Thread by @KesariDhwaj

The Vajra SPH is not even the most interesting part of this video @sparsh_amin

Lot of interesting info coming from articles on NE -
1. UAVs, which were earlier with Artillery as part of SATA (Surveillance & Target Acquisition) battalions, have now been transferred to Army Aviation.
2. UAV pilots from Artillery have also been transferred.
3. Army now has +

+ a Independent Aviation Brigade under 4 Corps.
4. Equipped at present with a mix of UAVs, WSI Dhruv, and Dhruv helicopters.
5. Going by the patch below, it will have Gunship (Apache/LCH), and Light Utility Helicopter as well.
- Patch below courtesy @manishindiatv

6. Another important point is that surveillance function has been centralized (pic: @neeraj_rajput)
7. Which means all assets will be integrated, and feed/intelligence will be shared with stakeholders in real time.
8. IMO, this will further be integrated with Air Defense assets +

+ of IA, and IAF +within the area-of-responsibility.
9. Another important point is co-location, and close coordination between IAF, and the IA.
10. While IA operates the smaller Dhruv helicopters, IAF controls the larger Mi-17, and Chinook helicopters.
11. Army and IAF need to +

+ work closely to ensure movement of troops, and materials by these bigger helicopters to required areas.
11. Another area of collaboration will be employment of IAF held Apache gunships.
12. IA is at present using WSI Dhruv/ Rudra, and will eventually have LCH as well.

Here's a fantastic report by @sneheshphilip on setting-up of aviation brigade, and higher surveillance along the McMahon Line in western Arunachal Pradesh Sector.
theprint.in/defence/armys-…

Another report by @ajaynewsman which gives similar, and some additional details.
tribuneindia.com/news/nation/ar…

Tawang/Dongzhang Stand-Off
- Couple of weeks back Indian Army had surrounded a large Chinese patrol & held them there for some hours.
- @ajaynewsman has a report with details.
- In this thread, I'll pin-point the area with maps and explain the importance
+
tribuneindia.com/news/nation/ke…

- Chinese reports refer to the area as Dongzhang, and the news linked earlier calls is Yangtse.
- Map below shows the general location of the area, and its position with respect to Tawang.
- The area is ~23 km NE from Tawang (as the crow flies).

- IA has two bases here and both are situated in the river valley in the area.
- A road from each base goes up the steep mountain side towards an army base & posts on the adjacent mountain ridge.
- Thang La pass is on the border dividing AP from Tibet

- Unlike our side, where the main bases are along river valleys, the Chinese base is located in a valley on the mountain itself.
- Map-01: Larger IA base towards rear.
- Map-02: Smaller forward base towards border.
Please click on the maps to read the details mentioned on them.

- Map: IA base and posts on the mountain ridge.
- Thang La pass can also be seen on the map
You can make-out the road coming from Indian bases along the river valley. IA has considerable presence on the mountain ridge.

- Map: View of the Chinese base when looking south towards Thang La pass from the Tibet side.
- As can be seen, there is a wide, flat valley on the mountain itself where the Chinese have been able to develop the base.

- Map: Satellite view of the road from the Tibetan side going up the mountain side towards the Chinese base.
- Probable area where the stand-off occurred, and it locations with respect to forward Indian position is also shown.

- What probably happened was that a large Chinese patrol tried to ingress up the Tsa Chu river towards the forward IA post.
- And block/gain access to the road which goes-up from Indian post towards our positions on the mountain ridge, and Thang La pass.
- Chinese refer to area+

+ their side as Dongzhang.
- We blocked the movement of this patrol.
- And not only that, we also seem to have surrounded them in strength, and not allowed them to move forward or backward.
- Hence, the mirchi in the Chinese media.

- So, why is this are important? Look at the map below:
- If either side achieves success in major breakthrough in this area, then it has the potential to unhinge the defenses of either side in the entire sector.
- Tawang on our side, and Cona on Tibetan side could be the +

+ potential gains.
- But such grand success aside, its the Chinese who've a bigger problem.
- Even a minor success here by India could mean that we cut their lateral connectivity.
- And threaten the flank of their defenses across Bum La, or rear areas towards east.

