power is magnified when we effectively
align. END/

Some highlights of the Q&A (here: armedservices.house.gov/2020/9/full-co…).
Important, thoughtful Q from @RepAdamSmith at 34:35 re how to press Ps to improve human rights even as we rightly promote their ability to resist China. A critical, tough issue that deserves much more thought. 19/

.@RepAdamSmith is right I think on this: We'd better off w a "pragmatic approach" to this issue that is careful about our rhetoric & is clear about our "modest goals" & recognizes "modest ability" to force other countries" on these matters. 20/

.@MacTXPress exactly right about importance of training & need to avoid constraining our ability to work w Ps' militaries (39:00 et seq).

.@JimLangevin rightly emphasizes importance of Pacific Islands as well as value of being able to defend Taiwan ~56:00 et seq 21/

V thoughtful q from @RepRickLarsen about tough issue of Asian states & how we manage "they don't want to choose" issue at 1:10:10. My point is we shouldnt make the choice re US v PRC but about PRC vs their own sovereignty & autonomy. 22/

To q from @RepGaramendi 1:21:25 on- my view is US perspective is neither isolation nor partnership for own sake, but rather enlightened self-interest. In that vein, A/Ps critical - BUT need to be more balanced. Friction is likely necessary to get there, as in any negotiation. 23/

To important q from @RepDonBacon ~1:24 on- we shldn't focus on Asian NATO b/c we don't really need. Most A/Ps shld focus on self-defense. Better to spend that political capital on posture, force dev, + def spending. 23/

Excellent points by @RobWittman on value of greater interoperability w allies/need to lean forward on "deep & meaningful" integration of force dev, posture, network arch, etc. at 1:44 onward. 24/

Superb points from @RepGallagher on strategy & importance of Taiwan at 1:54:25. As he put it: strategy is difficult b/c requires choices b/wn essential & extraneous. Also requires identifying key points in geopolitical competition. 25/

.@RepGallagher - "No more strategically important piece of terrain right now in IndoPACOM right now than Taiwan." Precisely. @RepGallagher has been leading the discussion on this eg here: nationalreview.com/2020/05/taiwan…. 26/

My take in the hearing: We shld clarify commitment to Taiwan. We're already effectively committed. We run in to danger of Korea 1950 by continuing w ambiguity. Problem when other side has ability to do something about it & wonders about our resolve. 27/

Clarification can be made consistent w One China Policy & move enjoys broad & bipartisan support, as I referenced @RichardHaass piece here: foreignaffairs.com/articles/unite…. 28/

.@RepGallagher also had q about Germany & how we can encourage Germany to make more substantial commitments in NATO. My view: Need to put Germany friction into perspective. 1) Friction is not new. Balance of payments crisis, Mansfield Amendment (I was wrong: It didn't pass!) 29/

Burden-sharing discussions were more intense, candid, more realistic during Cold War. 2) Let's take FRG at its word. They say they're committed to multilateral "rules-based order." No one has benefited more from NATO. West Germany did much more in 1988 even though 2/3 size. 30/

Candidly, I'm befuddled by Germany's policy. No good explanation...They should meet their obligations as they claim to want to do & we should not meet shy about insisting on it. 31/

In exchange w @RepGilCisneros re value of forward presence in Asia ~2:02:30 - I made broader point. Alliances are more akin to business partnerships than friendships. & in bus parts you have to have candid conversations & rebaseline. 31/

Critical thing Administration has done is make keenly clear that we recognize threat posed by China & scale of what's required to contend w it. Vital signal to states in Asia. 32/