Thread by @Andrewwood17

I read the interim London Fire Brigade report into the fire at New Providence Wharf
It confirms that fire safety involves more then just removing ACM cladding
I summarised the key issues/questions via comments in this PDF but will also list below
cllrandrewwood.com/news/npw-fire-…
1/

This is how the building should work in pic
But either smoke detectors failed or failed to activate (report unclear on this)
So fire doors did not close, the alarm did not sound outside flat (but did inside), corridors/stairwells full of smoke, lifts operated as normal
2/

The Automatic Opening Vent (AOV) systems could have been switched on manually but was only done by LFB 40 minutes after fire started!
Why not activated by the waking watch/Ballymore staff when automatic system failed?
training?
Fire control panel 'difficult to understand' !
2/

"SFSO SIERRA discussed the issues they had observed with regards to the AFD Control Panel and it was agreed that the AFD Control Panel would be seized by under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety)"
2/

2 tall ladders called for
1st call to LFB at 8.54am
Not clear when 1st ladder arrived
We do not think these tall ladders located in Tower Hamlets
But only parts of NPW accessible by a tall ladder (either too tall or no access from road)
Water also sprayed down from 11th floor
3/

So unclear how LFB would have fought a fire higher up the building or where no ladder access at ground floor & where fire spreading on outside
Would there have been more damage?
Government need to get wood balconies removed also (but not a lot of detail in the LFB report)
4/

8 minutes between first report of smoke & first call made to LFB!
8.55am first call to LFB
8.58 more resources sent based on phone calls
8.59 first engine arrives, in 4 minutes!
9.01 more resources ordered incl investigators
Excellent response clearly showing Grenfull lessons
5/

Front doors appear to be 30 minute fire safe but smoke could enter around the edges of the door
Front door of flat on fire left accidentally open which is one reason why fire & smoke in the hallway
6/

Start of fire was inside the fuse board in the kitchen related to the timer for hot water system inside the apartment
Other fuse boards in the building showed similar damage, all original
Was this picked up earlier?
In theory, rental apartments should all now be EICR tested
7/

Useful summary of fire spread
Reminder if you can in a fire: close doors & windows, you need to reduce the flow of oxygen to slow it down
Balcony & front door both left open
Helping fire to spread & providing it with fuel (air)
But none of the systems worked as intended, why?
8/

Last issue but not in the report is that firefighters appeared to struggle with water pressure & finding a hydrant outside, will need to ask LFB if that was an issue and whether material or not
This is just a preliminary report, timetable below
9/

"External ACM cladding on the 8th & 9th floors was also involved, but in this particular case, the cladding did not significantly add to the fire’s development"
But government give impression that ACM cladding is the only fire safety issue in tall buildings
There are others!
10/