Elbridge Colby Profile picture
Principal, Marathon Initiative. Former Pentagon, 2018 National Defense Strategy, inter alia. Author of Strategy of Denial. Views my own.
Sue Strong @strong_sue@mastodon.sdf.org 🇺🇦 Profile picture M Farblon Profile picture Norris Battin Profile picture BlakeNorrisBattin Profile picture Cheri Stahl Profile picture 14 subscribed
Apr 14 11 tweets 3 min read
I consider @RepGallagher and Matt Pottinger to be good friends. Each has a distinguished record of service to the country, above all on China. I agree with them about a great deal.

But I fundamentally disagree with their core argument here.

Why? 1/

foreignaffairs.com/united-states/… BLUF:

1) We do not need their goal of full regime change and liberalization in China to achieve core American national interests vis a vis China.

2) Pursuing that goal against China greatly raises the risks of cataclysmic war, which we must try to avoid. 2/
Apr 12 5 tweets 1 min read
“RUSSIA’S REBUILDING FAST: Russia has replaced its heavy battlefield losses in Ukraine faster than anticipated, the top U.S. commander in Europe and NATO warned lawmakers today.” 1/

politico.com/news/2024/04/1… “The overall message I would give you is [Russia’s military has] grown back to what they were before,” Cavoli said. “They’ve got some gaps that have been produced by this war, but their overall capacity is very significant still, and they intend to make it go higher.” 2/
Apr 11 5 tweets 2 min read
It has been an exceptional privilege to visit Taiwan and meet with leaders from across the spectrum.

My message here is the same: Taiwan is key but the situation is dire. Taiwan must show its grave determination to defend itself to persuade Americans to come to its defense. 1/


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My view is that true friends are direct and honest when a friend is in dire straits. That’s my approach here.

Americans are war-weary and more skeptical of military interventions. Taiwan matters a great deal to Americans. But it’s not existential and it’s remote to most. 2/
Apr 6 6 tweets 1 min read
Very good treatment of this issue here.

1) Europeans and Americans must face this issue realistically. As @ischinger said: “No reason for anybody in Pittsburgh to believe that they are at risk if the Russians take Estonia.” That’s how we did it successfully in the Cold War. 1/ 2) British and French arsenals lack plausible extended deterrence potency given their much smaller size and far less diversity vis a vis Russia’s. Plus Russia is likely to have advantage in asymmetry of resolve over plausible battlefields in Eastern Europe. 2/
Apr 3 8 tweets 2 min read
Why are we in such a dangerous situation? I laid it out in an interview with @dcexaminer

"But what we do know beyond question is that China is actively and massively preparing its military and its economy for a confrontation with the United States." 1/

washingtonexaminer.com/restoring-amer… "It’s important to stress that I don’t claim to know what China is going to do. And I don’t think anybody does. My best guess is Xi has not made a final decision about whether to use military force in Taiwan...As Adm. Aquilino said, they’re on track to be ready by 2027." 2/
Mar 29 5 tweets 1 min read
“The cross speaks to us of the supreme love of God and invites, today, to renew our faith in the power of that love, and to believe that in every situation of our world God is able to vanquish death, sin and evil, and to give us new, risen life.” 1/ catholicarena.com/latest/goodfri… “In the Son of God’s death on the cross, we find the seed of new hope for life, like the seed which dies within the earth.” 2/
Mar 26 19 tweets 4 min read
Key excerpts from Chapter 2 of The Strategy of Denial: “The Favorable Regional Balance of Power”

“THE WAY FOR THE U.S. to ensure that another state does not establish hegemony over a key region is by maintaining favorable regional balances of power.” 1/

yalebooks.yale.edu/book/978030026… “A group of states leaguing together to prevent another state from achieving such hegemony is an anti-hegemonic coalition. Such a coalition can include states both within and outside a region and may take many forms—formal or informal, open or quiet.” 2/
Mar 22 10 tweets 2 min read
Henry Nau:

“Biden has objectives more ambitious than Obama or Trump. He has pledged to support Ukraine, deter China, and backstop Israel with “whatever it takes,” for “as long as it takes.” But he has been more unfocused than his recent predecessors.” 1/ nationalreview.com/magazine/2024/… “He reacts in the moment, spraying commitments in shotgun fashion wherever a threat emerges. This spontaneity of style and lack of strategic focus are potential pitfalls. He takes on large commitments without mobilizing the means to follow through.” 2/
Mar 21 28 tweets 5 min read
Key excerpts from Chapter 1 of The Strategy of Denial:

"Certain fundamental political goals are very likely to command broad agreement among Americans...Our basic objectives are to provide Americans with physical security, freedom, and prosperity." 1/

yalebooks.yale.edu/book/978030026… “The international arena in which the U.S. pursues these objectives remains anarchic. There is no global sovereign to make and enforce judgments in a dispute. In this context, security, freedom, and prosperity cannot be taken for granted; they are not self-generating.” 2/
Mar 19 17 tweets 3 min read
I often refer to arguments I make in my book, The Strategy of Denial. For those interested, I’m going to do some threads highlighting the key points from it.