Impact of India-China stand-off on Indian troop levels.
- There is a perception that Ladakh stand-off has stretched Indian Army in terms of deployment.
- In this thread, I'll examine how relevant is this argument.
- And what's the impact of this deployment on the Chinese.
+

- Lets start with North-East.
- From Sikkim to Arunachal Pradesh, Indian Army's Eastern Command has four Corps.
- These are 33 Corps (Sikkim), 4 Corps (Tezpur), 3 Corps ( Dimapur), and 17 Mountain Strike Corps (Panagarh).
- While 17 MSC has 2 x divisions under it, all other +

+ Corps have 3 x divisions each.
- There was a time when 3 Corps has only ONE division.
- But sometime in last decade, IA raised 2 x Mountain Divisions and rationalized the Area of Responsibility (AOR) between 4 Corps, and 3 Corps.
- So, 4 Corps gave 1 x Mountain Divisions to+

+ 3 Corps, and gained a new Mountain Division.
- The other new Mountain Division went to 3 Corps, and both 4 & 3 Corps got 3 x divisions each.
- On top of this, we added a new division under 17 MSC.
- The second division which has been given to 17 MSC already existed.
+

+
- And even without 17 MSC, was dual tasked between eastern and western theaters.
- So, we've in all 3+3+3+2 = 11 Divisions for offense/defense in north-east.
- But what about the Chinese?
- Has anyone questioned/asked what troops do they have?
+

+
- The map below gives the geographical spread of PLA's 13 Group Armies.
- Plus, the assets under Xinjiang Military Region, and Tibet Military Region.
- To elaborate, the main fighting force of the Western Theater Command reside OUTSIDE of the Tibetan plateau.
- Troops +

+ under TMR include:
- 1 x Mountain Bde
- 1 x Light Combined Arms Bde
- 1 x Medium Combined Arms Bde
- 1 each of Aviation Bde, Artillery Bde, and a SOF bde.
- If a shooting match happens, PLA will have to get both 76 and 77 Group Armies to Tibet.
+

+
- Between these two Group Armies, they have 12 x Combined Arms Bdes, their main fighting components.
- Arty, Aviation and AD Bdes are in addition to them.
- Compared to this, 11 x Indian Divisions will have a minimum of 33 brigades between them!
- And here's one more +

+ point: Indian Army is kitted to fight in the mountains from ground-up.
- While the Chinese Group Armies are basically mechanized formations. How will they fare in the mountainous terrain along the McMahon Line?
- Yes, the Chinese can create hyper-local superiority in +

+ using better geography on their side, but then, two can play this game.
- To go the whole hog against India, China will have to induct more Group Armies against India from other theaters.
- And this applies equally to Ladakh theater as well.
[To be continued]

Map below gives a view towards east of Tawang. India-China border primarily runs along the continuous snow-capped peaks that you see on the map. Now, ask yourself this - where is the terrain to deploy the fantastic, mechanized Combined Arms Brigades of the PLA?

- Typical Chinese propaganda.
- 1st, video shows PHL-03, and not PHL-16.
- 2nd, firing a 370mm rocket to 350km range? Sure!
- What the Chinese do have are two types of ballistic missiles which can be fired from PHL-16 platform.
- Details in next tweet.
+

+
- King Dragon 300: 610mm, ~300km range.
- Fire Dragon 480 (bigger missile): 750mm, 480kg warhead, CEP 30 meters, ~300km range.
- So, its a good, modular system but it will not exactly rain guided rockets on India to 300+ km.

This🧵analysis evaluates some assertions make by @VishnuNDTV regarding dual-use villages constructed by the Chinese close to LAC.
- We start with village constructed on Indian claimed territory in the Upper Subansiri region.
- What is the ground situation in this area?
+

+
(1) Ground situation is as per the given map.
(2) Migyitun/Tsari is in Tibet while Longju is on our side of McMahon Line (ML).
(3) ML most probably runs approximately midway between Longju to south, and Migyitun to north (yellow flag)
(4) Longju was last under Indian +

+ control in 1959.
(5) On 25th August 1959, 200 PLA troops attacked a forward picket of 12 men, killing one soldier and capturing others.
(6) On 26th August 1959, they attacked and captured Longju.
(7) So, area south of Indian claim line/McMahon Line has been under the Chinese +

+ control since 1959.
(8) Now, lets come to PLA Border Post-1.
(9) Satellite images are available from 2010 and show that this post was operational before December 2010. Click on the image for details.
(10) So, the Chinese have been here for last 11 years minimum.
+

(11) And the Chinese village which @VishnuNDTV has highlighted came BEHIND a Chinese post (which has existed for 11 years that we know of) over last couple of years.
- But this does not end here.
+

+
(12) Chinese created a forward post ahead of their PLA Border Post-1 (marked as Chinese Border Post-2).
(13) Going by historic satellite imagery available, this forward post has also existed AT LEAST since 2013 (images in next tweet)
+

+
(14) Satellite images showing presence of Chinese border outpost-2 since 2013 at least.
(15) So, what are Indian options here?
(16) Unless your recipe is that we go all guns blazing, take out the PLA posts, and retake Indian territory till Longju, only option is diplomatic +

+ and raising ruckus over these developments.
(17) And contrary to what people will have you believe, these villages do not in any way cement the Chinese claims to the area.
(18) The salami slicing term that many are fond to use has actually happened in Eastern Ladakh.
+

(19) Here, the Chinese used to send Tibetan nomads and herders into Indian claimed area (but not physically held by any party), then send foot patrols behind them, gradually compact the earth, and one fine day black-top the road.
(20) This is what has happened in the +

+ Demchok area.
(21) And something similar happened in Depsang Plains. Here, there were no herders but Chinese foot patrols, then trails, then compacted road, and finally, black-topped road. All on the Indian side of LAC.
(22) To claim that Chinese villages on area which they+

+ have controlled since 1959 alters status quo, is similar to say that any development by Pakistan in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan alter their status quo. And the Pakistanis have done much more than simply build villages!

Clarification:
- The PLA Border Post-1 has been there since at least 2000.
- And not 2010 as I've mentioned.
- Pardon the error.
- So, the Chinese have been here for past 21 years AT LEAST.

- Funny thing is, those who oppose/question any military action against Pakistan, are the same set of people who want India to go to war with China.
- And there's a reason for it.
- They question the former because they know it gets votes for Modi.
- In case of China +

+ they want to create these sensational news items because this allows them to portray that Modi government is weak against China.
- And they hope that it cuts votes way from the government.

This is scare mongering w/o looking at underlying geography. The Chinese have strong presence to east of Kailash Range in Spanggur Tso area. We simply surprised them with our move. Next tweet has a map which puts Kailash Range & area where bridge is being constructed in context +

+ The bridge area is across two ridgelines to north of Spanggur Tso. PLA has strong presence in the blue highlighted area including armor + IFVs as they would like to break out from the Spanggur Gap and overwhelm Chushul, and cut-off Indian troops from behind in Demchok funnel.
+

I was actually expecting some hot takes like this one. And made a video explaining the location where the bridge is being made, and the impact of the same on the Chinese and the Indian side. Do have a look:

BTW, in case you want to understand why Spanggur Tso sector, and Spanggur Gap are very important for the Chinese, and why India taking the Kailash Range spooked them, here's a video explaining strategic significance of Chushul Sector.

- The article written today by Praveen Swami @ThePrintIndia has a map which shows alignment of LAC as per the Indian and Chinese claims.
- I think there's a fundamental problem with the map. See below area marked in red circle by me.
- As per the map, the outer line represents+

+ the Chinese claim line in this area, and the inner line represents the Indian claim line.
- Which is absurd because as per the map, there is an area between the two lines which neither India claims, nor the Chinese!
- Whole LAC drama is about overlapping claims.
- This would +

+ be the first instance where both the parties don't claim a piece of land!
- This should not be the case because, as per Praveen Swami's map, Indians voluntarily want the LAC to run in a fashion where the Indian Army is disadvantaged big time.
- Let me show how +