I believe the arguments are even more salient now than when the book came out in 2021. 1/

yalebooks.yale.edu/9780300268027/… From the preface:

“Following the collapse of the USSR, the U.S. was so much more powerful than any plausible rival that it could readily best any opponent over any interest for which it might realistically care to contend… That world is gone. The “unipolar moment” is over." 2/
Mar 17 4 tweets 1 min read
Whichever candidate wins will be President in 2027.

No one knows what Beijing will do. But they are - indisputably - seriously preparing for war.

America is at great risk of losing a great power war for the first time, with enormous consequences. 1/

amp.scmp.com/news/china/art… America has never lost a major power war. This would be truly unprecedented. We can’t predict the precise consequences, but we can be confident the reputational and practical consequences for America would be devastating. 2/
Mar 16 5 tweets 1 min read
The cavalier way in which many here discuss the consequences of direct U.S. and Western intervention in Ukraine and of nuclear war with Russia only reinforces to me the need for clearly defined constraints and caution on direct U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine. 1/ When I raised this risk of a slippery slope to direct intervention a few months ago, many dismissed it. Now @EmmanuelMacron, the FM of Finland, and others have elevated this idea. It also appears to be picking up steam on @X. 2/
Mar 15 11 tweets 2 min read
Americans:

Whether you think defending Taiwan makes sense, we *cannot* pursue a hemispheric defense strategy and maintain our way of life.

Why? If China dominates Asia, it will dominate world markets and thus our national life. 1/ Therefore, even if Taiwan falls, we will still need to prevent China from dominating Asia. This will require an anti-hegemonic strategy and thus a forward defense in Asia - but from a much tougher position once Taiwan is lost. I go into why in my book. 2/

yalebooks.yale.edu/book/978030026…
Mar 14 18 tweets 4 min read
China is actively preparing for a major war and we are NOT. That's the simple truth. That has to be the starting point for any serious discussion.

"The Chinese defense industrial base is increasingly on a wartime footing and, in some areas, outpacing the U.S. industry..." 1/ "A significant part of the problem is that the U.S. defense ecosystem remains on a peacetime footing, despite a protracted war in Ukraine, an active war in the Middle East, and growing tensions in the Indo-Pacific in such areas as the Taiwan Strait and Korean Peninsula." 2/
Mar 7 6 tweets 1 min read
"Many Republicans cite America’s bloody and futile history of intervention in countries like Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.

“I feel like there’s a lot of conflicts that we’ve been involved in that don’t have any positive results,” an Iowa R said." 1/

apnews.com/article/israel… “We might have good intentions. We might feel obligated to protect our allies’ interests, but the results speak for themselves.”

Common sense. Elite Rs and the "establishment" aren't going to bludgeon this sentiment away. 2/
Mar 3 6 tweets 2 min read
From the world's leading geoconomics thinker, why it's not "easy" to increase defense spending:

"The broader problem is that we cannot easily...increase our defence budget. For while defence spending has been going down, spending on civilian programmes has been going up." 1/ "The entire Western world has been living in a fool’s paradise, imagining that the post-Cold War era would never end. We have been living in the age of butter not guns, ploughshares not swords." 2/
Feb 26 7 tweets 2 min read
Don't take it from me.

From @SecAFOfficial:

"I bring us to the most pacing challenge that we have ever faced, China, China, China...It’s because, for at least two decades, China has been building a military that has designed purpose built to deter and defeat the United States if we intervene in the Western Pacific." 1/

airandspaceforces.com/watch-read-daf… "Some of you had a chance to hear the classified threat briefing earlier today. I don’t have to explain to you why time is my biggest concern. War is not inevitable, and deterrence, integrated deterrence is working so far." 2/
Feb 26 10 tweets 2 min read
We *cannot* assume we would have sufficiently clear advance warning of a Chinese assault on Taiwan to enable us to get everything as ready as we'd like. We have to prepare to be (effectively) surprised. 1/

newsweek.com/us-admiral-war… "China's military is perilously close to being able to launch a surprise offensive against Taiwan, the commander of the U.S. Pacific fleet has warned." 2/
Feb 19 8 tweets 2 min read
“This year at least 18 states, 62% of European allies, will hit [2%]…Those numbers flatter Europe, however. Its defence spending yields disproportionately little combat power, and its armed forces are less than the sum of their parts.” 1/

economist.com/briefing/2024/… “NATO leaders approved comprehensive defence plans. Alliance officials say those plans would require increasing Europe’s existing (unmet) targets for capability by about a third. That would mean around 50% more defence spending than today, raising the total to 3% of gdp.” 2/
Feb 13 9 tweets 2 min read
🚨

"The Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) is one of the Navy’s premier capabilities and has been a deep strike weapon of choice...While the Navy does have a large existing stockpile of Tomahawks to sustain its land-attack capability, it has recently been firing the missiles faster than it can replace them." 1/

nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-… "Last year’s entire Tomahawk purchase of 55 missiles accounted for 68 percent of the precision munitions fired at the Houthis in one day. This is an unsustainable rate of expenditure. However, this represents adherence to, rather than deviation from, the norm." 2/
Feb 13 17 tweets 3 min read
👇

"It would be more constructive, however, to assess how we ended up where we are now, after two full years of war with so few options to bring the fighting to an end and so little intellectual effort focused on developing realistic options for negotiations." 1/ 🎯

"A healthy democracy ought to be able to develop and debate its national-security options honestly, openly and vigorously. This has not been the case when it comes to Ukraine." 2/