+ Check the map below.
- The Chinese claim line runs along the ridgeline of a side valley which goes from PP16 towards PP15.
- This is expected because as Chinese you would want to control the heights and dominate the route from PP16 to PP15.
- This way you can interfere with +

+ any movement along this road.
- You can also make out the location of upper reaches of Galwan Valley on the map.
- And as PS says, Chinese are worried about Indians interfering in their position here from PP15.
- Which makes it all the imp that they control the heights
+

+ But why would India want the LAC to run along the valley from PP16 to PP15?
- Why would we want to shoot ourselves in the foot and cede space to the Chinese?
- I would want LAC to be as far to east from this valley as possible.
- At the least, I will be OK if it runs along the+

+ ridgeline because then even we can put troops on the ridgeline to dominate the other side.
- Because what is not shown on this map is a Chinese road that runs 5-6km on other side of this ridgeline.
- As per PS's map, why will I want to give land between valley floor to +

+ ridgeline to the Chinese?
- And for God's sake, what's Ching Chao river (yellow rectangle)?
- I know the underlying map has been copied from Mapcarta but it carries no such name/feature.
- If you're copying something, at least use some common sense.
+

+ BTW, this is not the only place where this anomaly occurs.
- It occurs again in the area opposite Hot Springs marked on the map. This is the area where Chang Chenmo river enters our side of LAC.
- Here again, there's a piece of land which neither India, nor China claims! 🤪
+

+
- I've some questions with respect to some other aspects of the map and LAC alignment but that's for some other day.

[Continued from above]
- Another major issue with the map in the story by Praveen Swami is around the Chinese claims in PP17A area (red circle on the map).
- His assertion is that Indian claim line is ahead of the Chinese claim line, and that Indians went till PP17A from PP17.
+

+
- That by agreeing to not patrol till PP17A, India has de-facto agreed to the Chinese claim line.
- First, as a mango-man, I've no way of knowing where PP17A actually lies.
- 2nd, Chinese claim line shown on this map is exactly same as the red-line you'll see on Google Earth.
+

+ 3rd, and the most important point, the NEW Chinese claim in this area is NOT what Praveen Swami has shown here. Or, what you'll see on Google Earth.
- Chinese claim here is much deeper. And serious.
- On actual Google Earth map, this is what the map in the story looks like.

+
- The map below is from the Chinese official online map portal.
- Look at the area circled in red.
- On Google Earth, the Chinese claim line here goes straight.
- But on this map, the claim line takes a big U-shaped dip, and is actually very close to PP17.
+

- In this map, I've marked approximate location of PP17A and PP17 as per Praveen Swami's map.
- The Chinese claim here is not only about PP17A.
- They're claiming area right up to PP17, which is the confluence of Kugrang River with Changlung River.
- Check map in the next tweet
+

+
- The red color U-shaped line shows approximate extension, and enhanced Chinese claim line.
- And as Google Earth shows, Chinese intrusion was not till the claim line shown on Google Earth, but further south, ~2km from PP17 (confluence of Changlung and Kugrang River).
+

+
- This map shows the area in detail.
- So, the Chinese intrusion was beyond the earlier claim line.
- News about disengagement suggests the Chinese have gone back behind the claim line as per Google Earth.
- And that they've definitely gone back from their intrusion area.
+

+
- Now comes the point about PP17A.
- My conjecture, I repeat conjecture, is that PP17A is ahead of the point till where Indian vehicles went but short of the claim line as per Google Earth (red border).
- In this case, disengagement would mean Indians not patrolling from PP17 +

+ to PP17A, and the Chinese not patrolling from their post (which has existed from at least 2010), till the red-line shown on GE.
- However, even if PS is correct, it means that the Chinese are behind all their claim lines (extended-yellow, and Google Earth-red)
+

+
- Which begs a question - what exactly did the Chinese achieve for all of their drama?
- Imagine if India had done this against China, or even Pakistan, and then gone back, the very same people who're saying that China came on top, would've said that India gained nothing +

+ because it was 'forced' to go back and create buffer zones.
- And that India achieved nothing!